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Abstract 
 
This thesis in concerned with the understanding of success and failure of innovation in 
resource processing, a sector that is central to the Australian economy. Decline in ore grade, 
complexity of available ore resources, increases in labour and capital cost, and increased 
market demand have driven innovation and larger resource processing projects. The 
outcomes from innovation investment have been disappointing, and not well understood. 
Innovation in Australian resource processing plants has now focused on incremental 
innovation and improvements in supply chain efficiency. This thesis aims to understand why 
so many large resource processing projects fail, and what factors have been critical in other 
projects that succeed. It proposes a new model for innovation investment, based on public 
domain data and an outsider view. 
 
Five criteria are used in this thesis to classify success and failure of large resource processing 
projects; that (1) the project and firm made a profit, in failure the project made a loss, (2) the 
production in the first 36 months of operation is 90% or more of nameplate capacity, while a 
failure is less than 70%, (3) return on investment is below 105 months, failure above 105 
months, average for successful projects is found to be 53 months,. (4) failure sees project and 
or firm fail, with the plant selling for less than 20% of cost, success sees the project continue 
to produce at close to capacity, and if sold was value at close to investment, and (5) the 
successful process is reproduced; in the case of failure it is not.  
 
The thesis examines a sample of 67 resource processing projects in Australia initially valued 
at over $100 million each, over an 18 year interval between 1993 and 2010. The projects 
totalled $45.3 billion in value with 73% of classified as successful, while 15 projects failed. 
Four hypotheses are proposed and tested, each respectively relating to one of the following 
four factors; (1) Firm competence, (2) new process innovation, (3) government involvement 
in value adding, and (4) information asymmetry and strategic misrepresentation.  
 
The first hypothesis states that project success was associated with firm competence. Most 
projects are classified as successful, and competent firms are found to be closely correlated 
with success. However, some otherwise successful firms had anomalous failures. Firms with 
low competence failed at large projects. Competent enough firms can fail where they lack the 
specific competence or motivation for a new process project.  
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The second hypothesis states that new process innovation is associated with project failure.  
Eleven of twelve projects based on new process innovation failed. In these cases radical 
process innovation is associated with large scale up that led to expensive failure. This is 
found to result in damage to future investor and corporate interests in such projects. No new 
process plants were built after 2005.  
 
The third hypothesis states that successful government involvement in value adding processes 
is related to process maturity. It is found that government involvement is positive in projects 
with mature transformation processes like bauxite-to-alumina and alumina-to-aluminium 
resulting in successful projects over a long time period. However, the same involvement in 
new processing projects is found to be disastrous over a short time interval. Therefore, 
government involvement in value adding is found to be associated with failure, except with 
mature technologies, such as alumina and aluminium refineries.  
 
The fourth hypothesis states that information asymmetry leading to strategic 
misrepresentation was associated with project failure. Information asymmetry leading to 
strategic misrepresentation explains the anomalous situation of otherwise competent firms 
failing at innovative projects. Information asymmetry could lead to benign or toxic outcomes 
depending how it is used. Strategic misrepresentation is found to be a significant factor in a 
number of high cost failures, which also encompassed government involvement, value adding 
and new processes. 
 
A rigorous data collection methodology is conducted in this thesis and data is collected for 
each of the 67 projects based on availability in the public domain. Data is collected from 
annual reports, local and foreign government statistical data, trade publications, newspaper 
reports, institute meetings and publications, as well as through personal site visits. 
 
Reference class forecasting is used to identify and group similar projects into the different 
classes of new process innovation (12 cases), gases transformed (8 cases), alumina and 
aluminium (11 cases), mineral sands (8 cases), noble metals (23 cases), and base metals 
projects (5 cases). An extensive set of distributional data for all projects is collected and used 
to identify causal (input) factors that correlate with success and failure, through financial 
calculations and cost and build performance measures.  
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Case studies are used to draw out fine details, explanations and understandings. Risk as 
predicted by indicators is found to be strongly correlated with project failure. For instance, a 
new team in Case 7, with little firm competence attempting a radical new process at large 
scale, failed severely. This case is an example of one carrying high risk as indicated by lack 
of competence, high level of Government involvement and investment as well as by multiple 
examples of strategic misrepresentation. While all other projects completed and produced 
some product; this particular failed case exhausted its capital and was only 5% complete. The 
process was never duplicated. In another (Case 8) it is learnt that investment of over a billion 
dollars and decades of incremental research and development resulted in a plant that was 
deeply uneconomic and capable of only 12% of nameplate capacity. The unusual factor was 
that it was built by an otherwise exceptionally successful firm. The successful innovation 
project (Case 40) was scaled up in stages, and was so successful it has been duplicated in 
nineteen other plants around the world. This success was also had the lowest cost at only 
$110 million, where many innovation failures typically cost over a billion dollars. Projects 7 
and 8 were the two projects in the study to have direct government funding, with $400 
million and $155 million respectively, and strategic misrepresentation was a feature of both. 
Project 40 benefited from Government indifference, and minimal involvement, and showed 
little asymmetric information and no strategic misrepresentation.  
 
Operational investment models based on existing academic and government theory are 
proposed and tested.  These are the firm competence model, based on the work of Prahalad 
and Hamel, the new process innovation model and the government involvement in value 
adding model based on published white papers and regulations, and asymmetric information 
model based on the work of Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz, and work on strategic 
misrepresentation based on the work of Jones and Euske. Each has five measures with a 
success to failure axis.      
 
An examination of developments after 2010, up to 2014 showed that investment in refining 
of resources had declined, and that production or ore concentrate was the preferred model, 
with minimum risk. 
 
Recently the model of four decades of successful government involvement in alumina and 
aluminium refineries has faltered with commodity price changes, and plants have closed.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context of research 
Australian wealth and prosperity is built on productive exploitation of our resources. 
Innovation in elaborately separating and transforming mineral and energy resources, the 
nation’s largest chemical engineering endeavour, is not well understood. Innovation has 
changed, and is presently changing our main source of foreign income and investments. 
Innovation involves risks and failure, some predictable and avoidable, as well as profit and 
success. 
 
My central question is “Why did innovation fail so often, and how could it succeed?” 
 
To answer this and other related questions, an un-biased understanding based on a large data 
sample was considered and modelled over years. In this time evolution of projects in this 
field could be observed.  The methods, models, and observations may be more widely 
applicable outside resource processing plants. 
 
1.2 Rise and fall of innovation 
 
Between January 1993 and December 2010, 67 resource processing plants valued at more 
than $100 million each were built in Australia.1 $45.34 billion was invested, and 73% gave a 
commercial return. The failure of eleven of the twelve most innovative projects, wiping out 
$11.4 billion, transformed the investment outlook and challenged many widely held beliefs. 
 
This research seeks to understand why so many innovative plants failed2, and how others 
succeeded3.  All these plants were subjected to extensive technical, financial, and managerial 
assessment and review by present methods4; yet 27% of this investment gave negative 
outcomes.5  Businesses responded to expensive failure with avoidance, and profitable success 
with replication.6  
 
The present methods of project evaluation are private, proprietary7 and use data that is not 
publicly available, at the time of the project or later. These expert insider views of “how it 
should work” produced unacceptable results in too many cases.  This normative model is 
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used to estimates of the cost of defence equipment, public infrastructure, and rail transport. In 
these areas cost overruns, delivery delay and performance benefit shortfall are usually 
significant. The insider evaluation methods and outcomes are closed, and unavailable for 
public or academic review. Criticism or disclosure from within is not career enhancing.  
 
The alternate view of that research is an outsider view of “what does it actually do?” over a 
longitudinal case study of all major projects in a reference group over 18 years, with 3 years 
more to observe outcomes. This descriptive model uses only public domain data available to 
the curious and persistent. It is an academic model in that it is open for all to see, use, criticise 
and enhance. The difference in viewpoint between the two views is essentially the “Is-ought 
problem” proposed by Hume in 1739.8  
 
The failed projects included all but one innovative processing plant. These new process plants 
were built to elaborately transform increasingly low grade and or complex ores; and add 
value to abundant but otherwise intractable resources.  The problem is described in the 
colourful quote:  “About the bravest thing anyone can do in Australia is to erect a green-
fields mineral processing plant. They cost zillions of dollars; they take years to build; they 
blow up; the state-of-the-art process that was perfected in the laboratory mysteriously won’t 
work in the field; and the plants never, ever run right the first time you press the button.” 9 
 
The willingness to innovate in process plant peaked in the 1995-2005 period, and as the 
above quote became commonly accepted wisdom, investment for innovative process plant 
stopped. 
 
Cutler10 states “We have known for several generations that innovation pre-eminently 
determines our prosperity.”  Yet only one innovative technology mega project and a number 
of smaller niche and incremental innovations were successfully implemented in this time.11 
The failure of almost 99% of investment in innovative new process plants changed how the 
investment and innovation cultures interact. 
 
1.3 Decline in grade  
 
Metals have been extracted in Australia for more than 170 years. The easily recovered, rich 
ores were long ago worked out. There is a general trend of declining ore grade show in detail 
 17
by Dr Gavin Mudd of Monash University, Mineral Policy Institute. 12 Gold grades have 
declined from greater than 50 g per tonne (or 50 ppm) of visible gold nuggets in the 1851 
Gold rush , to present recovery of less than 1 part per million from huge volumes of hard 
rock, using complex mechanical and chemical process. 
 
The decline in grade and the decline in ores that are easy to process mean that more energy 
and investment must be applied to extract smaller quantities of metal from larger volumes of 
increasingly difficult rock. To give a specific and recent example from the Cadia operations 
near Orange N.S.W. 13 the grade in the earlier accessed (2005) Ridgeway resource, at 1.75 g/t 
of Gold and 0.61% Copper was twice as rich as the later (2010) Cadia East resource with 
0.81 g/t of Gold and 0.3% of Copper. 
 
 
1.4 Links between grade, demand and innovation 
 
Decline in grade has progressed at different rates for different resources: 
 
Iron ore, coal, or natural gas have suffered little if any decline in grade over time, and 
increased demand has seen prices and profits increase. The leading Australian iron ore 
deposits, mostly in the Pilbara, require minimal beneficiation to meet export quality. The 
major coal basins of NSW and QLD are rich and located near railways linked to export ports. 
Coal extraction is not difficult; and requires only moderate beneficiation to reduce the ash 
content. These two minimally transformed resources represent more than half of Australia’s 
mineral and energy exports at $96 billion in 2013.14 This is up from $72 billion in 2009-2010. 
They are not considered in the case studies in this research as the processing is minimal, 
transforms the commodity only slightly, and adds limited value. They are however an 
element in the understanding as they represent the fastest growing share of the market, have 
yielded exception profit in the last decade, and are alternate options for investment, compared 
to mineral processing, with demonstrably low risk. 
 
Natural gas requires compression, cooling and liquefaction to - 162° to be exported. The 
process of refining natural gas and concentrating it more than 600 times is relatively new, less 
than 50 years and complex engineering activity carried out at large scale. Thus it is included 
in this study.  
 18
 
Gold, copper, nickel, and cobalt suffered significant decline in grade in the 1993-2006 period. 
Silver, lead and zinc had relatively good grades but from more difficult to process ores.  
Commodity price increases (average 3.9 x over 18 years) as shown in Table 1, and strong 
demand encouraged investment. The increased value of the metal, with both declining grades 
and more intractable ores drove a trend to new processing innovations and mega projects. 
The project innovation was to enable extraction of metal from resources that were difficult to 
process with existing technology. Mega projects, designed to process huge volumes of low 
grade and difficult ores were the response.  
 
Table 1 Commodity price increase and changes over 18 years of study (ABARE) 
 
Decline in grade has been managed historically by technological innovation; which led to 
increased productivity, increased output, and often a decline in metal price, which most 
disadvantaged the operators who did not have the new process. Four new processes are 
described to illustrate how new technology enabled the processing of lower grades or 
complex and difficult ores. 
 
The 1887 MacArthur Forrest Process for gold extraction by dilute cyanide solution enabled 
the economical extraction of gold from ores where it is in low grades and or small particles. 
Till then gold extraction sought visible gold, nuggets that could be picked by hand or 
separated by gravity. Most gold extracted today is in low parts per million, and in pockets 
measured in microns. This new process quickly adopted increased gold production 
significantly and transformed the industry.  
Commodity Dollar Jan 1993 Dec 2010 Increase In study Grade	change Extraction
Alumina Aust $252.84 $315.65  1.25 Yes little similar
Gold U.S. $329.01 $1,393.51  4.24 Yes much	lower complex	ores
Iron ore Aust $29.12 $119.56  4.11 No little simple
Met Coal Aust $68.53 $186.22  2.72 No little simple
Oil U.S. $16.17 $87.56  5.41 No little deeper	water
LNG Commercial Confidential ~ 8-10 Yes little deeper	water
Copper U.S. $2,262.62 $9,147.26  4.04 Yes much	lower difficult
Lead U.S. $437.66 $2,412.93  5.51 Yes moderate complex	ores
Zinc U.S. $1,061.40 $2,280.93  2.15 Yes moderate complex	ores
Silver U.S. $368.43 $2,934.90  7.97 Yes moderate complex	ores
Nickel U.S. $5,932.80 $23,454.29  3.95 Yes much	lower complex	ores
Zircon Aust $195.22 $1,123.37  5.75 Yes lower harder
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The development and improvement flotation technologies have evolved over many years. In 
1897 the brothers Frank and Stanley Elmore15purchased the Glasdir Copper mine in North 
Wales, and installed an early type of flotation processing plant. In Australia C.V. Potter in 
1901 and G.D. Delprat in 1902 independently invented new processes where naturally 
occurring chemicals such as fatty acids and oils were used as flotation reagents in a large 
quantity to increase the hydrophobicity of the valuable minerals. However their process was 
not successful in scale up implementation at the Broken Hill mines.16 In 1906 Belgium-born 
chemist, Auguste De Bavay patented his 'skin' or 'film' flotation process and opened what was 
to become the first successful plant at Broken Hill. In 1909, De Bavay started the public 
company, Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's Ltd), and enlarged the plant at Broken Hill to use 
the flotation process on the materials from the tailings dumps. This was very profitable, as the 
ore was already extracted and available at low price. 
 
Progressive incremental advances in flotation have been applied to a wide variety of 
materials to be separated. The flotation process is essential for separation of small portions of 
valuable materials from gangue in a low grade ore. The interesting detail is that vigorous 
commercial competition between small firms enabled this new and vital technology to rapidly 
evolve and be widely implemented in a decade.  
 
Two radical innovations transformed mineral processing and enabled the production of 
cheap, strong and lightweight aluminium, and its precursor alumina.  
 
The Bayer process for alumina production from bauxite was invented in 1887 by Karl Bayer, 
an Austrian working in St Petersburg. He sought to develop a method to produce alumina; to 
be used as a fixing agent in the dyeing of cotton. In 1888, Bayer patented his four-stage 
Bayer process of extracting alumina from bauxite ore, which is much the same as used today. 
 
The alumina process supplied the feedstock for the Hall-Heroult process; invented 
independently in France and America in 1886. Both inventors were 23 years old, both worked 
on their own inspiration on modest family funds, in makeshift laboratories. The developed a 
complex process that with a few improvements is in use today. Together these two radical 
innovations, from three amateur industrial scientists transformed the world. They saw the 
price of Aluminium metal declined by 80% as a result, yet that led to mass utilisation and 
profit. 
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By comparison with modern process research, the researchers had tiny budgets, primitive 
facilities, and worked incredibly fast, with very limited support. Their processes; as described 
in patents, worked first time, scaled up progressively, and over the next 124 years have 
evolved by incremental improvements. 
 
Decline in grade, and or increased complexity in available ores; at a time of increased 
demand, encouraged a wave of process innovation for processing more difficult resources. 
These innovative process plants were built, with one exception, in a decade between 1995 
and 2005. They were built in remote locations, at large scale, with blown out investments. 
They all failed and destroyed their investor’s capital and confidence.  
 
The viability of innovative processing plant and future investment are dramatically affected 
by how well the plant performed. When reaching design performance is long delayed, 
expensive in extra costs, and never achieved, future investment is at risk. Investors burned by 
innovation failure avoid repeating their pain. 
 
 
1.5 Three Gaps in knowledge 
 
Three pertinent gaps in knowledge are identified: 
 
There are no “outsider view” studies of factors that influence success and failure of large 
resource processing projects.  
 
There is an opportunity to evolve new theory in firm competence, innovation success models, 
interactions of government in value adding processes and strategic misrepresentation in mega 
projects.  
 
There is a need to build a wide and deep database in a project class on which to base methods 
and theory. The database should have enough examples to be statistically robust, and over a 
time frame long enough to see trends. 
1.6  Four Research Hypotheses 
 
Four hypotheses are proposed and investigated in this thesis: 
 21
 
That at project success was associated with firm competence. The hypothesis is in the 
positive as most projects succeeded, and the majority of firms were variably competent 
enough. Firms with low competence failed at large projects. Competent enough firms can fail 
occasionally for other reasons.  
 
That new process innovation was associated with project failure. The hypothesis is in the 
negative as most projects, eleven of twelve, failed. In these cases radical process innovation 
was associated with large scale up. That led to expensive failure; which has damaged investor 
and corporate interest in such projects in the future. 
 
That successful government involvement in value adding processes was related to process 
maturity.  The hypothesis is in the positive as government involvement in mature 
transformation processes like bauxite to alumina and alumina to aluminium have been 
successful over a long time period, whereas the same involvement in new process projects 
was disastrous over a short time interval. 
 
That information asymmetry leading to strategic misrepresentation was associated with 
project failure.   The hypothesis is in the negative as information asymmetry leading to 
strategic misrepresentation was the explanation for the anomalous situation of otherwise 
competent firms failing at innovative projects. 
 
1.7 Three Research objectives 
 
Three thesis objectives are: 
 
To understand why some (~ 27%) projects failed, and other (~73%) succeeded. The 
understanding is expressed by simple models that should be explanatory and predictive. 
 
To examine each of four hypotheses; that seek to explain why failure was so frequent and to 
indicate how success might be better managed. 
 
To answer “Why did innovation in resource processing plant fail so often, and how can they 
succeed?” 
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 1.8 Research viewpoint 
 
The research viewpoint is important, and will be expanded on in the literature search, and the 
methodology.  Project evaluation, and outcome forecasting has traditionally been an insider 
expert working with confidential data. The failure of 15 projects lost ~ $12.5 billion dollars. 
All had “bankable feasibility” studies using existing (insider) methods. The majority of this 
loss was to outsider shareholders and taxpayers.  
 
An insider is an actor within the system, where approving a project has a financial reward. An 
outsider is an observer, where approval or disapproval of a project is of no consequence. 
 
The insider has access to much more data, the outsider has access only to some data, and 
much of it only well after the event.  However as the outside data is often “what actually 
happened”, it may, in a model be more useful. 
 
1.9 Research methods   
 
The research methodology is based on building an extensive database and examining it for 
patterns. The data is examined in three layers, all drawing on existing academic research and 
theory. 
 
The first is data shown in a positional layout with multiple parameters as in reference class 
forecasting.  The selection criteria for the relevant reference class depends what type of 
outcome one seeking to predict or explain, from the outcomes of the prior projects. The 
distribution shows the extremes, the median, and clusters. The probability distribution may be 
ranked by a number of criteria. This is covered in detail in the literature search chapter, and in 
practical utilization in the methodology chapter. In brief it asserts that human judgement on 
future outcomes is often biased and there is insufficient regard to distributional data of past 
similar projects.  
 
The second layer is improper linear modelling; which is also covered in detail on pages 43-
44. It also seeks to avoid bias in human cognition by utilisation of simple and uncorrected 
rating of selected parameters. This modelling is the basis of the parameters used in positional 
 ranking
 
The thir
exampl
 
1.10 Th
 
This the
 
Chapter
the idea
 
Chapter
governm
misinfo
 
Chapter
perform
 
Chapter
innovat
 
Chapter
and Info
 
Chapter
 
, and in the
d layer is s
e for better 
esis struct
sis is struct
 2 reviews
s, models a
 3 examine
ent involv
rmation.  
 4 explain
ance measu
 5 explor
ion. 
 6 explores
rmation as
 7 reviews 
 predictive 
elected cas
understand
ure 
ured as fol
 the literatu
nd methods
s and expl
ement in v
s the meth
res used in
es the firs
 the secon
ymmetry le
the finding
and explana
e studies th
ing.  
lows: 
re which is
 in this the
ains the mo
alue addin
odology u
 the models
t two hyp
d two hypo
ading to str
s of Chapte
 
tory hypot
at compare
 the body 
sis. 
dels for fi
g and info
sed is this 
 and distrib
otheses of
theses of G
ategic misr
rs 5 and 6 a
heses. 
 and contr
of knowled
rm compete
rmation as
thesis. It 
utional dis
 Firm Co
overnment
epresentati
nd suggests
ast the extre
ge used as 
nce, new p
ymmetry l
covers indi
plays. 
mpetence 
 involveme
on. 
 further res
mes and a
the founda
rocess inn
eading to s
cating fact
and New 
nt in value
earch. 
23
 median 
tions of 
ovation, 
trategic 
ors and 
Process 
 adding 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“If I ha
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ve seen further it is only by standi
 
ng on the s
Liter
houlders of
C
ature
 giants” - Is
hapte
 rev
aac Newto
24
r 2 
iew 
n 
 25
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter first reviews existing literature and practice in resource project evaluation, 
which has an insider viewpoint. It then reviews the fundamental differences between 
descriptive and normative viewpoints, or the outsider and insider views. An examination of 
the development of simpler economic models to visualise large data sets over time is 
followed by economic theories dealing with decision under uncertainty. The back ground of 
literature for the four hypotheses is then covered, looking at Core competence, new process 
innovation, government involvement in value adding and strategic misrepresentation. 
 
2.1 Resource project evaluation - the insider view 
 
Project evaluation can be viewed from either an “insider” or “outsider” view, these might 
equally be as normative (or what ought to be) and descriptive (what is).  
 
Resource project evaluation has historically been an “insider” study, with a small number of 
experts.  Ed Merrow, the founder and CEO of Independent Project Analysis, Inc. (IPA17), 
was one of the earliest and most persistent researchers. His work in the field began at RAND 
in 1978 and has evolved into a firm that specialises in advice on Megaproject activity across 
the oil, minerals, and chemical industries in all parts of the world. 
 
US oil production began falling in 196918, and with the 1973 Yom Kippur War the price of 
oil rose sharply19. This lead to the building of a range of innovative processes plants for 
extracting oil from shale and tar sands. These new technology plants absorbed public research 
dollars but made little contribution to oil supply. The U.S. Department of Energy wanted to 
know why, and engaged RAND Corporation to investigate the problem. 20  
 
In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s innovative projects with great potential to add value to 
Australian resources under-performed and failed, in much the same way.   Edward W. 
Merrow21 and co-workers started production of a series of papers22 between 1978 and 1989. 
These are shown in Table 2 Merrow and co-workers laid the foundations for later studies of 
innovative project failure. This work was looking at the projects built in urgent response to 
the First Oil Crisis of 1973-4. These projects, shown in Table 3, consumed invested funds and 
made almost no short term contribution to oil sufficiency. 
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Merrow observes a rule of alternate fuel commercialisation23. It applies equally to new 
process development and is adopted in this study. “Successful commercialisation of a 
technology ultimately depends upon only one factor: profitability. No matter how actively the 
government promotes a technologies introduction, commercialisation will not occur if 
industry cannot obtain positive return on its investment comparable to what other investment 
opportunities offer.”   The plants had been un-commercial primarily due to significant cost 
increases and poor technical performance.” Merrow is stating the obvious, but an obvious 
that is sometimes overlooked. All private investment in resource processing attracted 
investment based on making a profit.  There is a development of research by RAND shown in 
Table 2, which is the seed for the “insider” project evaluation now conducted by IPA. It is a 
good model for “outsiders” to understand and to copy key features. Profit is a parameter of 
every model in this thesis. 
 
Table 2 RAND Papers on pioneer plant problems 
 
 
In his second paper24 Merrow notes the disconnection between initial cost estimate, and the 
cost growth till some projects were cancelled incomplete. The interesting anomaly is 
Syncrude Canada Ltd who has modified and expanded the plant near Fort McMurray in the 
Athabasca Tar Sands, and today produces 13% of Canada’s oil requirements.25  
 
Table 3 shows all pioneer plants suffered cost growth. One located in Canada went on to 
succeed, and be duplicated. Canada is today the largest supplier of oil to the United States, 
delivering around a million barrels a day by pipeline from Tar sands.  The objective of the 
program, oil supply to USA from new resources and processes in the long term succeeded. 
Year Title
1978 Constraints on the commercialization of oil shale
1979 A review of cost estimation in new technologies
1981 Understanding Cost Growth and Performance Shortfalls in Pioneer Process Plants
1983 Cost growth in new process facilities
1983 Pioneer plants study users’ manual
1984 Linking R&D to problems experienced in solids processing
1986 A quantitative Assessment of R&D Requirements for Solids Processing Technology
1987 An application of the pioneer plants study methodology to first of a kind MHD central station
1988 Trends in attrition of high quality military recruits
1988 Understanding the outcome of megaprojects
1989 An analysis of cost improvement in chemical process technologies
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Table 3 RAND studies showing cost growth in pioneer plants 
 
 
Merrow comments: “little systematic analytical work has been published on the question of 
cost estimation error for public works and large private sector construction projects.”  This 
is very much the situation for many types of projects in Australia today.  He continues “Such 
private venture data and analysis that does exist, to our knowledge, have not been published 
and remain proprietary”. 
 
The idea that the assembly of such confidential data for systematic analysis would yield 
knowledge and understanding is core concept, which is much later developed by Merrow into 
a business. To my knowledge there are no academic or public domain models, and it is the 
aim of this thesis to create one. 
 
The 1981 paper “Understanding Cost Growth and Performance Shortfalls in Pioneer Process 
Plants” is the cited inspiration for most studies that followed. 
 
Firstly Merrow identifies the linkage between innovation and failure.  
“By hypothesising (and later demonstrating) that unproven technology is related to cost 
growth and performance problems, we are not suggesting that innovation is “bad”. Although 
the estimates for an innovative process plant may grow far more than those for a 
conventional counterpart, the innovative plants may still cost considerably less than the 
technology it replaces. Even if that innovative plant performs poorly, it may ultimately pay a 
handsome profit to the innovating company if the subsequent units (employing what has then 
become demonstrated technology) perform well.”  (p13) 
Project Title Cost Growth Cancellation Stage Comments
Shell Tar Sands 350% Preliminary Two estimates
El Paso SNG 300% Preliminary Three estimates
Occidental shale oil 330% Definitive Three estimates
Wesco SNG 240% Budget Two estimates
Syncrude Tar Sands 300% Completed Plant started September 1978
Great Plains SNG 180% Definitive Two estimates
Colony Oil Shale 230% Definitive four estimates
Baltimore Solid Waste 160% Completed Unsatisfactory operation
Barnwell Reprocessing 200% Completed No start up due to problems
GE Reprocessing 230% Completed Plant failed to operate
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Innovation, particularly radical innovation with a new process fails often. But when it 
succeeds it can deliver the objective, transform the industry, and yield sustained high profits. 
 
Secondly Merrow lays out the model followed by most subsequent studies; the multi factor 
data base of around 50 similar projects. 
 
“Each of the 44 chemical process plants sampled is characterised by over 400 separate 
items. Participating companies voluntarily provided proprietary data underwritten non- 
disclosure agreements with The RAND Corporation.” (p19) 
 
The concept of building a database with items of data for all projects is like gather a new 
form of data in a census. This applies as much to insider as outsider studies, and is adopted in 
the methodology used in this thesis. 
 
Thirdly Merrow proposes “Measures of technological change”  
 
 The number of process steps that were new at commercial scale 
 The scale up of the plants from prior units 
 The percentage of estimated capital investment in the new steps 
 Whether the plant represented the first time the technology had been used commercially 
in North America 
 The extent to which heat and materials balance equations were known on the basis of 
data from prior plants as opposed to being calculated on the basis of theory or simply 
unknown at various points in the project (p25) 
 
These parameters are incorporated in this Australian study. Specifically the scale up from a 
prior successful unit is one of five parameters of the innovation model. The number 
complexity of new process steps are another. 
 
In “A quantities Assessment of R&D Requirements for Solids Processing Technology” 
(1986) this multi factor database is described as a “Parametric approach” … 
“Parametric analysis statistically links the characteristics of entities to some defined 
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outcome measures, such as commercial plant performance. The statistical links are derived 
from historical experience, e.g. a database describing many projects.” 
 
Parametric analysis of data collected into a systematic matrix has many practical similarities 
with reference class forecasting. It differs in that it is an inside, expert, proprietary system. 
The problem of using only private information is that the study is restricted to “insiders” who 
pay for the data. Apart from a silhouette of a good model it does little to assist with public 
understanding, examination and criticism. However it is a good model for the methodology 
of this thesis. 
 
Building on Merrows’ foundation, Terry McNulty26, developed 4 “Category” model27 based 
on 41 Copper plants built between 1965 and 1995.  These included 13 sulphide floatation 
concentrators, (which are the least challenging for ore and plant) 7 inorganic chemical plants, 
(which were a variety of techniques to treat poly-metallic ores) 6 copper and nickel smelters 
(as in North America the two are often found together, whereas copper gold is more common 
in Australia) 8 hydrometallurgical plants (biologically assisted heap leach, agitated leaching, 
and autoclaving) 7 hydrometallurgical oxide plants.   
 
This model was later extended with a 5th Category which described the Western Australian 
Murrin-Murrin (Anaconda) Nickel plant. This is reasonable as the Murrin-Murrin plant was a 
hydrometallurgical oxide plant, with comparable process to those considered for copper gold 
and copper nickel. The other reason for adding the 5th category was that category 5 is 
category 4 taken to the most egregious excesses. The very promotional project owner, a 
theme in many 1990’s business sagas, was possibly more focused on mining the share-market 
than the ore body. The problems of misstated ore reserves, ore grades, final value, or included 
elements that made the process more difficult were apparently largely ignored.    
 
The plant owner and operator that made limited input to engineering, showed their 
inexperience, and might have influenced the construction firm to appoint a “B” team to 
manage the work. This lead to serious engineering deficiencies, which went unknown and 
unresolved till the process plant, became operational. Incorrect materials specifications; were 
the final and spectacular evidence of very limited technical and managerial competence. 
When a process involved dissolving ore in hot sulphuric acid, it would be wise to ensure that 
the materials in contact with the acid and abrasive ore residue were resistant to both. The 
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valves were not; and quickly failed. Table 4 shows 5 levels which range from least risk in 
Series 1 to most risk in Series 5. This is utilised in the improper linear models shown in Sheet 
3 of Appendix. The Series showing risk from highest to lowest is also an indicator of 
probable performance. 
 
Table 4  1 to 5 Series categories by Mc Nulty 
 
 
To which Doug Halbe28 added a financial analysis for the Series above and the percentage of 
nameplate capacity of plant below, for a hypothetical gold mine29. A Gold mine (without 
intractable ores) is a rather standard operation, with long established processes, utilising 
existing plant with well-known performance characteristics. Table 5 shows a linkage between 
risk factors and financial outcome for 41 copper plants and for Murrin-Murrin PAL Nickel 
Cobalt HPAL plant (Case 3 in the Appendix). This is also developed in more detail in the 
Hypotheses in Chapter 5 and 6, and in sheets 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Appendix. 
 
Table 5 Halbes’ financial outcomes for the different series, showing profit or loss 
estimates. 
 
 
Series 1
Mature technology, Mature, experienced project owner, Standard types/sizes of equipment, 
Thorough pilot testing of risky unit operations.
Series 5
Most of Series 3 and 4 flaws, plus Very promotional project owner, Little owner input to 
engineering, Serious engineering deficiencies, Misstated reserves, Incorrect materials specifications.
Series 4
Process chemistry poorly understood, Equipment downsized or design criteria compromised to cut 
capital, Very complex flow sheet with many interdependent unit operations, Only continuous tests 
were for demonstration purposes, No safety margins.
Series 2
If licensed, one of the first licensees, Prototype equipment, Incomplete pilot testing, Non-
representative sample, Severe process conditions, Insufficient attention to materials handling or other 
standard unit operations.
Series 3
Limited pilot testing, some important steps ignored, Mineralogy poorly understood, Product quality 
ignored, Serious design flaws, Fast track; increased risk ignored, Inexperienced management, 
Unforeseen product price decline.
Category Net present value
Series 1 $ 209 million 
Series 2 $ 110 million
Series 3 -  $ 25 million
Series 4 - $ 240 million
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Every mine in Halbe and McNulty’s study is designed for a regular extraction capacity of a 
certain grade of ore. This ore is fed to a process plant tailored to process the volume and 
grade. This “nameplate capacity” is the performance of the plant; when fed the quality of ore 
that it was designed for.  The name plate capacity is usually set at an output of metal 
processed and refined to a widely accepted market specification.  
 
However it might better be defined as the mass or volume of materials that can be processed 
as an input. A plant that could process 600,000 tons of ore a month, to produce 20,000 ounces 
of gold a month is constrained by the input. If fed ore at twice the grade it might be capable 
of producing 40,000 oz. a month; but if half the grade, then only 10,000 oz. a month can be 
produced. 
 
In Table 6 data shows lowest indicator risk projects were fastest to reach plant design 
capacity. Highest risk projects performed worst at reaching nameplate capacity. The measure 
of output over first 36 months as a percentage of nameplate capacity is taken as a parameter 
13 in the Hypothesis studies. 
 
Table 6  Output from series process plants as percentage of nameplate capacity 
 
 
Chris Twigge-Molecey of Hatch and Associates points out that the funding for R&D or 
industrial design are but a very small percentage30 of an innovative project, yet if they are not 
excellent, the project must be in trouble31. He promotes the idea that the design and 
construction contractor must also be the technology developer, and thus take responsibility 
for project success.  An extra 5-10% on budget, AND the plants reached name plate quickly 
might transform innovation in mineral processing.  This concept is taken into the innovation 
model in Chapter 3. 
 
The example from Halbe shows this, as do a number of projects in the case study, where the 
6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 30 months 36 months
Series 1 80% 100% 101% 103% 105% 106%
Series 2 50% 78% 90% 95% 97% 97%
Series 3 40% 60% 75% 78% 80% 83%
Series 4 21% 37% 44% 55% 56% 57%
Series 5 10% 18% 30% 46% 60% 70%
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initial planning did not appear very professional, and a difficult start up followed.  In one 
large Australian project (Case 1) the proposed start date shifted 2 years, and was then late, the 
cost went from $750 million in 1995, to $1.5 billion in 1996, $1.7 billion in 1997, and $2.4 
billion in 1998.  
 
A Canadian expert in pressure acid leaching plants, was has been called into the post mortem, 
and partial resuscitation of 3 laterite nickel plants32. His papers shows multiple design and 
construction shortcomings.33  Table 7 shows three projects, and their production over time. 
The results indicate that they would be in Series 5 as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 7 Production of Nickel at three HPAL laterite process plants 
 
 
The conclusion from examining these insider studies is that they include excellent measures 
to be adopted and incorporated into the methodology used in this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Infrastructure project evaluation - an outsider view. 
 
Public infrastructure evaluation, selecting which projects will be funded to implement the 
policy and social objectives of the Government, have traditionally been chosen by insiders 
with an insider view. 
 
Yet such public infrastructure; railways, road, tunnels bridges and dams often cost more than 
the budget plan, take longer to build that projected, under-deliver benefits and payback  
investment more slowly than promised. 
 
A study34 of 258 transportation infrastructure projects, over a 70 year time frame, worldwide, 
shows the regular inaccuracy of construction cost estimates measured as the size of cost 
overrun. For rail, the average cost overrun is 44.7 percent measured in constant prices. For 
HPAL 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 30 months 36 months
Bulong 12% 45% 42% 69% 46% 65%
Cawse 25% 45% 88% 76% 88% Closed
Murrin Murrin 8% 12% 29% 42% 59% 66%
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bridges and the tunnels, the equivalent figure is 33.8 percent, and for roads 20.4 percent.  
 
The Treasury of the United Kingdom35 are aware of the problem and state: 
 
"There is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic. 
To redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to 
the estimates of a project's costs, benefits, and duration ... It is recommended that these 
adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere." 
 
The benefits proposed to justify, or pay for the projects are even more inaccurate36.  
“For rail, actual passenger traffic is 51.4 percent lower than estimated traffic on average. 
This is equivalent to an average overestimate in rail passenger forecasts of no less than 
105.6 percent. The result is large benefit shortfalls for rail. For roads, actual vehicle traffic is 
on average 9.5 percent higher than forecasted traffic. We see that rail passenger forecasts are 
biased, whereas this is not the case for road traffic forecasts. The difference between rail and 
road is statistically significant at a high level. Again the standard deviations are large, 
indicating that forecasting errors vary widely across projects.” 
 
The following observations hold for traffic demand forecasts: 
• 84 percent of rail passenger forecasts are wrong by more than ±20 percent. 
9 out of 10 rail projects have overestimated traffic. 
 
Governments who approve and fund rail projects have a policy problem when the cost and 
the benefit are projected so poorly. 
 
“Misrepresentation about costs, benefits …and the related cost overruns and benefit shortfalls 
- are a problem for the following reasons:  
They lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation of resources, that is, waste. 
They lead to non-democratic decisions. 
They lead to delays and further cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. 
They destabilize policy, planning, implementation, and operations of projects. 
The problem is getting bigger, because projects get bigger. 
 
The policy implications are equally clear: Lawmakers, investors, and the public cannot trust 
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information about costs, benefits, and risks of large infrastructure projects produced by 
promoters and planners of such projects. There is a strong need for reform in policy and 
planning for large infrastructure projects37.” 
 
The construction of railway links, roads, bridges and tunnels in NSW appears to have all the 
characteristics Flyvbjerg describes. Some investors in toll roads have seen their investment 
destroyed, and are thus may withdraw, or demand much higher risk premiums. The state 
government has proposed many rail projects, but delivered few, as they cost so much more 
than budgeted and take so long to complete. 
 
There are many similarities between resource processing mega projects and public sector 
transport projects. The analysis, concepts and methodology used by Flybjerg are uniquely 
well suited for this research study and are largely adopted. 
 
2.2 Descriptive and normative  
 
Project evaluation can be viewed from either an “insider” or “outsider” view. Decision theory 
may similarly be descriptive (what is) or normative (what ought).  
 
The normative or prescriptive outlook is concerned with identifying the best decision to take, 
assuming the “insiders” are ideal decision makers who are fully informed, fully rational and 
without bias, and in possession of models that have perfect accuracy.  The some highly 
developed tools are called decision support systems.  
 
The Descriptive or positive outlook looks at what people actually do, and how systems 
actually work. This considers the inputs and outputs, of what was proposed and what was 
actually delivered. This “what ought to be - what is distinction was first noted by David 
Hume.38  
 
In "The Methodology of Positive Economics39" Milton Friedman argues that economics 
should be free of normative judgments for it to be respected as objective. He argues that 
normative judgments frequently involve implicit predictions about the consequences of 
different policies. He further argues that useful economic theory should be judged primarily 
by it’s: 
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a.) Simplicity in being able to predict at least as much as an alternate theory, although 
requiring less information. 
 
b.) Fruitfulness in the precision and scope of its predictions and in its ability to generate 
additional research lines. 
 
A normative (or regulative) view is: 
 
1.) Based on implicit or explicit moral beliefs or value judgements. 
2.) Prescriptive, as in “What should be, or ought to be”.  
3.) “Relating to an ideal standard or model.” 
4.)  Where desired ethical or political goals or outcomes are important. 
5.) Often faith based preconceptions of good and bad. 
6.) Often an insider or expert view…to enhance their control. 
7.) Assumes an ideal decision maker who is fully informed, able to compute with perfect 
accuracy, and is fully rational. 
8.) What a system should do…design and specification. 
9.) Rules based and imply a command structure. 
 
A descriptive (or positive) view is: 
 
1.) Descriptive in that it only describes what happens. 
2.) Describes “what is or as it is.” 
3.) Encompasses all human flaws and imperfect knowledge or competition. 
4.) Outcomes are measured. 
5.) How the economy works in practice. 
6.) Often an outsider or consumer view…to enhance their utility. 
7.) Observes actual decision makers, who may be poorly informed, biased, self-interested 
and emotional. 
8.) What a system actually does…performance and cost. 
9.) Is potentially more critical of existing decision makers and participants. 
 
Einhorn and Hogarth40 pose two questions. Why are normative theories so prevalent in 
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academic publication, and why would no other branch of science tolerate rules of “what 
should be” that are so different to what actually happens.  
 
They note that “much of decision research concerns evaluating and developing ways for 
improving behaviour”, which in the past was more ethics or religion than science. They 
conclude with a plea to “adopt a broader perspective …investigating topics not usually 
treated in the decision literature, creativity, problem solving, and concept formation.” They 
conclude with the statement “we believe that psychologists can best contribute to decision 
research by elucidating the basic psychological process underlying judgement and choice.” 
 
This work, based on a descriptive or outsider viewpoint, will be based on information 
available in the public domain to an outsider.  
 
 
2.3 Economic models and theories 
 
An economic model is a simplification, based on empirical observations, of past human 
behaviour. The ultimate goal is to discover more accurate understanding of economic 
relationships in the real world.41 
 
An economical model is similar to a road map, in that it omits details, and emphasises 
specific points of interest, that enable an endeavour to be completed successfully.42 
 
Varian43 proposes modelling economic activity that has not been studied previously, working 
out if it has value, taking a different approach than previously, building the model then 
simplifying till “everything should be as simple as possible…but no simpler.”44 
 
An economic model may be casual or econometric45. Observing that petrol is usually cheaper 
on Tuesdays is casual, building a table of retail petrol price changes over a year is 
econometrics. A series of linked casual observations can suggest an economic model, which 
is then made econometric with the collection of data.  
 
Data is collected at a particular interval, and is like a snapshot. Data collected over time at 
regular intervals enables a longitudinal study, like a movie. In a movie change and direction 
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may be observed.  
 
The first systematic collection of numerical data was probably in Egypt well before the great 
pyramids were built 4,580 years ago. The purpose was to enable a ruler, or ruling class to 
understand what resources were available to them, and what responsibilities they might need 
to manage in hard times.  Data was probably collected for population numbers, residence 
location, age, gender and the productivity of the region.  
 
This would be used for estimating taxation levels, as taking 1/10 of available wealth might be 
unlikely to lead to higher collection costs (civil revolt).  The data was also valuable for 
managing military service, without depriving farms of too much labour, and causing famine. 
As much of the tax was taken in grains, held in temples, civil harmony could be maintained 
in a famine by the ruling elite. 
 
A Census in China taken in 2 AD showed the population at 13 million46. The Roman Census 
was conducted every 5 years to provide a register of citizens and their property47. This 
enabled taxation and registration of property. The word census comes from the Latin word 
“censere” meaning “estimate”.   
 
In 1085 William the Conqueror "had deep speech with his counsellors and sent men all over 
England to each shire to find out what or how much each landholder had in land and 
livestock, and what it was worth48."  This enabled the tax administration of the Kingdom, as 
whatever wealth existed was recorded in the Domesday Book.  The Domesday Book and 
earlier Censuses recorded “What Is”, so as the ruler may take a realistic financial slice. Too 
high a tax burden engenders revolt by those with nothing to lose. Too light a burden 
diminishes the ruler’s power, and leaves resources available for a revolt. 
 
Jean Baptiste Colbert49 commented "The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as 
to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing." 
 
The use of census and estimate to determine what wealth might be extracted (without 
insurrection) was advanced by William Petty’s 1654 survey of Ireland50.  Petty based his 
ideas on efficient methods of land survey, and estimates of the most productive use that may 
be made of it. Land that had a value per measure could be “paid” in lieu of wages to 
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victorious solders, or sold to defray other English Civil War (1642-1651) expenses. 
 
From the collected data and statistics, he also reached radical conclusions.  He recognised 
that the total economic contribution put in by the ordinary workers represented the majority 
of the wealth creation of the economy. Yet much of it was outside the money economy, and 
could only be taxed in kind.  Thus he recommended consumption taxes in kind, rather than 
poll taxes in cash.51 
 
Petty’s survey goes a step further than its assigned task52, in that it is not just a catalogue of 
“what is” but estimates value of “what could be”. The data starts to project patterns that were 
unimaginable before, enabling Petty to take the third step to “what are the best ways of 
achieving what may be”. 
 
A census is the basis of rational civil administration, in that it shows “what is”. With 
reference to earlier census “what is” can be compared to “what was”, and in a longitudinal 
model, projected forward to what might be. Data, viewed as it is in this context, without a 
bias of “what should be” is useful for scientific understanding, prediction and management. 
This work uses a census like approach to collecting data, with a similar outlook to William 
Petty. 
 
2.3.1 Life expectancy - data into prediction. 
 
In 1662, John Graunt published “Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a following 
Index and Made upon the Bills of Mortality”. This work was a compilation of weekly bills of 
mortality, and enabled an estimate of probability of cause of death in a locality at a time. But 
it did not include age at death.  
 
A fellow member of the Royal Society Edmund Halley added birth and death data from the 
Prussian town of Breslau53, and was able to work out the probability of death at any age; 
producing the first life table.   
 
By a longitudinal study (the collection of the data over many years), of a complete set, or 
reference class, meant that accurate prediction could be made for life insurance or annuities. 
The purchaser received the highest potential benefits, and the company a low and manageable 
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risk.  Previously insurance typically for cargos carried at sea were set at a premium more by 
guess work, and what the market would bear than probability. 
 
Life Insurance based on mathematical probability rather than intuition followed in 1743. 
Robert Wallace and Alexander Webster applied their spreadsheet calculations to the sum a 
Scottish minister would need to pay during his lifetime to insure an adequate income for his 
widow and children if he was died early. The total of ministers with a “living” (income from 
the church) at that time was 930. Over a 20 year period, it was found that 27 a year died, 18 
leaving a widow and 5 children without a widow54.  The challenge was to predict future 
demand for payment, based on the past reference class so as to set the premiums just 
sufficient to not burden the participating clergymen. As the capital and interest was only 
sufficient to meet the expected claims, the expected growth (uptake by clients) also has to be 
worked out. 
The original quill, ink and parchment spreadsheets survive, and are an inspiration to use 
similar methods. They calculated that by 1765 they would have capital of £ 58,348. Both men 
lived to see “Scottish Ministers’ Widows’ Fund” with a free capital of £ 58,347 in that year.   
 
This is probably the first and finest example of careful “reference class forecasting”, and was 
the seed for growth in insurance and pension investment. Scottish Widows55 has today more 
than £ 100 billion under management.56 
 
Conclusion: Case studies of all cases in a class, over a period of time will yield far more 
robust data. The larger the data set and the longer time over which they are considered the 
better the prediction. In the years 1743-65 Wallace and Webster were able to calculate future 
expenditure with accuracy difficult to imaginable in any public or private undertaking today 
over a 22 year period. Their error was 0.000017%.  In contrast the collapse of HIH Insurance 
in March 2001 saw a loss of $5.3 billion in assets from a total of $7.8 billion under 
management, or 68% “error”.57 58 This was Australia’s largest corporate collapse, and 
involved extraordinary incompetence and criminality. Government involvement via the 
regulatory system of checks, also failed. The risks that HIH were taking were known to 
insiders and some outsiders.  
 
“The corporate officers, auditors and regulators of HIH failed to see, remedy or report what 
should have been obvious. And some of those who were in or close to the management of the 
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group ignored or, worse, concealed the true state of the group’s steadily deteriorating 
financial position.”59  
 
In 1743 honest and capable people are able to produce excellent predictions using simple 
spreadsheet data based analysis. From 1997 to 2001 dishonest and incapable people, without 
an outsider overview were capable of extensive economic damage.  Simple methods of 
reference class forecasting applied to understanding the success or failure of resource plant or 
financial firms might achieve a similar outcome, enabling investments to be made with less 
risk. Government involvement, incompetence, and behaviour that may be found to be illegal 
are a factor in failures. 
 
2.4 Reference class forecasting and non-linear models 
 
2.4.1 Reference Class Forecasting 
Whilst practical actuarial methods very similar to reference class forecasting have been in use 
in life insurance for more than 267 years, the theory is more recent. Reference Class 
Forecasting (RCF) evolved from Prospect Theory, which is a descriptive decision theory. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky60 developed an alternative descriptive model of decision making 
under risk, which they called prospect theory. They noted “In particular, people underweight 
outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with 
certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices 
involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people 
generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This 
tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice 
is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is 
assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are 
replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly 
convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are 
generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low 
probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both 
insurance and gambling.” 
 
The accurate weighting of risk is rarely precise, and ranges between optimistic 
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overconfidence and insufficient consideration of probable outcomes. In these situations there 
is a tendency to underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, 
whilst tending to overestimate the benefits of those same actions. This is evident in many of 
the failed projects in this study. 
 
The reaction to searing financial loss is then an emphasis on certainty, where projects are 
chosen for the certainty of outcome, rather than a balance of risk to reward. This has been the 
response to innovation in mineral processing in Australia since 2006. 
 
Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman61, acknowledging earlier work62 outlines a 5 step method.  
Making a forecast using the outside view requires planners to identify a reference class of 
analogous past initiatives, determine the distribution of outcomes for those initiatives, and 
place the projects at hand at the appropriate point along that distribution.  
 
1.) Select a reference class. Identifying the right reference class involved both art and 
science. You usually have to weigh similarities and differences on many variables and 
determine which are the most meaningful in judging how your own initiative will play 
out. If you’re a manager at a chemical company that is considering building an olefin 
plant incorporating a new processing technology, you may instinctively think that 
your reference class would include olefin plants now in operation. But you may 
actually get better results by looking at other chemical plants built with new 
technology. The plants outcome, in other word, may be more influenced by the 
newness of its technology than what it produces. The key is to choose a class that is 
broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly 
comparable to the project at hand. 
 
2.) Assess the distribution outcomes.  Once the reference class is chosen, you have to 
documents the outcomes of the prior projects and arrange them as a distribution, 
showing the extremes, the median and any clusters. Sometimes you won’t be able to 
precisely document the outcomes of every member of the class. But you can still 
arrive at a rough distribution by calculating the average outcome as well as 
measuring the variability. 
 
3.) Make an intuitive prediction of your projects position in the distribution. Based on 
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your own understanding of the project at hand and how it compares with the projects 
in the reference class, predict where it would fall along the distribution. Because your 
intuitive estimate will likely be biased the final two steps are intended to adjust the 
estimate in order to arrive at a more accurate forecast.  
 
4.) Assess the reliability of your prediction. This step is intended to gauge the reliability 
of the forecast you made in step 3. The goal is to estimate the correlation between the 
forecast and actual outcome, expressed as coefficient between o and 1, where 0 
indicates no correlation and 1 indicates complete correlation. In the best case, 
information will be available on how well your past predictions matched the actual 
outcomes. You can then estimate the correlation based on historical precedent. 
 
5.) Correct the intuitive estimate. Due to bias, the intuitive estimate made in step 3 will 
likely be optimistic – deviating too far from the average outcome of the reference 
class. In the final step you adjust the estimate towards the average on your analysis of 
predictability in step 4. 
 
Flyvbjerg63 proposes: More specifically, reference class forecasting for a particular project 
requires the following three steps: 
 
(1) Identification of a relevant reference class of past, similar projects. The class must be 
broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with 
the specific project. 
 
(2) Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. This requires 
access to credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects within the reference 
class to make statistically meaningful conclusions. 
 
(3) Comparing the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish 
the most likely outcome for the specific project. 
 
Thus reference class forecasting does not try to forecast the specific uncertain events that will 
affect the particular project, but instead places the project in a statistical distribution of 
outcomes from the class of reference projects. In statisticians’ vernacular, reference class 
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forecasting consists of regressing forecasters’ best guess toward the average of the reference 
class and expanding their estimate of credible interval toward the corresponding interval for 
the class. 
 
Flyvbjerg has evolved reference class forecasting as a tool to understand and manage public 
transport infrastructure projects in Europe.64  
 
Optimism Bias is discussed in a paper by Lovallo & Kaneman65  which links in with the 
“very promotional project owner” described by Mc Nulty. They comment “when pessimistic 
opinions are suppressed, while optimistic ones are rewarded, an organisations ability to think 
critically is undermined”. 
 
This is a comment heard anecdotally in with engineers who had worked on some of the large 
projects; that beyond a point where the decision has been made, any criticism was a “career 
limiting move.”  From this point it is only one step to changing the numbers so that the 
project continues to look good, which is the situation Flyvbjerg describes in “Rationality and 
Power”66. In this in depth case study the seemingly innocuous choice of locating a bus 
interchange in the centre of town, causes the individuals who want to push through the 
decision “defining reality” to ensure their goal is achieved. 
 
This means whatever lie must be told, whatever data must be altered to ensure the project 
proceeds as planned is an acceptable cost. But how are such unreal costing and over blown 
benefit passed through the maze of specialists and consultants who handles the technical and 
reporting on a project? According to Flyvbjerg67 they realise that unless they are part of this 
process the job will not progress and they will get no work, or the job might progress and 
someone else more accommodating will get the work. They all have a vested interest in the 
project being approved. In a recent paper Flyvbjerg68 calls this practice “the survival of the 
un-fittest”, those who told the greatest lies got the most reward.  
 
The work of Merrow, Kahneman, Lovallo and Flyvbjerg may be synthesised onto a five step 
model for understanding large volumes of data describing resource projects in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4.2 Improper linear models 
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Improper linear models are described by Robyn Dawes69 as "Improper linear models are 
those in which the weights of the predictor variables are obtained by some non-optimal 
method; for example they may be obtained on the basis of intuition, derived from simulating a 
clinical judge’s predictions, or set to be equal." 
 
The original work in this area was by Paul Meehl70 in his book Clinical vs. Statistical 
Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence” In this he argued that 
numerical methods of data combination outperformed expert clinical judgements. 
 
A year earlier (1953) Virginia Apgar71 had published her paper on “a new method of 
evaluation of the newborn infant.” Here she proposed the now famous and universally 
adopted APGAR test. It has five parameters and three levels of degree from greatest risk on 
the left to least risk on the right. This is shown below in Table 8. 
 
Table 8  APGAR Test 
 
 
Here the addition of judgements on the five factors will give a score between 0 and 10.  7 and 
above is a baby that is at low risk. Below 3 is a baby at high risk of neurological damage 
without urgent medical attention. 
 
Similar predictive factors and measures are used in the work of Halbe and McNulty72, which 
used 5 classes (series) of project types, from lowest risk to highest risk. In this model the 
most experienced (and least risk) type projects were series 1, and the least experienced (and 
most risky) projects were series 5.  The model was developed based on proprietary data for 
41 case studies of resource processing plants constructed after 1965 and before the mid 
1990’s. 
 
Daniel Kahneman73 devotes a chapter to Intuition vs. Formulas, and notes that he instituted 
such a five step grading system over five factors in 1966 for evaluating new recruits into the 
Israeli Army, that is still in use. The five models shown in Table 12 in Chapter 3 and the 4 
Post birth criteria Score of 0 (greatest risk) Score of 1 Score of 2 (least risk)
Skin colour / complexion Blue of pale all over Acrocyanosis, blue at extremities, body pink No cyanosis, body and extremities pink
Pulse rate Absent < 100 > 100
Reflex irritability No response to stimulation Grimace / feble cry when stimulated Cry or pull away when stimulated
Muscle tone None Some flexion Flexed arms and legs that resist extension
Breathing Absent Weak, irregular, gasping Strong lusty cry
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distributional tables shown on sheets 4 to 7 in the appendix follow this form and principal. 
2.5 Core Competence 
 
The modern academic concept of “core competence” is first developed in 1991 by Prahalad 
and Hamel.74 Two quotes illustrate the ideas: “Such a competence will be difficult to 
replicate as it rests on deeply held cultural norms and draws on employees' tacit knowledge 
of tasks and processes.” and “a core competence is a combination of complementary skills 
and knowledge bases embedded in a group or team that results in the ability to execute one 
or more critical processes to a world class standard”   
 
The authors contend that Core Competence  
(1) Provides customer benefits,  
(2) It is hard for competitors to imitate,  
(3) Can be leveraged widely to many products and markets. 
 
The last factor (3) was not widely evident in Australian resource projects. Firms with good 
commercial results across a broad spectrum of process skills still had some notable failures, 
particularly with new process projects. The focus on specific skills, and evolved skills 
development in a narrow area of firm competence were more evident. 
 
The concept of focused skills has ancient and enlightenment progenitors. Xenophon75 writes 
of the division of labour possible in larger city states, like Athens, enabled a quality and 
quantity of specialised and luxury goods to be produced. 
 
“Now it is impossible that a single man working at a dozen crafts can do them all well; but in 
the great cities, owing to the wide demand for each particular thing, a single craft will suffice 
for a means of livelihood, and often enough even a single department of that; there are shoe-
makers who will only make sandals for men and others only for women. Or one artisan will 
get his living merely by stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, a third by shaping the 
upper leathers, and a fourth will do nothing but fit the parts together. Necessarily the man 
who spends all his time and trouble on the smallest task will do that task the best…--it is 
obvious, I think, that in this way a far higher standard of excellence will be attained in every 
branch of the work.”76 
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Xenophon is describing a focused competence and that a team of collaborating specialists, 
repeating and refining their skills resulted in a more productive and value added product. 
Today firms that specialised in one type of transformational plant; probably in repeat 
collaboration with specialised suppliers, were able to use each new project to incrementally 
increase the performance or efficiency of the plant by 3-5%; and were successful in each new 
project. 
 
Aristotle77  is reputed to have taught "We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, therefore, is 
not an act, but a habit."  Implicit both of these observations from antiquity is that division of 
labour, with skill specialisation and the close association of upstream and downstream 
transforming skills produces much enhanced productivity, and hence wealth creation. 
 
It is to be argued that the advantages gained from division of labour, and hence development 
of specialised skills in a firm is different to core competence. 
 
Adam Smith78 makes much the same point with the Pin Factory example, where the core 
competence at each operation enables a productivity increase of 2,400%. 
“One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth 
grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct 
operations;  to put it on, is a particular business,  to whiten the pins is another;  it is even a 
trade by itself to put them in the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this 
manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are 
all performed by distinct hands...Each person, therefore... might be considered as making 
four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and 
independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they 
certainly could not each of them have made twenty...pins a day." 
 
Smith continues: It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that 
universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people. 
 
Competence from repeated practice and incremental improvement leads to both productivity 
and diminution of risk. The US investor Warren Buffet79 states “Risk comes from not 
knowing what you are doing.”   This might be extended to “Risk come from not knowing 
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what the other parties are doing”. Where the competent firm knows what they are doing, and 
what their supply partners are doing, they can provide the consumer what they want with 
minimal transaction costs and risk of failure. 
 
The opposite possibility is cognitive ignorance of risks which would be obvious to 
experienced practitioners; being core incompetence. This incompetence is well noted in 
literature. "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than doe’s knowledge"80 and "One 
of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with 
any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision."81 
  
Dunning and Kruger82 write that, for a given skill, incompetent people will: 
 
1.) Tend to overestimate their level of skill; 
2.) Fail to recognise genuine skill in others; 
3.) Fail to recognise the extremity of their inadequacy; 
4.) Recognise and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they can be trained to 
substantially improve. 
 
These studies83 are focused on individuals, whereas we are interested in firms of many 
people. It is difficult to know whether a firm overestimates its competence and or 
underestimates the risks and difficulties.  Failure was fast and devastating where competence 
was significantly over estimated and risks significantly underestimated; especially when this 
became evident to the shareholders and banks supporting the project.  
 
Dunning and Kruger’s work is a good model to modify from individuals to firms, with some 
changes. Companies with specialised core competencies, executing a project that they knew 
from habit, had the most successful projects; quick to reach nameplate capacity in this study; 
none failed. 
 
Competency hereafter referred to as Firm competence in Australian resource processing takes 
the form of: 
 
1.) Technical superiority embedded in the experienced production team. 
2.) Practice in incremental innovation, where each successful project was incrementally 
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improved. 
3.) Implementation know-how in production reduced risks and costs. 
4.) Reliable processing and thus delivery to supply chain customers. 
5.) Close relationships with customers, suppliers and stakeholders.  
6.) New project or development pipeline, financed at preferred rates. 
7.) A culture encouraging employee improvement and dedication. 
8.) The outsourcing of activities that are not the company's core competency. 
 
Where core competency yields a growing long term advantage to the company, it can be said 
to be a sustainable competitive advantage.84 
 
There are three tests proposed for Core Competencies by Prahalad and Hamel: 
 
1.) Potential access to a wide variety of resources and markets - the core competency must be 
capable of evolving low cost products and services in new markets. 
 
2.) A core competency must make a significant contribution to the perceived benefits of the 
product.  
 
3.) Core Competencies should be difficult for competitors to imitate. In many industries, such 
competencies are likely to be unique. 
 
The two largest resource companies in the world, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, have unique 
core competences in both iron ore and coal supply.  However that competence in moderately 
transformed resources, essentially managing governments to access resources and retain this 
ownership, logistic skills in moving large volumes of moderate value tonnages, maximising 
price and market share, and financing their business under favourable terms;  do not translate 
to any unique competency in innovative or high technology projects. One of the firms has 
experienced significant difficulties with new and innovative mega projects, and admits so 
quite openly85.  
 
In a second paper86 Prahalad and Hamel point out that core competency in a company “unlike 
physical assets, competencies do not deteriorate as they are applied and shared. They Grow!” 
Thus the people most practiced and perfect at a task build a competitive advantage, by 
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utilising their skills frequently.  ConocoPhillips87Darwin LNG plant is an example of a plant 
built by a firm who specialised in improving each new plant.  They found that plant with risk 
minimised by core competence is much easier to finance in advance. It thus makes more 
sense to engage firms that are most practiced and competent. A competence rarely used, is 
rarely a competence, or a competence soon lost. 
 
These three core competency tests apply equally well to the Firm Competence model to be 
described in Chapter 3. 
 
 
2.6 New Process Innovation 
 
The OECD published Oslo Manual 88 defines “Innovation is the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), process, new marketing method or a new 
organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.” 
 
Joseph Schumpeter89 argued that economic development is driven by innovation through a 
dynamic process in which new technologies replace the old, a process he labelled “creative 
destruction”. In Schumpeter’s view, “radical” innovations create major disruptive changes, 
whereas “incremental” innovations continuously advance the process of change.  
 
Successful mineral process innovation can be radical in initial concept and embodiment and 
then incrementally improved and expanded. 
 
Schumpeter identified innovation as the critical dimension of economic change. He argued 
that technological innovation often creates temporary monopolies, allowing abnormal profits 
that would soon be competed away by rivals and imitators. He said that these temporary 
monopolies were necessary to provide the incentive necessary for firms to develop new 
products and processes.90 
 
The Frascati Manual91 defines: 
Technological innovation activities are all of the scientific, technological, organisational, 
financial and commercial steps, including investments in new knowledge, which actually, or 
are intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved products and 
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processes.   
Baumol92 defines innovation as the ‘recognition of opportunities for profitable change and 
the pursuit of those opportunities all the way through to their adoption in practice; in 
particular, as the activity of recognising economically viable inventions and doing whatever 
is necessary to bring them to market or to ensure their effective end use by some other 
means.’   
 
The “activity of recognising economically viable inventions” is a sharply focused idea, and 
an important consideration in this work, which will attempt to show that many of the 
“innovations” that failed; should have been recognised as failing this concept. The economic 
viability of the worked invention was below a threshold for successful implementation, and 
the project delays, cost over runs, and product underperformance brought forward the 
commercial failure to an earlier point. 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics93 definition: business innovation as the process of 
introducing new or significantly improved goods or services and/or implementing new or 
significantly improved processes.  
 
Whilst Baumol’s view is appreciated in the 2007 Productivity Commission Report94 they 
favour a broader approach, including: 
• Governments, communities and their agencies are included, as well as businesses. 
• Gradual catch-up to technological frontiers is included.  
• It also incorporates preparedness — an enhanced capacity for dealing with future 
uncertainties. By this definition, almost every enterprise is involved in multiple degrees of 
incremental innovation. Incremental innovation is encouraged, managed and often measured 
by almost all successful firms in this survey. But that is not the definition that is being applied 
to “new process” innovation. 
 
The Productivity Commission Report also states: 
There are widespread and important economic, social and environmental benefits generated 
by Australia’s $6 billion public funding support of science and innovation. 
– On the basis of multiple strands of evidence, the benefits of public spending are likely to 
exceed the costs. 
– But, given a host of measurement and methodological issues, it is not possible to provide 
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anything other than broad estimates of the overall return to government contributions. 
This might be seen as a rather equivocal measure for the benefit derived from expenditure of 
2.78% of the Commonwealth Budget (2006-07).  
 
Innovation and Science in Australia enjoy broadly bi partisan support at the Federal level, but 
with some nuances of emphasis.  A more recent (2009) Innovation paper95 leads with the 
credo from the Innovation minister: 
This is a ten-year reform agenda to make Australia more productive and more competitive. 
Increasing our capacity to create new knowledge and find new ways of doing business is the 
key to building a modern economy based on advanced skills and technologies. It is the key to 
success in this, the global century. 
Innovation is not an abstraction. Nor is it an end itself. It is how we make a better Australia, 
and contribute to making a better world — a prosperous, fair and decent world, in which 
everyone has the chance of a fulfilling life. 
 
Innovation is here broadened to encompass building new industries, protecting the 
environment and advancing social justice. On building new industries: 
Innovation has the power to transform existing industries — enabling them to operate more 
efficiently, to deliver improved products and services, and to win new markets. It can also 
give rise to entirely new industries, from carbon capture and storage to online retailing. A 
strong innovation system also gives us the capacity to match and adapt to the innovations of 
others. This is especially important given the pace of technological and organisational 
change in today’s world.  
The points of interest are that innovation is here an enabling process for government within a 
wider range of political objectives. This is a statement of “what should be.”  
 
Two themes developed in 2009 Innovation paper are publicly funded innovation for 
contribution to and consumption by public sector services implementing government policy, 
and a strong belief in the value of collaborative research.  
 
In the 5 years from 2005 to 2010 no new innovative process plants were commenced.  Four 
of the largest new process plants were closed down as failures. The Government rhetoric and 
models of action in innovation had a strong negative correlation with innovative process plant 
failure. 
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Voices of dissent are noted in 2007 Innovation report. Kealey96 argues that: 
 
 Private companies would fund and undertake much of the valuable R&D currently 
supported by governments if public funding were not forthcoming. This displacement is 
sometimes referred to as ‘crowding out’ of private funding by public funding. Indeed, he 
makes the observation that frontier basic science is already done by private companies 
and openly published by them, undermining the conjecture that private firms have no 
incentives to participate in an open scientific system. Equally public sector research of 
commercial value is intensively protected by intellectual property units, seeking cost 
recovery. 
 
 Much of publicly funded (basic) science is fun, but not valuable, or it may be pushed 
into commercial white elephants selected by bureaucrats, wasting valuable capabilities. 
Moreover, because public science has to be funded through taxes it has damaging 
incentive effects throughout the economy, so that the waste extends outside the activities 
of scientists and the organisations that employ them. As a consequence, he claims that 
public funding does not just displace private funding, but actually diminishes aggregate 
R&D spending, with adverse effects on economic growth and the innovativeness of a 
country. 
 
 political forces behind the formation of the public science system in the United Kingdom 
and the United States (pp. 139ff), suggesting that while cloaked in the public interest, 
the leading advocates and bureaucrats were often motivated by personal and private 
interests that frustrated more sensible allocations of resources.  
 
 Basic science does NOT necessarily lead to technological developments and economic 
growth — attributed to Francis Bacon originally and given fresh vigour by Vannevar 
Bush in post-world war two United States. He argues that this ‘linear view’ invariably 
places the cart before the horse. In many cases technology begets new technologies 
directly, and technology often raises interesting problems for basic science rather than 
the other way round. Project Hindsight by the US Department of Defence found that of 
the 700 research events that led to the development of weapons systems, only two had 
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arisen from basic science (Kealey p. 163). Project TRACES (published the National 
Science Foundation) found the missing link to basic research, but ironically to research 
that was undertaken 50 years before, when it was mainly privately funded in the United 
States. 
 
The 2007 Productivity Commission concluded:  The key question about all of these 
potentially major deficits of publicly funded science is not whether there are vivid examples 
available — Kealey clearly provides many of them — but whether their presence is 
sufficiently systemic to matter when there are positive influences that go the other way. This 
is why consideration of the validity and interpretation of Kealey’s more general empirical 
results is warranted. 
 
The clear outcome from the resource process plant case study is that radical innovation was 
strongly linked with negative outcome for the investors; and that this was less so in past eras 
when innovation was largely private. The examples mentioned in Section 1.3 from a century 
ago are quite the opposite. 
 
A second dissenting voice on innovation was Davidson97 questions wether: the standard 
economic analysis supporting public expenditure on research is fundamentally and 
methodologically flawed? 
He argues: Each of the stepping-stones in the case for publicly funded science is flawed: 
R&D is not a public good. 
The cost of public funds is not lower than the cost of private funds. 
The returns to public science are low. 
Governments have a poor track record of picking ‘winners’. 
Publicly funded R&D has a negative impact on economic growth. 
Economists are unable to explain how spill-overs occur, or how valuable these spill-overs 
are. 
The notion that throwing an infinite amount of money at public research will somehow, at 
some time, automatically lead to some benefit is a myth. The government spends a substantial 
amount on public science and innovation. It is not clear that any substantial benefit is derived 
from that expenditure. 
 
The returns from the largest public science innovation effort (Case 7) were strongly negative, 
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and that Governments demonstrably had a poor investment track record (Cases 7 and 8) of 
picking ‘winners’. The two dissenting voices question that innovation is always good or 
valuable. Davidson goes on to observe that many of the arguments proposed in reports 
prepared by consultants to support further public investment are self-serving. 
 
Cutler11 suggests that Innovations can be classified usefully along a variety of dimensions: 
 
Process vs product: • Process innovations reduce the costs of producing and delivering a 
given good or service (a product), while product innovations improve the qualities of existing 
products or provide new products to be offered to consumers. 
 
Radical vs incremental: • Radical innovations lead to fundamental changes in processes or 
products, while incremental innovations involve adaptations of a core innovation in 
particular applications. 
 
technological vs organisational:• Technological innovations are generally embodied in 
equipment used by labour, while organisational innovations involve the organisation and 
reorganisation of groups of people into effective teams in the production and delivery of 
goods and services. 
 
science-led vs customer-driven: • Science-led innovations are an outcome of scientific 
research both in the public and private sectors, while customer-driven innovation is built 
upon careful market research and user interaction. 
 
Cutlers four points should be for resource processing projects. 
The only project that sought to produce both a new process; and also produce an enhanced 
product produced neither. (Case7) 
Radical innovation and incremental innovation are joined and follow one another to produce 
a desirable outcome. 
All the projects were technological, in that they sought a new transformation step. However 
the organisational innovations introduced by BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto into managing their 
logistics chains, finance management and marketing are largely unknown successes. 
The only successful project (Case 40) was one that applied customer drive to the existing 
science lead.  
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The productivity Commission suggest: From the perspective of this study, these 
improvements may be specific to the entity, to the industry, country or world, and could be 
incremental or novel. Innovation can be distinguished from knowledge generation per se, 
since to comprise innovation, any knowledge must be productively incorporated into an 
entity’s activities and outcomes. 
Both concepts are worth adopting; the first as a means of grading the novelty or radical nature 
of the innovation. The second as a measure of innovation success or failure; where the 
innovation was unproductive it was a failure.  
 
The measurement of innovation inputs and outcomes is not precisely defined. The OECD 
Oslo Manual (2005) Guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data”61 spreads it 
discussion over 166 pages, but reaches the conclusion: 
Both the measurement and analysis of the role of demand in innovation are problematic. It is 
very difficult to isolate demand effects from supply, and little is known about how to measure 
demand effects in surveys.  
 
Demand for the productivity increase from innovation seems to be one of the most important 
success factors; though measuring this demand is not easy. 
 
Rogers98 recommends measuring inputs and outputs of the innovative activity. Looking at the 
capital invested into a project with many elements, and then examining the output as shown 
in the company annual reports; is a consistent measure applicable to all projects.  This 
approach is taken. 
 
Another measure proposed by Griliches99 was using patents as an input indicator, but 
concluded “inventions that are patented differ greatly in their quality” and reflected only a 
firms willingness to spend the money to take a patent. This might be for political or strategic 
reasons, more than innovation. Basberg100asks: 
 To what extent do patents reflect the commercial use of technology? 
 How does the usage of the patent system vary across firms and industries? 
 
The existence of a patent does not signal commercial activity, nor does lack of a patent 
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indicate that the firm is not about to spend billions of dollars on a process plant. Firms may 
choose to keep as trade secrets details of a novel plant, rather than reveal them in an open 
patent.  An examination of patents held by a large multi-national firm showed well 
considered technology patents which they had not implemented, and huge technology plants 
that were not patented…and then failed. This is counter intuitive, and suggests that there 
might be more subtle motives in both patenting and innovative plant building.   
Thus patent activity is of little obvious use in defining innovation in resource process plants, 
much the same result that Basberg finds across a broader spectrum. 
  
2.6.1 Success and failure of innovation 
 
Van der Panne, van Bers, and Kleinknecht101 review 43 published papers on success and 
failure of Innovation, and found wide agreement existed on the positive impact of: 
 
• A firm’s culture that is susceptible to innovation and recognizes the collective nature of 
innovation efforts; 
• A firm’s experience with innovation projects (learning-by-doing; learning-by-failing); 
• The multidisciplinary character of the R&D team; in particular equilibrium between 
technological and marketing skills, and the attendance of a product champion; 
• An articulated innovation strategy and a management style suited to that; 
• Compatibility of the project with the firm’s core competences; 
• Product quality and price relative to those of substitutes; 
• Adequate timing of market introduction. 
Some of these themes will be recognised in the models developed in Chapter 3. 
 
Carr102 shows that across a range of change projects the failure rate is between 70-80%, with 
those projects where the outcome is easily measured failing more often than those where 
there was some subjectivity. This finding is much more optimistic than Australian resource 
processing case outcomes, where failure rate was 99% of investment. 
 
The linkage between a firms innovation experience is critical, whether they learned by 
failing, trying again and then succeeding or by doing and succeeding.103 Bessant rhetorically 
questions: if technological innovation is essentially a learning process, what capabilities 
need to be acquired in order to be able to deploy it as a strategic resource? And finally, how 
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might such capabilities be developed within the firm? The firms that found a pathway to 
innovation knew both routes.  
 
Wind & Mahan104 found that experience in similar projects allowed for substantial reduction 
in time and investment in following innovations. Larger firms who cut and ran earlier built no 
useful experience other than innovation avoidance. A firm’s track record and focus is used to 
assess risk in innovation implementation in the models proposed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Government Involvement and Value Adding 
There must be government involvement in every resource project as the States regulate and 
tax their land and coastal fringes; and the Federal Government owns offshore resources. They 
exercise this ownership for the benefit of the people; as they interpret this interest. They seek 
the optimum economic, political and social interest benefits from the lease terms under which 
they allows access to the non- renewable resources.   
 
In Australia ownership of all mineral resources is vested in the State. As such, the Australian 
government is owner of the offshore petroleum resources seaward of the 3nm limit. It 
develops these resources as an agent of the Australian people, therefore assuming a 
stewardship role.105 
 
Royalties average 4.7% for low and 7.8% for high resource value, and contribute an average 
of 9% of States revenues.106 The details of the value of the resources on which royalties are 
collected are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Resource value on which royalties are collected 
 
 
Table 10 shows the value of the royalty income flowing to the states. Western Australia is the 
largest recipient, and has involved itself more actively in value adding requirements. 
 
Millions of $ Australian NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT Total
High royalty minerals $16,870 $1 $30,061 $16,660 $972 $0 $293 $64,857
Low royalty minerals $4,818 $2,576 $7,734 $61,565 $5,060 $1,374 $1,898 $85,025
$149,882
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Table 10 Value of royalties collected by states 
 
 
Value adding to resource processing within a state is believed by State Governments to 
enables further streams of taxable economic value, more widely spread wealth creation and 
higher wage and skill job, and professional services. Thus there are direct and indirect 
revenue implication, economic multiplier effects, and vested interest benefits from value 
adding.   
 
As an example in the 2012-2013 financial year the output and approximate value of Olympic 
Dam (Case 48) was as shown in Table 11 107 
 
Table 11 Olympic Dam production and values 
 
 
It was reported that BHP-B paid $ 90 million in royalties (or about 5.3%) but spent $ 664 
million on wages for 4,000 staff and local supply contracts108 the non-royalty cash flow may 
be many times more important to the state economy. 
 
States also set the environmental conditions that must apply as part of the resource access 
agreement. These have become more comprehensive over time. Long established process 
plants with environmental regulations from decades past have a “right to pollute” advantage 
over a new project. 
Millions of $ Australian NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT Total
High royalty minerals $1,316 $0 $2,345 $1,299 $76 $0 $23 $5,059
Low royalty minerals $226 $121 $363 $2,894 $238 $65 $89 $3,996
State revenue estimate $1,542 $121 $2,708 $4,193 $314 $65 $112 $9,055
Commodity Mass Value
Copper (t) 166,200 $1,227,719,400
Uranium (t) 4,066 $310,654,598
Gold (oz) 113,246 $141,557,500
Silver (oz) 880,000 $17,600,000
$1,697,531,498
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Government involvement in value adding has been long standing and is bi-partisan. 
The emotion appeal of Government mandated value adding is captured in this 2001 example, 
but the practice of linking a licence to extract bauxite to secondary processing into alumina 
began in Western Australia in the 1960’s. 
 
Australia is the world’s largest miner of bauxite, accounting for about 40 per cent of 
production. It is also the world’s largest producer of alumina with about 30 per cent of 
production. However, it accounts for only about seven per cent of the world’s aluminium 
production. About 70 per cent of Australia’s bauxite is processed into alumina in Australia, 
but only 20 per cent of Australia’s alumina is processed domestically into aluminium. 
The total value of export earnings by the aluminium industry in 1998-99 was $6.3 billion—
$2.9 billion from alumina and $2.8 billion from aluminium metal. Only $350 million was 
earned from the export of semi-fabricated products. There is a substantial amount of value-
adding that already occurs in the aluminium industry—about $3.1 billion in 1997-98—but 
there is considerable potential for that to be increased.109 
 
A “secondary processing obligation” is simply a “if you mine you must refine … in the way 
we tell you”.  “The State’s broad objectives are to: 
• Facilitate the efficient and effective development of the State’s natural resources; 
• Manage the development by ensuring it is consistent with State policies on issues such 
as land use, conservation, competition, infrastructure sharing, secondary processing 
development and maximising local content; and 
• Ensure that development provides economic and social benefits for the Western 
Australian community.”110 
 
The obligation to transform $20-30 a tonne bauxite into $330 per tonne alumina has worked 
relatively well over the last 50 years. The process was mature; and well understood, the firms 
involved were large and reputable, and the economic outcome was favourable both for firms 
and the state. 
 
The success of the bauxite to alumina obligations let to further planning for a more value 
adding from collaborative efforts directed by research agencies, funded by industry and for 
the advantage of government.111  
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The Light Metals Action Agenda produced a dynamic vision for 2020 that would see:   
• The aluminium industry to expand its combined domestic and export market by more than 
30 per cent; 
• Magnesium metal output tonnage of 800 000tpa, with exports capturing 50 per cent of the 
growth in world demand over the next 20 years; 
• Titanium to develop a metal output tonnage of 25 000tpa, establishing a 25 per cent share 
of the global market, and; 
• The downstream sector to continue in the establishment of a vibrant and sustainable export 
orientated industry using all three metals in new innovative products. 
The progression of the Vision will be through the collaborative efforts of industry, research 
agencies and Governments. 
 
The $370 million112 invested by the Federal, and Queensland Governments in the Stanwell 
Magnesium project was linked to this vision. CSIRO invested, and lost $75 million.113  The 
vision has not been realised. The Aluminium industry is closing smelters, of the seven 
operating in 2001, Kurri Kurri, producing 160,000 tonnes a year closed in October 2012, and 
Point Henry, producing 190,000 tonnes per year will be closed in 2014. The Gove Alumina 
refinery is to be closed in July 2014. Australian production of magnesium and titanium is, as 
yet, non-existent. China now produces 640,000 tonnes of the total world production of 
750,000 tonnes of magnesium. 
 
A counterpoint, from the above report was provided by Minerals Council of Australia.114 
The idea of adding more value to our minerals and agricultural products by further 
processing is often advanced. Value adding is seen as a way of increasing employment 
through jobs in processing; improving our net export performance - through exporting 
"higher value" products; reducing Australia's exposure to price fluctuations for raw 
materials; and improving regional or national income …"Value adding" is a subtle concept. 
Decisions to encourage and undertake further value adding must be taken in a manner that 
ensures they do not subtract value from the total economy by diverting resources from where 
they could be most efficiently and effectively used.” 
 
A second counterpoint, from the Australian Productivity Commission, stated:115 
“The existence of a divergence of interests between public and private objectives is not 
 61
clearly established, and further, government agencies do not appear to have superior 
technical knowledge to that of the private sector, it is not clear that the benefits from 
government intervention outweigh the costs." 
 
This quote points to a significant information asymmetry, and the possibility for strategic 
misrepresentation. The politicians and administrators making decisions; are at best, dealing 
with firms that have much better information and understanding of the processes and profits. 
At worst they may be seeking to implement political outcomes that are not economically 
rational for the firms. 
 
Gravelle and Rees argue that market failure is often a problem of property rights. 
Markets are institutions which organize the exchange of control of commodities, where the 
nature of the control is defined by the property rights attached to the commodities.116 The 
rights to access and transform resource property owned by the state by firms can be less than 
optimal in information asymmetry and commercial understanding of market function. Both 
state and miners might utilise strategic misrepresentation to achieve an outcome favourable to 
them. 
 
State Government rarely have mining engineers or successful commercial entrepreneurs 
amongst elected members, but often have a significant proportion of political staffers to 
previous ministers, lawyers and trade union officials.  The difference in this example being 
both working knowledge and philosophical outlook; the entrepreneur or engineer has to work 
with “what is”; the lawyer or trade union official is much more focused on “what should be”. 
This leads to the next topic. 
 
 
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Strategic Misrepresentation 
The 2001 Prize in Economic Sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to three 
academics for "for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information".117 
“Many markets are characterized by asymmetric information: actors on one side of the 
market have much better information than those on the other. Borrowers know more than 
lenders about their repayment prospects, managers and boards know more than shareholders 
about the firm's profitability.”  
Akerlof118sought to establish a structure … for determining economic costs of dishonesty. 
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There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of 
prospective purchases. In this case there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality 
merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose 
statistic is affected rather than the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction 
in the average quality of goods and the size of the market. A market may even cease to exist 
where there is widespread uncertainty as to quality.  
 
Akerlof continues with a model of new and used cars, which may be good or bad. The buyer 
does not know when he buys a new car, but after a period of time his knowledge of the cars 
quality is well informed. If it is good there is a desire to retain the vehicle, but if bad (a 
lemon) to on sell it to someone with less knowledge.  Thus the used car market is perceived 
to have a higher proportion of bad cars and attracts lower prices.  Even good used cars are 
driven down in value by the bad. The “bad” cars tend to drive out the good (in much the 
same way that bad money drives out good).  From these examples he finds that the cost of 
dishonesty is born unequally by honest traders, and that this is a significant restriction to trade 
and development. 
 
The Akerlof paper draws conclusions about the cost of dishonesty in markets in general: 
 The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is 
cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of 
existence. 
 
If these concepts were applied to innovative resource process plant, the question could be 
asked as to the quality of the failed projects, and whether the many failures destroyed the 
market for local innovations in process plant.  
 
Spence119 proposed and developed the idea of signalling, using education as a positive 
example. A job applicant signals that they are skilled at learning, or at least will make the 
investment needed to graduate and to comply with authority. They thus signal that they are 
better prospects for a structured employment environment.  
 
This type of positive example is recognised in resources plant projects by those firms with a 
track record of successful implementation. The signal is their past performance, which is a 
valued but somewhat subtle signal to the best informed. Those firms most active in signalling 
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future suitability for investment, without this past performance, send a strong negative signal. 
Their signal is anything but subtle, and is usually directed at the least informed. 
 
Stiglitz120 established the theory of screening. One of the most important kinds of information 
concerns the qualities of a factor or a commodity. We know that there are important 
differences among individuals, among bonds, among equities, among brands of automobiles. 
The identification of these qualities we call screening, and devices that sort our commodities 
(individuals) according to their qualities we call screening devices. 
 
Screening is the counterpoint to signalling, in that the buyer is seeking by a structured 
questioning procedure to differentiate between investments. As investors in a new process 
plant are usually under informed as to the risks and probabilities, a questioning and filtering 
process that used public domain information would encourage informed investment.  
 
One the main factors Flyvbjerg draws from his work with reference class forecasting is 
“strategic misrepresentation” described in 1990 by Kain121 and defined in 1991 by Jones and 
Euske.122 
 
“Strategic misrepresentation is the planned, systematic distortion or misstatement of fact – 
lying – in response to incentives in the budget process.” They identify that this is most 
profitable in relation to government, a point that Merrow touches upon, through only in 
reference to cost over runs in military procurement of new weapons systems. 
 
 Flyvbjerg123 expands on “strategic misrepresentation”, particularly in public transport 
projects, and finds that “costs are underestimated in 9 out of 10 projects”124  
 
The inaccuracies in 111 projects, over an 80 year period, have progressively increased, 
though not as much as in the earlier synthetic fuel example. He points out that project 
promoters gain a financial advantage from under estimation, in that they win the project. 
Once the project is underway the cost and risk are often passed to the taxpayer.  
Governments seeking to win support for popular projects may not be rigorous in the costing 
as the benefit is immediate, and the actual cost many years, perhaps even a different 
government into the future.125 
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In addition to “strategic misrepresentation” and “optimism bias,” there is a systematic 
tendency for people and organisations to overestimate their level of competence, and the 
likely outcome for an action.  Long delay between action and the account; or lack of specific 
responsibility seem to be significant in all.126   Flyvbjerg127 suggests that the lack of 
accountability for strategic misrepresentation and the rewards that flow from the practice, 
lead to the selection of the unfit projects; and there is evidence of this in the worst examples 
in this study.  
 
This is further explored in Chapter 3, with a model for information asymmetry and strategic 
misrepresentation. 
 
The veteran journalist Trevor Sykes, has written; as “Pierpont”; for the Financial Review for 
almost 40 years, and has authored a series of detailed and incisive books on Australian 
Economic History.128 His description of the problems with an innovative green-fields129 plant 
has been quoted many times.  
 
Pierpont routinely suggested that mining promoters were not always honest, and that the 
character, integrity and practical knowledge of the management team were the major 
considerations in success or failure.  This seems probable with some projects, where the 
information asymmetry between the proponents and the investors was abused. 
 
Case 7 a new technology process to produce light metal was the most spectacular failures in 
innovative plant. Pierpont’s comment expresses disbelief in management actions. “In all the 
statements about the Stanwell project, Pierpont has yet to see one which defines exactly why 
the project came up $200 million short. Didn’t they know how much steel or concrete they 
needed? And if they didn’t, what right did they have to put a prospectus before the public?  
Worse, Pierpont questioned how one senior manager, could have collected $320,000 in 
consultancy fees for commercialisation of the project when it has never been commercial.”130  
 
In 1995-96 BHP had Australia’s longest track record in conventional steel production; and 
their dominance of the market indicates that there were as competent at this endeavour as was 
possible in the local market. BHP was possibly better informed as to the economics of iron 
and steel production within the Australian market than any other firm. It was not a business 
they wanted to be in.  The lack of growth or profits and decline in value of the steel making 
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businesses since they divested indicates that the decision was well founded. 
 
BHP did not have a demonstrated firm competence in converting research work to practical 
production. At the time they were investing in the HBI project, they were duplicating at large 
scale a process they believed would work. However the reason for this project, even as early 
as 1997131 was political. 
 
On 31 March 1994, the Western Australian State Government agreed to delete all secondary 
processing obligations in respect of these agreements in exchange for a new secondary 
processing obligation and limits on production from three mining areas: Mining Area C, 
Yandi and Jimblebar. 
 
The new secondary processing obligation requires BHP Minerals Pty Ltd, alone or in 
association with others, to spend $400 million (in 1993 dollars) on the further processing of 
iron ore or on an alternative investment approved by the Minister for Resources 
Development.  Further processing is defined to include the production of iron and steel, 
direct reduced iron, hot briquetted iron, iron carbide sinter or pellets.  No time limit is given 
for this investment. 
 
The Agreement provides for the consideration of alternative investments in lieu of further 
processing if further processing proves not to be technically or economically feasible.  Until 
this obligation has been fully discharged, production from Mining Area C, Yandi and 
Jimblebar will be subject to tonnage limitations. 
 
The Western Australian State Government has agreed that the obligation to invest a further 
$400 million (in 1993 dollars) will be treated as satisfied when the construction of the first 
train of the HBI Plant at Port Hedland has been completed and commissioning has 
commenced (i.e. when the first hot briquette of iron from that train is produced). 
 
There is no mention of profit or market demand. This is a process to gain unrestricted access 
to an exceptionally profitable and desirable iron ore mining areas.  BHP made the investment, 
built the plant, and produced HBI. They met the obligation and gained the access. There was 
no contractual obligation to make the process work, and after some reasonable time, and 
genuine efforts it did not. 
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The consideration that the project might not work, technically or economically; seems to have 
occurred relatively early on. The project finance structuring was exceptionally competent at 
recording and utilising the losses that eventually occurred. The quality of this aspect of 
project planning was only publicly realised in March 2010, when BHP comprehensively beat 
the Australian Tax Office (ATO) in the conclusion of a long running case.132 The ATO had 
sought payment of $2.2 billion in tax.  
 
The long-running case relates to two bad debts that were written off by BHP Finance after 
loans were made to two subsidiaries. One loan was for the ill-fated construction of a plant in 
Western Australia to produce briquettes from iron ore fines (particles) in a bid to turn them 
into a valuable product -- and to satisfy an obligation imposed by the WA government that 
BHP had to be involved in secondary processing of iron ore. The project suffered several 
setbacks from its inception in 1995 until 2000, when the financing company decided to write 
off $1.8bn of the $2.2bn owed. This development also ran into problems and BHP Finance 
wrote off $310.9 million in the 2000 financial year. 
 
One of the issues in both the original case and the appeal was whether BHP Finance was 
actually in the business of lending money. The court heard the company had no employees 
and paid management fees to BHP. The tax office argued it was merely an "appendage" to 
BHP, and not in the business of lending money, but the court rejected this argument. 
 
BHP met its state obligation, and gained access to iron ore resources, then passed the 
majority of the losses it incurred in implementing a value adding project that failed to the 
Commonwealth, and effectively the Australian taxpayer. 
 
2.8.1 Moral Hazard in government involvement in value adding 
 
Moral hazard arises where a person or institution can avoid much of the consequences and 
responsibilities of their actions.  It applies as much to governments as firms, or institutions 
and individuals, who may act less carefully than they otherwise could. This leaves another 
party holding responsibility for the consequences of those actions.  Some of the large 
resource plant failures may involve moral hazard. Government involvement and incentives 
have had mixed, and often negative outcomes, that is not well understood even after the 
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events. 
 
“In contract theory, moral hazard results from a situation in which a hidden action 
occurs.133”  “It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when 
individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions 
affect the probability distribution of the outcome.134” 
 
The term Moral hazard has come from use in insurance industry, where one definition is: 
Circumstance that increases the probability of occurrence of a loss, or a larger than normal 
loss, because of a change in an insurance policy applicant's behaviour after the issuance of 
policy. It may be due to the presence of incentives that induce the insured to act in ways that 
incur costs the insurer (but not the insured) has to bear. In common usage, moral hazard 
suggests a conscious malicious or even illegal motivation, as opposed to an unconscious 
change in behaviour135. 
 
The concept was been mentioned by Adam Smith38, People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against 
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices…. But though the law cannot hinder people 
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate 
such assemblies, much less to render them necessary. Arrow’s 1963 paper136 is widely cited. 
Whilst he makes a strong case for universal medical insurance, he points out that there is a 
moral hazard when the event insured against is within the control of the beneficiaries. Cars 
and homes are insured against accidental fires, with severe consequences for the beneficiary 
who initiates their own misfortune. However in provision of health services the insurer pays, 
and the doctor and patient both receive benefits…in medical policies the cost of health care is 
not completely determined by the illness suffered by the individual but depends on the choice 
of doctor and his willingness to use medical services…the physician acts as the controlling 
agent on behalf of the insurance company …and it may be convenient to them to be pleasing 
to their patients. 
 
In an investment there is a risk that one party to a transaction or activity is not acting in good 
faith, or that one party has perverse incentives to act in a manner detrimental to the counter 
party. This is most probable when that party is insulated from a risk, borne more heavily by 
the other, and behaves differently than they would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. 
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Hulsmann137argues that: Moral hazard is present in “actions of economic agents to the 
detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. 
It is the incentive of a person A to use more resources than he otherwise would have used, 
because he knows, or believes to know, that someone else B will provide some or all of these 
resources. The important point is that this occurs against B’s will and that B is unable to 
sanction this expropriation immediately. Expropriation is using B’s property against his will 
with impunity.” 
 
Kotowitz138 explains that moral hazard may “be due to uncertainty and incomplete or 
restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages to the agent responsible.”  
 
Hulsman further argues that government effectively owns most property, or has the right to 
tax and regulate what is private, and government involvement has moral risk implications.  
 
Moral hazard involves information asymmetry, a situation in which one party in a transaction 
has more information than another. Arrow161 states: Where there is uncertainty, information 
or knowledge becomes a commodity. Like other commodities it has a cost of production and a 
cost of transmission, and so it is naturally not spread out over the entire population but 
concentrated amongst those who can profit most from it. 
 
One example would be the promoters of a gold mine share float, who were far better 
informed as to the exact grade of the deposit, and the cost and complexity of extraction; that 
the purchasers who were impressed with the “forward looking statements” in the prospectus 
and presentations.  In this case the party with more information is insulated from risk, in that 
they can sell their shares at the peak, and collect a salary for managing what unfolds, whereas 
the party with less information may take most of the negative consequences of the risk. Moral 
hazard can give the party with more information an incentive to behave inappropriately, and 
to the detriment of the party with less information.  
 
Balakrishnan and Koza139 explore joint venture, where information is shared by both sides to 
common benefit as a means of avoiding adverse selection. They found that such ventures 
between similar firms were beneficial and those between different firms more problematic.  
Adverse selection may have been a problem with some projects in the case study, where a 
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larger asymmetry of information, or misrepresentation allowed flawed projects to proceed. 
 
Akerlof and Romer 140  point out that where government implicitly guarantees a business 
there are “severely distorted incentives”.  “Because of this disparity between what the owners 
can capture and the losses that they create, we refer to bankruptcy for profit as looting.” 
“The introduction of even a relatively small number of looters can have a large effect on 
market prices.” 
 
They also point out that “Governments sometimes do things that optimizing agents would not 
do, and, because of their power to tax, can persist long after any other person or firm would 
have been forced to stop because of a lack of resources.” 
 
They propose a simple model: 
 
First, limited liability gives the owners of a corporation the potential to exploit lenders.  
 
Second, if debt contracts let this happen, owners will intentionally drive a solvent firm 
bankrupt.  
 
Third, when the owners of a firm drive it bankrupt, they can cause great social harm, just as 
looters in a riot cause total losses that are far greater than the private gains they capture. 
 
To modify this 1993 model focused on US “thrifts” to Australian resource projects the model 
changes only slightly. 
 
First, limited liability gives managers of a project the potential to exploit the investors.  
 
Second, if circumstances indicate that failure is unavoidable, managers have an incentive to 
intentionally drive a project to an outcome that maximises insider benefit in failure.  
 
Third, when projects are managed to fail, they can cause great social harm. The total of the 
losses, in the present project, and future projects foredoomed, are far greater than the private 
gains that were captured. 
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They propose: Once owners have decided that they can extract more from a firm by 
maximizing their present take, any action that allows them to extract more currently will be 
attractive-even if it causes a large reduction in the true economic net worth of the firm.  
 
A dollar in increased dividends today is worth a dollar to owners, but a dollar in increased 
future earnings of the firm is worth nothing because future payments accrue to the creditors 
who will be left holding the bag.  
 
As a result, bankruptcy for profit can cause social losses that dwarf the transfers from 
creditors that the shareholders can induce. Because of this disparity between what the 
owners can capture and the losses that they create, we refer to bankruptcy for profit as 
looting. 
 
Businesses are run by economical rational agents; Governments are run by politically rational 
agents. Business managers and politicians are professional insiders, often with significant 
skills and intuition. Shareholders and the electors are outsiders, often with limited interest or 
understanding of the complex processes involved.  
 
In theory business rewards managers for increasing shareholder value, but the two are not 
always directly related. When a business goes bad it is often necessary to pay management 
more for “staying on as Captain of the Titanic” rather than exiting.  
 
Managers as economically rational group; might be expected to put their own outcomes as a 
priority. When a receiver is appointed to a failed firm, they prioritise their costs and expenses 
as a priority over all others. The logic is the same. 
 
The largest worked example of this type of looting of a financial institution in Australia was 
the collapse of HIH Insurance on 15th March 2001, with losses of $5.3 billion. In sentencing 
Rodney Adler, the Director of HIH to 30 month jail, Justice Dunford said: 141 
 
The offences are serious and display an appalling lack of commercial morality…Directors 
are not appointed to advance their own interests but to manage the company for the benefit of 
its shareholders to whom they owe fiduciary duties…They were not stupid errors of 
judgement but deliberate lies, criminal and in breach of his fiduciary duties to HIH as a 
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director. 
 
This is very much what Akerlof and Romer are documenting, and may be option to consider 
when looking at failed resources plants at much the same time. 
 
2.9 Conclusion:   The need for such a new model and methodology 
 
In this study the failure of fifteen projects lost $12.5 billion dollars; 29.68% of capital 
invested. All had mathematically based “bankable feasibility” studies using existing insider 
methods. The majority of this loss was to shareholders and taxpayers. The failure of every 
“new process plant” made firms risk averse; yet a number of “improved process plants” gave 
great results. 
 
A new public domain model of resource project evaluation is needed. This model should: 
 
1.) Be simple in concept and application 
2.) Not require exceptional skill or knowledge 
3.) Use publicly available sources of information 
4.) Have robust predictive power  
5.) Gives prediction at the earliest stage of project conception 
6.) Uses an open model that may be tested, adapted and developed 
 
The retrospective models developed from the case study data assist in understanding why 
there was failure.  These might be used as forward looking models to predict failure, without 
stopping successful projects. These models use data that is known before the project started. 
 
Project evaluation from the insider (expert or proponents) view: 
 builds in bias 
 is by proponents seeking to proceed;  
 is by contractors seeking further work; 
 is focused on inputs from insiders; and political goals; 
 is about control, and access to reward; 
 is defensive against later responsibility; 
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3. INDICATORS AND ESTIMATION MODEL FOR SUCCESS AND 
FAILURE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Five models are proposed to deal with managing and considering the complexity of the data.  
These are shown on Sheet 8 of Appendix and through this chapter in tables. The first is a 
model for estimating the spectrum from failure to success. This is then applied to the other 
four models to examine the contrasts between the best and worst, and explain why this 
happened. The second model is an evolved model of firm competence, with the assumption 
that competent firms will be successful. The third model of New Process Innovation, 
contrasts the 99% of investment that failed with the 1% that succeeded. This raises the 
anomaly of why otherwise highly profitable firms could invest and lose billions in these 
endeavours. This leads to the last two models, the fourth examines the positive and negative 
roles of government involvement in value adding, and the fifth the model of information 
asymmetry and strategic misrepresentation in project failure. 
 
 
3.2 Success and failure estimation model 
 
The criteria for measuring success and failure are related to the viewpoint of the observer and 
the context of use, and may undesirably reflect a collective interest, ideology or belief 
system. This simple objective model of success and failure to large capital resource 
processing plants, based on post project evidence and comparative numerical data is 
developed, and applied equally to every case; using public domain data. 
 
Success is from the Latin “successus” an outcome. Thus success and its opposite failure are 
post event outcomes, capable of being judged from different angles. An outcome considered 
to be a failure by one party might be considered a success by another party, applying different 
criteria. . There is even more opportunity for variability in assessing the degree of success or 
failure in a project with a valued social change component, such as innovation. 
 
Success is defined by Collins English Dictionary 2003 as “the favourable outcome of 
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something attempted” and “the attainment of wealth.” Failure is defined by the same source 
as “non-performance of something required”  “cessation of normal operation” “an 
insufficiency or shortage” “a decline or loss” and “not reaching the required standard”. 
The model for failure and success is shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Failure to success model  
 
 
A resource processing or transformation plant might be viewed as a black box with inputs 
and outputs. Inputs, usually investments of capital and skills are supplied to meet quite 
specifically defined output objectives. A proposed investment of $100 million in a plant for 
gold extraction will have a “nameplate capacity” at which it will transform predicted volume 
of ore into a stated mass of gold. The reason to make such an investment is that the investor 
believes that the outcome of gold produced, less cost of production will be significantly more 
profitable than having the same funds being held in bank term deposits. The successful 
attainment of this objective give further life and growth to the company, and if it involves a 
new or innovative process, results in the adoption of this better process in other similar 
projects that follow. 
 
These criteria can be shown as outcomes. The first criterion is profit, which is related to 
production, commodity price, and return on investment. In the short term this is not always 
clear, as the profits of a firm may be across many projects, and only the agglomerated results 
show a firm profit. Firms with only one project that show a significant loss are easy to 
allocate. Firms with many projects of variable outcome, and modest profits can fail, and be 
taken over; even though the projects go on to be successful. Successful firms with solid 
profits can have anomalous project failures. In the long term this becomes clearer as 
successful firms decline to fund failed projects, and troubled but ultimately successful 
projects work by all the other criteria for their new management. 
 
Failure outcome model Success estimation model
The project and the firm made a loss The project and the firm made a profit
Production less than 70% nameplate capacity in 36 months Production better than 90% of planned output
CRoI more than double industry average < 106 months Calculated Return on Investment > 105 months 
Firm has ceased, been taken over, been deregistered Firm is alive, grows and evolves
Process is no longer worked, or only worked sub optimally Transforming process is worked and duplicated
 76
The second criterion is production of transformed commodity as a percentage of the 
“nameplate capacity” where percentage below 90% indicated trouble, and a percentage below 
60% was fatal. The average the most successful 50 projects was 99%. The average for the 17 
projects least successful projects was 33%. Case 46 which failed with a production of 88.5% 
was wiped out by low commodity price, and freak weather occurrence, a pollution disaster 
and failure of its US parent. Case 44 which succeeded with a production of 65.3% has 
subsequently been closed as the most uneconomic alumina refinery in Australia. Case 63 
which succeeded with 63.9% was a large deposit with unusual ore, but may have contributed 
to the economic failure of the firm who developed the mine. 
 
The third criterion is return of investment, as calculated by methods shown in Chapter 4.  
The point of differentiation between failure and success is captured in the quote from the 
1930’s depression era American commentator Will Rogers: “People should be more 
concerned with the return of their principal than the return on their principal.” Successful 
projects give the investors a variable but largely private return. Failed projects consume, 
rather publicly, the invested capital. Successful plants pay back their investments quickly and 
go onto profits. Failed plants have the potential to repay their investment so slowly, that they 
have difficulty attracting further investment to sort out their myriad problems. They eat the 
investors’ capital till it is almost gone, or worse, if they use complex financial structures; 
leave the investor with nothing. The average for successful projects was 53 months. Projects 
over 106 months were failures or in 4 cases projects done for an environmental outcome, not 
a production increase. 
 
The fourth criterion is the “life” of the firm. Success allows firm growth, and evolution. 
Failure leads to firm extinction via bankruptcy and de-listing or incorporation into a more 
successful firm. Better managed failure, enabled the selection of the new owner. Employees 
were able to continue with careers, plants continued to transform and investors moderated 
their loss. Badly managed failures spend much time having their troubles examined by 
lawyers and regulators. Employees had to find new roles, and investors largely lost their 
finds. 
 
The fifth criterion is the life of a transforming process. Successful process innovations are 
reasonably widely and quickly adopted, in that they are notably more efficient at the desired 
transformation than previous technology. Unsuccessful process innovations may offer some 
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advantages, but with risks and difficulties that make them unattractive in the Australian 
economic context. Failed process innovations are not duplicated, as whatever advantage they 
might have offered was counterbalanced by more powerful risks or unforseen outcomes. 
 
These five criteria together differentiate a continuum from most emulated success, to “never 
to be repeated” failure. Around 72% of these private sector projects were successful enough 
to still be operating. 6% are still operating, but only as the initial failure and losses reduced 
their value to such a low level that they can “limp along”. 22% are dead; with their 
tombstones as stark reminder “not to do this”. 
 
The estimation used in the Appendix 3 is the addition of production (which is variable 
between 0 and 2.06 but averages .82 over all the 67 projects) plus life of firm and life of 
process, (which are 0.1 to 0.5 variables). The sum is multiplied by five to balance the 
weighting against the much larger numbers of returns (which is divided by 53 which is the 
average for successful projects). 
 
Of the 67 projects considered, fifteen failed, but 3 were purchased for around 10 cents in the 
dollar invested and returned to work, though under different production routines. 15 projects 
encountered difficulties that saw their firms seek takeover, or were in the takeover due to 
other firm difficulties; all went on to satisfactory performance. Thirty seven projects were 
successful. Two have subsequently been closed after operational conditions changed, and 
four were environmental upgrades. These are show as coloured bars in Appendices. 
 
3.3 Firm competence model for resource transformation 
 
Firm competence is a predictive model, for resource processing plant, of the ability and 
probability of a business entity to successfully complete the task they have proposed, with a 
better than average outcome for the investor. The plant operator obtains the wealth proposed 
by effecting the resource transformation in a superior manner, with favourable reliability and 
economy of production. 
 
Warren Buffett says “Risk comes from not knowing what you are doing.” This is applicable 
to individuals or groups.  A person learning to be an airline pilot, a brain surgeon, or a 
concert pianist; and a firm seeking to produce exceptional returns from transforming 
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resources, follow very similar paths.  Firm competence comes from knowing, exceptionally 
well they are doing, whilst and practicing and improving.  
 
Experience and practice in the field, focus on refining the particular special skills, scaling up 
of both to build competence and avoid risk, and the confidence of experts in all these 
abilities; are the four common factors of the Firm Competence model.  The selection of a 
pilot for a Boeing 747, or a brain surgeon who one would choose to operate on a loved one, 
or selecting a famous musician to hear at the Opera House follow this model. 
 
The pilot, for example, may start learning to fly on a glider or small single engine Cessna, 
work up over time to larger and more powerful and complex aircraft, spend some time in 
military or freight transport, before becoming responsible, after rigorous training and 
certification;  for the safety of hundreds of passengers as part of an organised team. 
 
Few airline passengers would want to trust their lives to a pilot or team without the 
knowledge, skills and practice to safely get them to their destination. Yet investors have 
entrusted their capital to teams lacking all four factors; who were attempting a new process 
for transforming resources into high value commodities. These investors lost their money. 
 
Where a resource processing firm had a track record of successful project implementation; a 
focus on a limited field of skill and technical competence; allied with a program of 
incremental improvements; who then scaled up existing successful plants to new and better 
plants by a moderate ratio; experienced the least risk, achieved the best project outcomes, and 
received a better return on investment. 
 
There is an apparent exception or anomaly with large and diversified firms, like BHP-Billiton 
and Rio Tinto. These firms have a broad range of largely successful activities, and have 
developed their firm competence in high profit areas, rather than technically challenging 
areas.  Both are predominant in iron ore and coal, which are harvested more than processed. 
This firm competence, which involves minimal resource transformation, is outside the focus 
of this study. 
 
The firm competence model and the core competence models are shown in Table 13. There 
are five key components to “firm competence” in resource processing plants. 
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Table 13 Firm Competence model 
 
 
Firm competence is the demonstrable skills, resources and will to complete the task.                       
It is most easily assessed as the historical track record of project implementation, production 
performance, and commercial outcome. They get the job done. 
 
Firm focus is specific dedication to excellence within a particular well-practised process 
expertise to achieve a superior outcome. This is rarely general over a broad range of complex 
resource transformations. As such a focus is exceptional; it will be difficult to copy. The 
productivity increase from focused specialisation has been noted from Greek Antiquity with 
Aristotle’s quote of "We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, therefore, is not an act, but a 
habit." A specific focus on a particular resource, with a practiced and evolved technology, 
leads to superior reliability of commodity delivery at enhanced profit margins. The focus on a 
particular resource, processing technology, and supply chain to customer; leads to planned 
and constant incremental improvements that reduce risk. The focus on a specific resource and 
technology means that the new plant to be built will incorporate much of the skills and design 
of the last. The “DNA” from previous plant design and implementation “evolves” by 
selecting what works best and avoid that which was troublesome.  
 
Scale up ratio on previous similar plant a simple metric. Skills and knowledge are more 
economically developed through small scale trial and error, scaled up in progressive steps. 
Radical innovation at bench scale has a low cost of failure, and full opportunity to learn from 
failure. Trial and error with a full scale plant is a recipe for waste, and delay at exceptional 
cost. Cutting and changing pipework on a 50 kg per hour pilot plant has a moderate cost, in 
that few people are idle whilst it happens, and it is expected in the budget. Cutting and 
changing pipework on a 5 tonne per hour production plant (~ 45,000 tonnes per annum) 
usually sees the whole plant stopped, and hundreds of employees idle on full pay. The loss of 
a week’s production of nickel and cobalt from a HPAL plant can be around $4 million of 
Firm Competence failure  model Firm Competence success  model
Limited or no relevant track record of success Track record of successful implementation
Limited or no prior firm focus in area endeavour Firm focus in particular area of endeavour
Large scale up from previous similar project success Modest scale up from previous similar project success
Firm financed at high interest from least informed Firm engenders financial confidence from best informed
The firm and the project made a loss The firm and its projects regularly made a profit
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production. If the budget is tight and financial confidence short, the plant is probably doomed 
by a few such weeks. Building a copy of existing working plant with improvements, or a 
copy that is 50% to 100% larger is largely risk free. Building a new process plant at mega 
scale, without these steps involves almost certain risk of failure.  
 
Financial confidence comes from investors, customers, and stakeholders. If they believe, 
based on past performance, that the firm will get the job done, reliably and with minimal risk 
then they will invest, and enter into favourable contracts. Once a firm is widely perceived as 
competent, reliable and low risk they can raise patient capital at favourable rates and terms. 
Their shares are often sought after and rise significantly in value, which is highly desired by 
the initial investors. They can win long term supply contracts from customers who are 
adverse to delivery uncertainty. An example would be LNG supply to a Tokyo gas company 
with 25 million customers who will be irate if the gas or electric supply is interrupted. Failure 
and risk are not financeable options. This firm competence is difficult to imitate, and is a 
barrier to new entry that gives advantage to existing competent operators.  Firms with limited 
financial confidence, have higher cost of capital, often at twice the interest rate applicable to 
competent firms. In retrospect this is not high enough to compensate the investor for the 
losses that are shown in this study, linked to lack of firm competence.   
 
Regular profits are both an outcome of the other criterion, and one that contributes to 
financial confidence. Investors seek returns from a share of profits paid as dividends, and the 
payment of good dividends also leads to a sustained appreciation in share price, again 
rewarding the investor. No profits, no dividends and declining share price destroy the original 
investment. 
 
These five points have parallels and differences from the original work by Hamel and 
Prahalad who proposed three key criterions for “Core Competence”. 
 It is not easy for competitors to imitate. 
 It can be re-used widely for many products and markets. 
 It must contribute to the end consumer's experienced benefits.  
 
This new model is proposed as, based on the study of sixty seven resource processing 
projects, the first and third of Hamel and Prahalad’s criteria are demonstrated, but the second; 
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that core competence could be used widely over many projects is not evident. In fact the 
opposite is shown in the case studies. Large firms with exceptional competence, and long 
term profitability in some areas of resource businesses; had significant problems in successful 
implementation and operation of process projects that were outside their “firm competence”. 
BHP and after 2001 BHP-Billiton is the world’s largest mining company, with 125,000 staff 
at more than 100 locations, generated revenue of $72.2 billion US, and profits from 
operations of $23.752 billion US142.   In the 67 Australian resource processing projects over 
18 years, 13 are associated with BHP or BHP-Billiton. 
 
Five processing plants (12) Kalgoorlie Acid Plant, (13) Phosphate Hill, (41) Kambalda 
Nickel Concentrator, (42) Mt Keith mine and concentrator, (48) Olympic Dam expansion; 
were all purchased from WMC Resources Limited on 29th June 2005.  Phosphate Hill was in 
financial difficulties due to low commodity prices and was sold to Incitec Pivot Ltd. The 
other four plants were retained as profitable operations. In retrospect the purchase price of 
$9.2 billion Australian seems to have been an exceptionally good investment.143 
 
Four resource processing plants, all utilising new process technology; (1) Boodarie Crude 
Steel plant, (9) Ravensthorpe Nickel/Cobalt from Laterite plant, (10) Yabulu Nickel refinery, 
and (11) Beenup Mineral sands operation all failed. 
 
Two resource processing plants owned and operated by BHP-B (64) the Cannington silver 
and lead plant, and (25) the Worsley Alumina Refinery (86% BHP-B Owned) have been 
completed and operate successfully. Two plants on which BHP-B has a 16.67% interest were 
managed and operated by Woodside Petroleum Limited. 
 
BHP-Billiton has demonstrated firm competence in gaining control of iron ore and coal 
resources, that are not elaborately transformed or processed; and this is the core of their 
profitability. They also show firm competence at high level in the harvesting of these 
resources, then transport and shipping to customers, and maintaining margins and sales 
volume with their customer base. 
 
However this exceptional and profitable firm competence did not extend beyond the mature 
technologies employed at Worsley and Cannington.  WMC, which effectively ran out of 
capital in 2005, was far more competent at implementing complex new process plant 
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projects.   
 
The role of financial confidence is crucial in resource transformation, and will be illustrated 
with a number of case studies.  Firm and team competency engenders respect and trust from 
groups who study and finance resource projects. They back teams with a track record in a 
particular type of endeavour, because risk is low and probability of repayment high. Firms 
with adequate capital usually succeed; firms without adequate capital usually fail. 
 
Dunning and Kruger proposed that, for a given skill, incompetent people will: 
1. Tend to overestimate their own level of skill; 
2. Fail to recognize genuine skill in others; 
3. Fail to recognize the extremity of their inadequacy; 
4. Recognise and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they are exposed to 
training for that skill. 
 
Competent firms: 
1. Tend to rationally estimate their own level of skills in specific areas 
2. Tend to recognize genuine skills in other firms, that they engage with; 
3. Accurately recognize the limits of their adequacy; 
4. Organise projects to match critical needs to recognized skills. 
5. Operate to the advantage of their investors. 
 
Firm competence is shown by: 
1. A track record of successful implementation within 
2. An area of firm focus, in which they are known to be exceptional 
3. At modest plant scale up ratio, or using small steps up for innovation  
4. And is recognised and rewarded by astute business and financial partners. 
5. Investors being rewarded with above average returns. 
 
3.4 New process innovation model 
 
The model is related to the previous hypothesis, and focuses on the projects with more radical 
innovation processes, and focuses on the scale up steps in the development. A new process is 
one where few if any working process plants have been build. Firm competence and practical 
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experience come from their existing projects and the stage of knowledge building in pilot 
plants.  A firm that develops a process to solve a problem they face every day has an 
advantage over the firm that adopts a process to meet a need they believe is important. 
When the process is new, so the interactions with the specific ores can be a painful process of 
discovery, and the knowledge, based on prior experience, to manage both is valuable. Trying 
“something new” at a small scale where inevitable troubles and learning can be low in cost; is 
logical and desirable. A staged scaling up of plant size allows a new process to be evolved to 
match the resource, test the market, and for the operators skill to increase. 
 
This only happened in one new process plant, the least expensive and the only success. 
The reasons for a firm to invest in a new process plant project are often, but not exclusively 
found in the following six concepts. 
 
 A new method is proposed to affect a much improved or unique value adding 
transformation. Such radical innovations as MacArthur Forrest Process (Gold), Bayer 
Process (Alumina), Hall Herault Process (Aluminium) and Flotation process (Ore 
concentration) transformed the respective industries, brought wealth to practitioners, 
and rendered the prior processes obsolete and uneconomical. 
 The existing processes are progressively less productive, often due to exhaustion of a 
preferred type of resource. An alternate, less desirable, more available and or more 
complex resource requires a new process. The HPAL Process for nickel and cobalt 
from Laterite ores is an example. 
 The potential resource body is large, under-utilised, and low in cost, compared to the 
declining availability of traditional resources. Large reserves of laterite ores are an 
example, with nickel sulphide ores increasingly exhausted. 
 The desired commodity is seen to be likely to be, or projected to be; subject to 
increasing demand and hence increasing commodity price rise; and thus profitability. 
 The new process is often promoted, with a positive or promotional bias, as relatively 
trouble free, and giving an exceptional commodity with superior quality and hence 
price. If the new process can deliver productivity benefits the profit potential can be 
more attractive than traditional ventures. Enthusiastic “new process” promoters had 
found investors more than willing to be optimistic in the time frame when these 
projects were built. Due to failures this is much less so now. 
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 New processes have been in the more distant past, exceptionally profitable 
investments. The MacArthur-Forrest process transformed the Gold recovery and the 
Bayer and Hall–Héroult process created the Aluminium industry. These rapid 
advances in many types of technology have made the successful firms wealthy and 
rewarded the astute investor. As an example, in 1888 Charles Hall started the 
Pittsburgh Reduction Company to implement his invention. In 1907 this became the 
Aluminum Company of America, and today is the $25 billion a year turnover Alcoa.  
 
New processes, to resolve technical difficulties in processing a resource, are often radical 
innovations, and have high risk. Those new processes when scaled up rapidly and without 
extensive testing, and without a capital reserve to resolve implementation difficulties failed.  
Two new processes that followed a long path of progressive scale up, incremental innovation, 
and adequate capital; one succeeded and one did not as yet.  
There are twelve projects that are radical innovation new process plants, which hoped to 
transform their industry segment. One project (Case 40) succeeded brilliantly and has been 
duplicated many times and the technology exported around the world. The eleven other 
projects failed rather disastrously, largely destroying the investment.  The input steps are 
subtlety different, the outcomes diametrically opposed. There are two outcomes, each with 
dramatic and subtle differences in development and implementation models.   
 
The 12 new process plants represented a total investment of $12,098 million with an average 
project value of $1,008 million.  The 55 plants that were “old or incremental innovation 
process” had an average project value of $616 million. The new process plants were almost 
64 % more costly than the average mineral processing project. Had the plants been built for 
the original estimated cost, as first shown in ABARE data their total cost would have been 
$5,050 million or an average cost each of 421 million. This is well below the average for the 
complete set of 67 projects, and still below the average for 55 mature process plants. The 
time management or completion delays for the new process plants was estimated at 97% over 
estimates leading to a cost over-run  estimated at 2 .4 times the original budget.  
 
The successful project Case 40 was the exception. It experienced no completion delay and 
only a 10% cost growth.  
 
All new process plants, except Case 40 failed. One failed plant, under new management 
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(Case 10) reverted to an earlier old process technology and went back to full production. 
Another one (Case 3) was able to produce a reduced product stream, after more investment 
beyond the initial failure. One plant (Case 7) was only 5% complete, when stopped. The 
others all reached variable, but below nameplate, levels of production, before being closed. 
Seven have been scrapped, or are in the process of being “de-constructed”144 (Cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 
6, 7, & 8). Three sold to new owners, one (Case 10) returned to its original and profitable 
pyro-metallurgical use, another (Case 3) returned to partial nameplate production, and the 
third (Case 9) has not yet reached moderate success.  
 
Case 40 has transformed 210,000 tonnes of ore per year into copper for the last 20 years. This 
4.2 million tonnes of production, at the March 2013 value of $7,700 per tonne could be 
valued at $32.3 billion.   The new process, ISASMELT, has been installed and is operating at 
11 other locations since Case 40 was completed, and is in the process of installation at 6 more 
sites.145 
 
The remarkable contrast between the successful ISASMELT Case 40 and the other 11 
failures is that the successful project, at $110 million was the lowest in cost by a wide 
margin, the fastest to build, and lowest in cost over-run.   
 
ISASMELT cost $110 million; the average for the 11 failed projects was over a billion 
dollars. It was built in seven months; the average for the other 11 projects was 31 months, 
with an average of 59% delay over projected completion. ISASMELT was 10% over budget, 
versus an average 2.4 x original budget for the others. 
 
Every one of the 11 new process projects that failed destroyed the vast majority of investor 
value, or transferred losses to the taxpayer via complex accounting.  Sadly the firm that 
developed the new process that worked so well, Mount Isa Mines, fell into financial 
difficulties and was taken over by Xstrata in 2003 for $2.9 billion. Xstrata has continued to 
develop and promote a suit of process technologies.146 
 
Some of the evolutionary concepts of how “scale up ratio” interacts with “new process 
projects” were put forward 85 years ago by Russian engineer Peter Palchinsky. 147 
The three concepts are: 
1.) Seek out new ideas and try new things. This is like the evolutionary concept of 
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“random variation”. 
2.) When trying something new, do it on a scale where failure is survivable. Building a 
“mega-project” without a trial and learning mini-project can be costly. 
3.) Seek out feedback and learn from your mistakes as you go along. This is like the 
evolutionary concept of 'natural selection.' 
 
These concepts model natural evolution, and successful incremental improvement in resource 
transformation plants. The one successful new process project, ISASMELT, was the one 
project that largely followed these concepts.  Eight others launched from limited prior 
application into mega-projects, in one over reaching step and failed.   
 
Peter Palchinsky was executed in 1929 for his opposition to gigantic projects. After his death 
the three major projects he had opposed, the Dnieper Dam, Magnitogorsk, and White Sea 
Canal had human and economic costs that that could only be tolerated in a dictatorship, and 
benefits that were delayed, subject to extensive and repeated rebuilds, and well below 
expectation. 
 
Two key factors are highlighted by the conflicting views of Palchinsky and Stalin.  The first 
is that the state driving innovator is top down, a decision is made and implemented, and 
questioning is unwise. The collective structure of the state is engaged, people and 
organisation are joined in.  The second part is that collective projects are often big.   The 
building of the pyramids can only happen in an organised state focused on a common goal 
over decades. Such a project, a large dam, canal, pyramid or process plant is hierarchical, and 
difficult to modify once committed. This has many similarities with mega project 
construction. 
 
The alternative is the individual or small team, trying and testing small ideas that can grow. 
Most, like random genetic mutation, will fail, cheaply and quickly. Some that have technical 
advantage will grow and prosper in small steps and stages. Each step and stage has a low cost 
self-correction potential.  In time as the scale of the projects grow, the level of investment and 
organisational control must increase, but they are then duplicating and scaling up a concept 
grow by multiple iterations. Failure has already happened many times early, cheaply and 
quickly, and has been corrected when small.  
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The model for new process innovation is shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 New process innovation model 
 
 
The first criterion is ownership and responsibility. Innovation is more efficiently 
“championed” by an individuals or small teams of innovators with direct ownership and 
responsibility. Their greatest reward comes from the successful implementation and adoption 
of the process. They have made a personal and public investment in success, and failure 
brings pain, shame and fiscal disadvantage.  
The second criterion is Complexity and performance. The innovative process is initially 
simple, and with evolutionary development becomes incrementally more complex. The 
process works at the micro scale, and shows utility at every stage of the scale up. The initial 
process system is simple, low cost at small scale, and incremental improvements are 
economical. Thus it is relatively easy and quick to implement with modest resources and 
early trial and measurement of outcome is practical. Rapid modification at small scale is 
practical and economical, there is little ego invested, and a billion dollar plant construction is 
not delayed. Process complexity evolves with process incremental improvements over a 
longer time 
 
The third criterion is Step up stages and benefits. Multi stage scale up steps, incremental 
improvements, and “bug fixes” before a commercial plant. Many moderate iterative scale-up 
steps in process development enhance efficiency and potential utility. Incremental 
improvements in process, associated knowledge base, and tacit knowledge of operators is 
built with low cost and risk 
 
There is a great advantage in being able to fail fast, change cheap, learn quickly at smaller 
scale. Failure is able to be admitted and resolved without endangering the project. 
Complexity evolves with process incremental improvement steps over time, leading to a new 
New process innovation failure model New process innovation success model
Management with limited responsibility or ownership Individual Ownership and responsibility
Initially complex process that became more complex Initial process simplicity that evolved
Rapid scale up to mega scale without evolution Multistage incremental scale up with evolution
Many firms chasing same perceived opportunity Niche demand for innovation
The process made a losses from start to finish The process made profits quickly and repeatedly
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process that delivers significantly more product for lower cost than existing processes. 
 
The fourth criterion is Niche demand and uptake. The small focus a "micro climate" of 
small scale innovation is not visible to larger predators. There is a strong unmet demand for 
product and process visible to practitioners, who are often closely connected to the firms who 
will benefit. 
 
They can see that existing processes are inadequate for transforming new of existing 
resources. A new type of cheap and abundant resources may be available but requires new 
process to implement. This unique transformation advantage is relatively easy to establish at 
small scale. In some cases due to the small scale of innovation there are few competitive 
players in early stages of development. Firms that have unique need for the new process, for 
their resources, often have a good expertise base to do implement it. 
 
Once implemented successfully and profitably other firms with similar unique needs adopt 
process world-wide relatively quickly. The new process transforms the market and makes 
others processes economically and technically obsolete within the life span of existing plant. 
 
The only successful innovation project was built on brown-fields site, by a firm who wanted a 
solution to a problem costing them dearly. The development and practical of the submerged 
lance smelting process by John Floyd, inside, then outside CSIRO enabled smelting of 
sulphide ores and waste slag recovery of lead. 
 
The fifth criterion is that the process made a profit. The one successful innovation project 
(Case 40) first enabled its developing firm to process ores more productively, and make 
better profits. The productivity and profitability are shown by other firms with similar needs 
buying licences to duplicate the process over the next two decades. 
 
 
3.5 Government involvement in value adding process model 
 
Ownership and taxation of resources has become more complex, with competing and 
overlapping interests. State governments own the resources under their boundaries, and three 
nautical miles to sea.  Oil and gas outside three nautical miles is Commonwealth owned. The 
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Commonwealth collects income taxes, and a range of other taxes, charges and levies. States 
collect royalties and a range of taxes, and indirect benefits from resource extraction and 
processing.  
 
For states the value that may be extracted from local supply contracts feeding the state 
taxable economy, as well transport and infrastructure charges, can be larger than the royalties. 
An example would be the investment in building the narrow gauge rail line that linked Mt Isa 
to Townsville in the late 1920’s enabled the development of the rich mines, but at a price that 
has since taken a large share of profits, and largely funded the Queensland rail network for 
the last 90 years.148 
 
Governments seek both economic and political return from resource access. These can be 
contradictory, in that maximising economic return can be based on best past practice for the 
type of resource.  Political advantage may be more urgent and effectively trade off economic 
return for a concession to an interest group. 
 
Uranium mining has been intensely political, especially in South Australia. The S.A. 
Government has urgently wanted the royalties and economic activity, from Olympic Dam. 
But they have sought to manage the uranium issue, with local processing and value adding. 
That this has led to an outcome that may be less than optimum for the state and the operator 
is explored in the Case 48 study.    
 
Gold mining is only moderately political, with State Governments largely content to collect a 
share of revenue. The modern exception is in the growing opposition to the use of cyanide in 
extraction. This is most notable in NSW, where two of three operations ship concentrate, and 
do not refine.  
 
In New South Wales the problems with poisonous cyanide tailings water required a more 
expensive modified process in Case 58. The gold and copper mine in Case 47 is the state’s 
largest investment at nearly $2 billion. Yet it has chosen to not refine the gold or the copper, 
avoiding the use of cyanide; and ships the metals as concentrate. This reduces risk and capital 
investment for the operator, and increases rail freight and port charges. The concentrate 
shipped in containers is between 25 and 26% copper by mass and 75 to 80 grams per tonne of 
gold149. The other 74-75% if fine crushed rock. The value of the concentrate is around $2,000 
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per tonne. 
 
Value adding is the processing of a resource to the most refined and highest value 
commodity, which is hopefully integrated into a local manufacturing value chain. To give a 
simplistic example, bauxite is valued at around $30 a tonne, alumina at around $300 a tonne; 
and aluminium until recently was around $3,000 a tonne. Transforming the aluminium into a 
motor vehicle could theoretically increase the value, the input of skilled human labour, by 
between $30,000 and $60,000 more per tonne.   
 
The opposite to value adding is concentrate shipping. In this process an ore is concentrated to 
a balance between transport costs and the value to the refiner for their needs and processes. 
The metal content might be between 20% and 30%, and poly-metallic ores are common. As 
local refining costs in Australia have risen over time, and transport costs have generally 
fallen, shipping concentrate is often more economical, involves less capital, and less risk.  
 
The purchaser in China, Japan or Korea feeds an existing refinery that may be closely linked 
to the next steps in the value chain. 
 
State and Federal Governments, and their public sector research organisations favour value 
adding, to the point where they invest in projects that are seen as strategic. Case 7 received 
$370 million and Case 8 received $155 million. Both failed are now scrapped. The 
governments received no value or return for their investment. 
 
For the operator the lower levels of transformation, such as concentration involve little risk. 
In this study of 67 projects over 18 years no project that concentrated ores failed. All failed 
projects were value adding refineries.  
 
Australia is the world’s largest exporter of low valued bauxite, with 73 million tonnes 
shipped in 2012. Bauxite has traded as low as $19 per tonne (in 2003)150 and as high as $39 
(in 2011).151   Through government value adding requirements, Australia is also produces 
20.4 million tonnes of alumina in 2011-12. Approximately 17.1 million tonnes of alumina 
was exported in 2011-12, with estimated revenue of $6.03 billion for the year; or about $352 
per tonne. 
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Starting in the 1960’s The Western Australian Government tied access to Bauxite to 
establishment of an alumina refinery. Other states followed, and this has become an accepted 
practice. Whilst there are some financial stresses on a number of Alumina refineries in 2013, 
over nearly 50 years the linking of profitable value adding in return for access to bauxite 
deposits has been successful. This is explored in the alumina case studies. 
 
Australia has the second largest reserves of bauxite in the world, about 22% of total. Far more 
precious is nickel, valued at between $22,890 (2011) and $17,600 (2010).152 Australia is the 
leading resource holder, with 28.4% of world total.153 This is larger than the next two 
resource holders, Brazil on 11.9% and New Caledonia on 9.7%. 
 
Australia is the largest exporter of iron ore in the world, with 525 million tonnes in 2012154 
contributing $62.7 billion of export revenue155. 
 
In contrast to the successful government intervention the mature technology of alumina 
production, there was little Government interest in the five innovative laterite nickel cobalt 
process plants that failed in the 18 year period.  There was strong Western Australian 
government intervention, to develop new and innovative steel making technologies; along 
similar lines to what had been achieved with bauxite and alumina. These achieved quite an 
opposite result; both projects failed and no secondary processing to crude steel now takes 
place. 
 
Thus the comparison in government intervention is; why did it work so well for bauxite to 
alumina and so poorly for iron ore to crude steel? 
 
A secondary consideration is why the South Australian government has received so little 
benefit from so much involvement in Case 48?. 
 
The government involvement in value adding model has five parameters shown in Table 15. 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 Government involvement in value adding model 
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The first criterion is a maturity and well understood process that has evolved over time. 
Alumina refining is the best example. This is closely related to the Asymmetric information 
model, in that where all parties have a good understanding of the inputs, the process and the 
probable outcomes, government involvement is likely to achieve the desired outcome.  
Conversely where the Government party has an information poor understanding or the inputs, 
process and probable outcomes government involvement is unlikely to result in the outcome 
desired by government.  This can be related back to the first model of firm competence.  Risk 
comes from not knowing what is being done. 
 
The second criterion is that the firm involved in government involved value adding is that it 
works best when the counterparty is mature firm with a complete value chain built around 
the commodity. The maturity of the firm means that its preferred business activities are well 
known, and how it deals with other parties, especially government are also well known. 
Examples would be Alcoa, which has been operating a value adding chain of bauxite to 
alumina to aluminium to processed aluminium products for more than a century, and has 
been involved with multiple governments in its international engagements.  Where the firm is 
new, or only wishes to work in a single transformation stage of a larger value chain, often 
with good reason; then the outcome will more likely be disappointing. The reason being that 
the extra transformation stage required is not one that is economic for the firm to undertake. 
   
The third criterion is related to the first and second. Where the value adding results in mutual 
benefit to the government and firm over many decades, and they openly agree to such a 
venture, then success is likely. Where the economic feasibility of carrying out the 
government desire marginal or where a Government commands an outcome that is contrary 
to economic reality, they can expect disappointment.  The story is told of King Cnut (Ruler of 
England 1016-1035) commanding the tide not to rise, and getting his feet wet.156 Where a 
lease requirement is at odds with economic reality the cost of compliance is uneconomic. 
Either the firm must absorb the loss, and potentially fail, or the firm must manage the 
Government Involvement failure model Government Involvement success model
New process, not well understood Mature and well understood processes evolved 
New firms with less established value chains Mature firms with complete value chain 
One sided benefits sought upfront Mutual benefit from decades on agreed collaboration
High level of reward for information asymmetry Low level of reward for information asymmetry
The project made a loss despite government investment The project made a profit after government involvement
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compliance to avoid the desired government outcome. Many Governments have a political 
desire for high technology projects that elaborately transform low value resources into high 
valued added commodities. This is more apparent in marginal electorates, before elections, 
and when good news is required. The investment in new plant often benefits the broader state 
manufacturing economy. The potential for more highly skilled and paid jobs is played out in 
media releases.  
An environmental counterpoint is that final value adding can be the part of the process with 
the greatest potential for environmental emissions. Government and operators have 
increasing social pressure to reduce any potential for pollution. This is a growing factor in 
decline of government enthusiasm for value adding projects. 
 
Where the process is not mature; and poorly understood by the government party, the risk of 
adverse outcome is unacceptably high. Risk comes from not knowing what is being done. 
Where the cost of meeting lease conditions is uneconomic, or unrealistic, then selective 
avoidance or decreased operation viability are likely to follow. The failure of the crude steel 
projects (Cases 1 and 8) are an example of the former, and the failure of WMC, who accepted 
value adding conditions for Case 48 project a part of the second. 
 
The fourth criterion points to the next model, of information asymmetry and strategic 
misrepresentation when related to government mandated value adding. Where there is a 
high level of potential reward for abusing information asymmetry, or engaging in strategic 
misrepresentation and the responsibility or liability for this action is limited; then it may be 
expected. 
 
The fifth criterion is that the project made a profit for the firm operating it, and indirectly 
delivered the benefits that the government hoped to achieve from the intervention. Where the 
project made a loss the firm operating it must eventually close or the government make good 
the shortfall. Case 30 was closed down when an offer of low cost natural gas supply was 
curtailed Territory government. The project was uneconomic and will be closed.   
 
 
 
3.6 Asymmetric information model. 
The asymmetric information model draws from a body of related academic research in 
 94
economics and contract theory. Where one side has better information than another, the 
unbalance of power, may be used by the more powerful to their advantage. Contracts between 
two or more unequally informed parties do not give the outcome the less informed party 
expected. 
 
Information asymmetry is a situation where the “insider” party in a contract has superior 
information or the process and probable outcomes compared to the others. The informed 
party, usually a proponent or project implementer can take advantage of the other party’s lack 
of knowledge for commercial advantage, and or avoidance of responsibility for their 
managing actions. This creates an unbalance of power in contract negotiation, and 
implementation. 
 
Information Asymmetry can lead to two morally questionable outcomes: 
 
Adverse selection is where the insider knowledge leads to behaviour that takes advantage of 
asymmetric information before a transaction. As an example, insisting on a cost plus 
contract; where a project can be projected by the informed insider, to have many complexities 
likely to drive up price; not understood to the outsider; usually investors. An alternative 
adverse selection would be where an informed party structured and managed a process to an 
outcome that failed to deliver the benefit sought by a Government that granted a valuable 
licence.  
 
Moral Hazard is where the insider knowledge leads to behaviour that takes advantage of 
asymmetric information after a contract. As an example, a manager in a cost plus contract is 
rewarded with greater margins if project costs escalate unsustainably. They are further 
rewarded if the project fails as they are fully remunerated up to failure point. They avoid 
responsibility for project performance as in failure the project does not perform. A project 
disaster hides a multitude of sins and mistakes that would be visible in a working 
embodiment. 
. 
The adverse selection example with Government may be extended into a moral hazard 
situation after contract. If the informed party felt that the benefit demanded was unrealistic 
and/or undeliverable, it might encourage the informed party to behave strictly within the law, 
but in a manner that avoided responsibility for a negative outcome, that still met the contract 
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conditions. 
 
Adverse selection is also a negative outcome selection for the less informed, in that they 
invest in a "bad" project that they would not have selected if they were better informed.  
 
Two options for managing adverse selection are signalling and screening methods. 
 
Signalling is modelling of the information publicly available on the proponents. Signalling is 
what a client tells the bank manager to elicit a loan. It may be self-serving, but can contain a 
pattern of useful information. A loan applicant displaying a noticeable lack of veracity in 
their signalling might well be politely declined.  A skilled contracting firm declining a project 
or insisting on a cost plus contract is signalling that they see the project as troubled. Project 
managers who seek to limit legal responsibilities by avoiding liability for the outcome send 
an even stronger signal, indicating trouble is almost unavoidable. 
 
Screening is a proactive process of gathering and modelling information. Screening is the 
questioning and checking done by the bank manager after the application in assessing the risk 
in the loan. The data gathering and methods of this thesis are a template for project screening. 
Moral hazard can be confirmed post project if the well informed insiders received almost all 
the benefits, but sustained little if any of the loss. The less informed outsider finds they have 
taken all the risks, taken almost all the losses, and received few if any of the benefits. The 
people paid to manage the project have taken the benefits but not been able to deliver any 
outcome promoted to the investor. 
 
“Strategic misrepresentation is the planned, systematic distortion or misstatement of fact—
lying—in response to incentives in the budget process.”157  As such it is difficult to prove 
outside a court of law, but may be modelled and patterned from the examples in case studies. 
The contrasts between exceptionally optimistic projections and subsequent lacklustre 
performance; where there is no other obvious reason; might reasonably lead to a well-
founded suspicion of strategic misrepresentation.  
 
Strategic misrepresentation should be differentiated from optimism bias. In optimism bias the 
proponent genuinely believes the projection and often shares in the risk. Where a 
management team, accurately report events and these insiders suffer loss, then optimism bias 
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is most likely.  Where firms like WMC have in optimism bias taken on too many challenging 
projects and suffered a reverse, the WMC management chose the path that gave the investors 
the greatest reward even at the cost of their own positions. The acceptance of responsibility 
for managerial actions is an indication of honest optimism bias being realised. 
 
But here the management team report events in an evasive and /or repeatedly unrealistic 
manner, transfers losses to less informed parties, shows unusual diligence in avoiding legal 
responsibility, whilst maintaining their own significant rewards, then strategic 
misrepresentation is more likely. A confirmation would be that the finally revealed losses are 
dramatic, unexpected to outsiders, and involve the insiders in no losses.  The planned, 
systemic and effective transfer of risk and loss from the managing insiders to the investing 
outsider is a strong indicator of strategic misrepresentation. 
 
Strategic misrepresentation might be active or responsive.  In active strategic 
misrepresentation, the insider is the architect of risk transfer to the outsider. In responsive 
strategic misrepresentation the insider is not the architect of the disaster, but the manager who 
can see an inevitable disaster coming and takes every careful step to ensure minimal losses 
for their own party. 
 
A firm that has a poorly considered commercial undertaking forced upon them, by superior 
force, might gain a better outcome by going through the required actions. By managing and 
planning for the almost unavoidable negative outcomes they aim to meet statutory 
requirements, avoid the superior force penalties, and minimise or transfer the losses that will 
inevitably occur.   
 
Whilst strategic misrepresentation may have a limited financial sacrifice involved for the 
insider proponent, the bulk of the loss is borne by the investing or contractually participating 
outside parties, and the bulk of the benefit is won by the strategic misinforming inside party.  
 
The problem in assessing where optimism biases (a genuinely held belief) ends and where 
strategic misrepresentation (a systematic plan to deceive) starts is not new. 
 
The maxim attributed to Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a Roman Consul of 127 B.C. who 
asked “Cui Bono” translated from Latin as “who benefits”, or” to whose benefit”; could well 
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be applied. The logic behind the question is the assumption that the person or people 
responsible for misfeasance may be found among those who have something to gain, or have 
retained financial gain as a result of their actions. In modern U.S. terminology “follow the 
money trail” says much the same. 
 
Proponents with optimism bias often invest their own capital in the venture, and suffer loss. 
Having optimism bias they may fail to foresee the responsibility they will bear if the project 
fails, and do not plan carefully to avoid legal liability. 
 
Proponents with strategic misrepresentation in mind have two well-formed models of reality. 
The first optimised one, of great benefits, is loudly proclaimed, and lavishly illustrated. The 
second pessimistic one is where they want to be sure they are not found responsible; usually 
has very few words or small print. Where both can be seen in a prospectus or a series of 
presentations there is a higher probability of failure. 
 
With Asymmetric information “Risk comes from not knowing what is being done or why the 
insider proponents are doing it.” 
 
The concept of information asymmetry being abused, to the benefit of the insider, at the 
expense of the outsider, is long standing. American author Samuel Clemens, writing as Mark 
Twain (1835-1910) was quoted as saying "A mine is a hole in the ground with a fool at the 
bottom and a crook at the top." This encapsulates the idea of abuse of information by 
strategic misrepresentation elegantly. 
 
The model, based on this rather complex preamble is as follows. 
 The level of information asymmetry between the parties is potentially the level of 
power unbalance in contract and or management responsibility; should the better 
informed party have wish for avarice or need to exercise this power in self-defence.  
The extension to existing theory is the concept of “active strategic misrepresentation” 
or self-benefit and “reactive strategic misrepresentation” or self-defence. This is the 
same sort of question asked for in a violent homicide … did the survivor seek the 
outcome, or find they had to defend their interests with whatever force was required. 
 The level of information asymmetry is all important. Where the parties are both well 
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informed of the opportunities and risks of a venture, based on a long history of 
implementing previous similar agreements, then there is little power disparity or risk. 
Where the less informed party is uninformed to the point where they are incapable of 
adequately understanding the process, the market, and the probabilities of risk, then 
an adverse outcome is more certain. 
 Government by control of resources and the apparatus to make and enforce laws is 
usually in possession of superior force. Operators and project proponents by 
experience and knowledge of the project details are usually in possession of superior 
information. Government uses the power to tax to implement social policies; business 
uses their knowledge of transforming operations and markets to make profits. They 
are fundamentally different in outlook. There is an asymmetry of power on one side 
against knowledge on the other. Both sides can easily lose, if the group with power 
dictate non-commercial outcomes.  
 Adverse selection and moral hazard are divided by the contract, but otherwise closely 
linked. The adverse selection chosen by one party largely leads to the morally 
hazardous practice that follows. 
  Structuring a project to avoid responsibility for an outcome that the information rich 
can foresee as probable, whilst advising or signalling to the information poor almost 
diametrically the opposite; is common to self-benefit and self-defence strategic 
misrepresentation. Optimism bias firms send similar signals, but do not focus on 
responsibility avoidance, as they believe the signals they send. 
 In strategic misrepresentation the risk and cost of failure is disproportionately carried 
by the information poor, the least informed, and the benefits flow by the same tilted 
margins to the best informed regardless of, even in spite of, actual outcome or 
performance.  
  The outcome of information asymmetry, when driven by greed or need, leading to 
strategic misrepresentation, in this study, is predictable. The under informed investors, 
stakeholders, government achieved a much worse outcome than proposed, but the 
informed proponents suffered limited losses and are well rewarded beyond actual 
performance. The preferred alternative model of competent firms using their 
information advantage to provide reasonable outcomes for investors and customers is 
the common model with most successful firms following this path. 
  The unwelcome outcome is market failure, when the allocation of “desirable 
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activities” is not efficient, or there is a failure to halt “undesirable activities” that lead 
to economic waste158. Economic waste is a situation where the loss to one side was 
not balanced by gain to the other.  
 
The model for asymmetric information has five parameters, which may be indicative of 
success or failure outcomes. These are shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16 Asymmetric information and strategic misrepresentation model 
 
 
The first criterion is where the there is a high level of information asymmetry, such as where 
proponents of a new process plant had detailed information of technical difficulties in the 
pilot plant, but were seeking to use the power imbalance implicit in that to present a quite 
different outlook to uninformed investors in the project. 
 
The second criterion is where a party possessed of crucial information is subject to a strong 
driving force that leads them to strategic misrepresentation. This could be opportunity for 
enrichment, or self-preservation or a little of both. The informed party may have valid reason 
to feel that they face irrational force majeure that is beyond their reasonable control. Dealing 
with government bent on uneconomic and unavoidable requirement could cause a party to 
take actions they would not normally choose. 
 
The third criterion, and this is related to the second, is that the access to resources is open and 
on a commercial basis. Where the exercise of sovereign power is seen as ignorant of reality 
or capricious in allocating valuable resources, the choice is either to loose or play a game as 
adverse in outcome as the exercise of power. 
 
The fourth criterion is where selective and strategic misrepresentation is loudly given to 
promote investment in projects with high risk, by firms with little competence. The louder the 
Asymmetric Information failure model Asymmetric Information success model
High of information asymmetry and power imbalance Low of information asymmetry and power balance
Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation Limited motivation for strategic misrepresentation
Asymmetrical information used to manage ignorant power Open and commercial access to resources 
Loud strategic misinformation to promote investment Little information noise on good projects
The project made a loss that was unexpected The project made a profit that was expected
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4. OBSERVATIONAL OUTSIDER DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction to methodology  
  
The methodology to be used is mix of qualitative and quantitative data available to an 
outsider. Sixteen measures are used in this analysis, ten are qualitative and six are 
quantitative. The qualitative relate to inputs that influence the outcomes, and description of 
the outcomes. The quantitative data are indicative calculations based published numbers 
relating to the performance of the project in its life.  
 
Qualitative research is word based, and includes stories and evidence. The aim is to 
understand human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. Quantitative 
research is number based, and includes statistical, mathematical or computed data techniques.  
 
The qualitative and quantitative data is derived from a longitudinal series of 67 case studies 
over 18 years, from January 1993 to December 2010. The case studies were those projects 
shown by ABARE as resource processing projects with a planned investment of over $100 
million. Projects that extracted coal, or iron ore, or gas that was then reticulated by pipeline; 
have only minimal processing stages that modestly transform, and add limited value. The 
majority of investment is in the extraction and transport, not in elaborate transformation. 
 
The cost of the process plants; and the cost of the extraction process are difficult to determine 
separately, and vary with the location and geology of the resource, as well as the type of 
process plant. The total cost figure is the only one shown in ABARE and press publications.  
 
The ABARE data provided the complete set of case studies. Data from Company Annual 
Reports, articles from newspapers, trade journals, and professional institute publications 
provide greater detail of what is in the public domain.  
 
Practical and empirical data collection for this thesis took place during plant visits, involved 
operators, process experts, and financial analysts. They often highlighted facts that the firm 
did not want public. Where the public statements and the expert analysis were in sharp 
variance, more research was required; and more detailed case studies will follow. It will be 
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no surprise that failed projects had a much greater variance between what was presented, and 
what apparently happened. 
 
4.1.1 Limitations of the data, and advantages 
 
The case studies use best available information in the public domain; which may be 
somewhat at variance with proprietary data. Firms have many incentives to put the best 
public face on adversity, and may release favourable views of data selectively, or “massage 
the numbers”.  Enron famously hid the true state of their financial affairs with a range of 
morally hazardous reporting and accounting practices; over many years. Table 17 shows the 
sources of the data. 
 
Table 17 Sources of data 
 
 
The initial selection of sixty seven mega projects with initial cost of greater than $100 million 
was taken from published Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
ABARE data. This organisation is now named Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics and Sciences ABARES.  This date is independent, but represents what 
firms have told them. ABARE also published data on commodity values at monthly intervals, 
which were used to calculate Commodity values, Pay-back plan measure, Return (actual pay 
back). 
 
These Commodity values are matched with data taken from United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) published data, and also with data from London Metal Exchange (LME). 
1 ABARE Minerals and Energy Major Developments Projects
2 ASX Company Annual Reports
3 Government Specialist publications and webs sites
4 Trade press Technical and project articles
5 Online references of variable veracity
6 Newspapers Business articles
7 AusIMM Papers and confrence proceedings
8 USGS United States Geological Service
9 Company websites Project descriptions and statistics
10 Site visits to a number of projects
11 Personal contact with project participants
12 Court actions with damages awarded
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State and Federal Government departments, such as Geoscience Australia, CSIRO or 
Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources are examples of Government data 
resources. 
 
Where possible data is taken from published Annual Reports, where the data has a legal 
requirement to accurately represent a true state of affairs, and these figures are used in 
preference to any alternatives. Company annual reports are retrospective; and by their nature 
seek to reassure the shareholder, and explain in the best light what has happened.  
 
Trade press are technical in focus, and promotional in outlook, but they can provide an 
“insider insight” into a project. An example would be the details provided on the use of Pre-
Assembled Modules (PAM’s) in the Gove G3 project. 
Online reference to projects are low in cost to access, and at best cause one to think about an 
issue and seek verification on an insight or viewpoint otherwise not considered. 
 
Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (AusIMM) papers, monographs, conference 
proceedings and site visits are part of the data gathering in this thesis. What is publicly 
presented in print and at conferences is almost invariably positive, not untruthful, but 
carefully selective. Professional organisations do not seek to invite criticism or scrutiny of 
their less successful activities. However in private conversations a different accounting can 
be heard.   
 
Newspaper articles and internet sources are also used to try to fill in gaps in knowledge, of 
what must be an incomplete data set. All were freely available and open to the public. Many 
are written by journalists who have been following the industry for some time, and are keen 
to reveal as much as they can. 
 
Where a figure is shown; in the next section; such as project cost, this is the figure from the 
most trusted source; or the most frequently mentioned figure.  The numbers are comparative 
rather than absolute.  
 
Some firms are more transparent than others in their public data, others more opaque. The 
more imaginative and visionary statements made by entrepreneurial promoters contrast later 
releases that ameliorate the different outcome.  
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Large and difficult projects are found to be better documented, and more extensively studied 
than upgrades in capacity at existing plants that appear to have been accomplished. This is 
because there is little data available, and because of the usually low risk and successful nature 
of the projects. Their existence, size and value are counted to balance out the more well 
known cases. Data for construction time of alumina and aluminium smelters is largely 
estimates, as the exact start and finish date for extra capacity is not widely publicised. 
 
Project start and completion dates are more often estimates from ASX and ABARE data, and 
are indicative only. The exact start and finish of a project is very much whatever the operator 
says it is. A resource processing site being private property, and secured for safety; so is a 
black box.  Project cost from the outsider view is also, what the company chooses to report.  
 
Every project described in this study was designed to elaborately transform a resource into a 
higher value and more compact form. The planned performance of the plant is “nameplate 
capacity” or the mass of output meeting a commercial specification. But for hard rock mining 
the limitation is the capacity constraint is the volume of ore it can process. The feed in of a 
carefully selected ore with many times the planned grade of gold per tonne, can allow greater 
than nameplate capacity, and hence profitability, early in the operational ramp up.  In small to 
medium gold process plant the mining and stock pile of the richest grade ore is an indication 
of an exceptionally competent and experienced team. 
 
The data that is available for outsider modelling is not as accurate or immediate as 
proprietary data available to insiders. However it is more difficult to massage, and over many 
projects and many years presents a different view point to insider data. This outsider data can 
be modelled for understanding of the mechanisms in the black box, especially the efficiency 
at converting investment into desired outcome. 
 
Outsider modelling examines inputs, specifically investments, and firm capabilities against 
outputs and outcomes. An output is the plant production; the outcome is its value when 
multiplied by the commodity price. This study focuses most on the relationships between 
investment, and the ability to repay the investment; a risk factor.  It also examines a range of 
factors and measures that are evident to investors before a project has started, and investment 
has been made. 
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Investment in firms and projects often comes from the public. The public can only utilise 
public information to make their choices. Thus they invest with limited and asymmetrical 
information, in the hope of increasing the value of their investment.  
 
The general model of collection of inputs and outputs may be used to model almost any black 
box activity. A black box activity is one where the internal workings are not transparent, or 
are deliberately obscured. The internal functions of a private firm are proprietary. But their 
inputs, outputs and outcomes can be modelled over time.  Where the public pronouncements 
about the firm’s success or value are not matched by the model, moral hazard is suggested, 
and the risk to investment increased. The wonderful business success claimed by Enron, and 
the quarterly profits regularly reported, was in conflict with the increasing size of borrowings 
from a host of financial institutions. Once this was realised by investors and lenders the firm 
quickly collapsed in debt spiral.159 
 
In the public domain, the comparison of the benefits that will flow from public investment, 
with the actual benefits finally delivered; in a range of government programs, invites 
modelling of black boxes. The funding inputs for rail infrastructure or indigenous housing, or 
defence procurement are consumed within the black box, but the proposed benefits are often 
delayed, and or well below that originally proposed.    
 
The provision of housing to indigenous people in the Northern Territory would be an 
example. The Australian Broadcasting Commission reported160 on 31st August 2009 that after 
investment of $672 million, and a time of 18 months, not a single house had been built.  This 
can be compared to an earlier news article161 from 2006 where the then indigenous Affairs 
Minister Mal Brough revealed “the federal Government cannot account for what happened to 
$2 billion given to the states in the past decade to provide houses for Aboriginal 
communities. The states and territories have been unable to answer a request from his 
department asking how the taxpayer funds were distributed and where or how many homes 
had been built with the money.”   
 
Thus an outsider model of inputs, specific to a worthy cause, and outputs for which the 
money is directed, might reveal a high level of inefficiency within the black box.  
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By comparison with public sector black boxes, the majority (more than 70%) of resource 
transformation projects had outcomes that reasonably matched, and in many cases exceeded 
their investment objectives. 
 
 
4.2 Data collection steps for an outsider model 
 
The first stage of data gathering was to select the 67 projects over $100 million, where there 
was elaborate transformation. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) first started collecting data on new resource projects in 1993. This data 
was published annually and then biannually till April 2011 when it halted.  It is an 
independent source of public information, prepared by an Authority with an interest factual 
statistics. Recent data is available from their website 162  and early data is held (in booklet 
form) at the National Library of Australia.163 
  
By taking data on the 67 projects over 18 years a longitudinal study is also possible. The 
proportion of harvested to transformed resources has changed between 1993 and 2010, with 
iron ore and coal becoming more important and valuable. Also the cost of plants to produce a 
given volume of a commodity has risen over time.  
 
From this ABARE data every (elaborately transforming) project with an initial project value 
over $100 million was selected. Projects that only harvested resources, with minimal 
transformation were not included. Iron ore and coal are only moderately beneficiated. The 
extracted product and shipped product are only minimally transformed to meet specification. 
Natural gas fed into a pipeline after stripping of water, inert gases, and sulphur compounds, is 
equally only moderately transformed.  When it is compressed by 614 to 1 in volume, and 
reduced in temperature to -162° C, it has been elaborately transformed. 
 
The second stage of data gathering was to seek news articles and commentary from media 
and trade press to understand what was relatively common knowledge.   
 
The third stage of data gathering was to seek informal insider comment from those 
participants willing to discuss projects they were involved in at conferences, social function 
and mine visits. In the Toyota Production System164 one of the ways to understand and solve 
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root problems within an organisation is to “Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand 
the situation” (Genchi Genbutsu). By visiting many of the plants and talking with participants 
informally and off the record, it is possible to find “where to look for the bodies.”    
 
These insights led to the introduction of some new factors related to isolation and competence 
levels.  An example would be the case of the then largest, and most complex chemical 
engineering plant in Australia. An operator from the plant165 advised: “The reason that the 
project will fail is that it is run by a bunch of fly-in fly-out miners, who don’t want to be 
there.”   Another would be for different case: “The contractors soon realised that the project 
was doomed, and put their B Team on the job.”  This sort of comment can neither be used as 
evidence, nor presented as attributed data.  But they do enable a data structure to be 
structured to look for more solid evidence or numerical data that either confirms or denies the 
idea. 
 
The fourth stage is to read through annual reports from local firms in the years before and 
after the project was built and operated.  The second and third stages have built up a list of 
suspicions that the reports can confirm, or provide numerical measures on which to evaluate 
the gossip.  
 
Connect4 is a Thompson Reuters service of Australian Company Information provides a 
valuable resource for much of the hard data.166 This is accessed through the Sydney 
University Library online. 
 
Australian Company Reports are legal documents, and should be accurate and truthful. Some 
are models of transparency, closely associated with competent firms, and ethical 
management. Production statistics are easy to find, and are shown in comparison to past 
performance and expected nameplate capacity.  The firms are proud of how well they are 
transforming resources with the investors’ capital. 
  
Other Annual reports are evasive and misleading, usually associated with firms with less 
obvious competence and ethics.  This is difficult to quantify, but is a recognised 
phenomenon.  
 
Annual reports provide both the stories and the numbers. The story of how good the ore body 
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is and the riches that will follow can be contrasted with the actual production performance 
data.  A simple metric would be to equate the competence of the firm with the timely delivery 
of the proposed outcome, with minimal cost overrun. This is shown in with the measures that 
look production performance proposed before the project and actual delivery in the 36 
months after, with the commodity price included. 
 
The fifth stage is in compiling data on supply, demand and commodity process. Australian 
commodity prices for most commodities are from ABARE, and are shown as ABARE 
Commodity Price Appendix.  Data on supply and on US costs on a wider range of 
commodities comes from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) website167 
 
The sixth stage is in compiling the data into large Excel spread sheets that encompass all 67 
cases, and the range of factor and measures later discussed. These spread sheets are shown in 
the Appendix section. 
 
Once this was accomplished the data was structured along the lines of the five step model of 
Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman model described in Chapter 2 where he identifies that a 
new process may be more important class that the type of transformation. So the iterative 
process followed was as described in these five steps. 
 
(1) Select a relevant reference class of past, similar projects. The class must be as broad as 
possible to visualise meaningful distributional but narrow enough by key parameters to show 
patterns and variations within a project class.   
 
(2) Establishing an input and outcome distribution for the selected reference class. This 
requires building a census-like database of credible, empirical data for all similar projects 
within a project reference class, in a location with similar customs and law, and sufficient 
time to watch evolution of inputs and outcomes. Sheets 1 and 2 in Appendix do this. 
(3) Compare similar projects, by distribution according to risk factors, to observe patterns and 
variations. These patterns and variations may be modelled to give increased understanding, 
which may be used to manage future projects, or avoid obvious risks. Sheet 3 in appendix 
covers risks, sheets 4, 5, 6 and 7 show outcomes related to risk for the four hypotheses. 
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(4) Examine how well the modelling explains in the simplest possible manner the more 
numerically significant patterns of most common outcomes and the less common anomalies.  
 
(5) In the light of case studies, adjust the models till they match all the data. The evolved 
models are shown in Chapter 3. 
 
 
4.3 Project classes 
 
The 67 projects are broken down into 6 classes. New process plants, Gases transformed, 
Light metals, Mineral sands, Nobler metals, and Baser metals. This differentiation is a 
fundamental element of reference class forecasting. New process plant investment was 
unusually risky, 99% of investment failed, and this class of investment is now not well 
considered. Gases transformed, especially LNG was remarkably rewarding and now 
represents a large share of new investment. The classes and data are shown in Sheets 1 and 2 
of the appendix, and briefly described below. 
 
4.3.1 New Process Plants 
 
Twelve “New Process” projects were new technologies to transform resources by innovative 
processes. All plants were the implementation of a new or significantly improved process, 
which aimed to transform a difficult resource into a higher value added commodity. 
 
Some were more radical innovations, of first in the world or first in country processes. Three 
projects were based on extensive local research and development. (Cases 7, 8 and 40) Six 
were first in country plants for processes that were not well proven overseas, (Cases 1, 2, 6, 7, 
8, 40) and two (Cases 9 and 10 process inter-connected plants) were the effort of a firm 
without specific focus to use modified processes based on an earlier least-worst failure.   
 
All but one (Case 40) destroyed the majority (between 90 and 95%) of the original 
investments.  Eight plants are closed and/or demolished, 2 are under new management, with 
one producing a fraction of nameplate capacity, and the other abandoning the new processes 
and operating an older (and pre-existing) 30 year old pyro-metallurgical plant with apparent 
success. 
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4.3.2 Gases Transformed Plants 
 
Eight “Gases Transformed” projects included Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Fertilizers and 
Explosives from natural gas, and Acid plant projects.  All eventually succeeded with the 
majority of investments yielding good returns.  One plant (Case 13) was a struggle for the 
original owner; then a windfall for the new owner as commodity prices changed. The others 
returned handsome yields to competent owners. 
 
4.3.3 Light metals plants 
 
Eleven “Light Metals” projects transforming Bauxite to Alumina and Alumina to Aluminium. 
The technologies are exceptionally well known and developed. Commodity price fluctuations 
were the major risk. Over production may have influenced negative commodity price trends. 
At time of writing (February 2014) one older Aluminium Refinery at Kurri Kuri had closed, 
and the Alcoa Point Henry Aluminium Smelter and the Alcan Gove Alumina plant had 
closure announced due to low world prices for Aluminium. 
 
4.3.4 Mineral sands plants 
 
Eight “Mineral Sands” projects returned seven good outcomes to experienced operators and 
one poor outcome to inexperienced investors. In case 33 only 1.2% of the proposed 175,000 
tonnes per annum was ever produced and when the firm folded investors lost their capital. 
 
4.3.5 Noble metals plants 
 
Twenty seven “Nobler metals” projects covered the extraction of higher value metals like 
Gold, Copper, Nickel Sulphide, and Vanadium, usually from hard rocks in relatively low 
grades.  A few parts per million of gold to 1-2% or less for copper or nickel, is indicative of 
the low grades. These grades declined over time. Three firms failed, destroying much of the 
investment, but this is a sector dominated by experienced firms with moderate risk. 
 
The three cases of failure were Case 46 where production reached 88% of that proposed, but 
at a higher cost of production, at a time of low gold price, and with a flood thrown in. Case 
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52 only produced 50% of nameplate capacity, and experienced difficult market conditions, 
possibly aimed at assisting the firm to fail, and maintaining market demand and price of 
vanadium. Case 60 only reached 26.8% of projected output, largely due to the lack of gold in 
the ground in anywhere like the volume the investors had been advised.  
 
4.3.6 Baser metals projects 
 
Five “Baser metals” projects covered Zinc and lead, with traces of silver. The lead and or 
zinc is often at higher grades ~ 10% metals, but the zinc and lead have had limited demand 
and flatter commodity prices than most other commodities. All projects succeeded, some 
better than others. 
 
4.4 Factors and measures 
 
There are sixteen factors and measures. The first ten explain and potentially predict the 
outcomes shown in the last six. These are shown in detail in sheet 3 of the Appendix 
spreadsheet, and are selectively used in Sheets 4 to 7 to show 804 data points over the 67 
projects in a semi visual manner. Patterns and anomalies may be more easily seen, which has 
led to more hypotheses and models to explain. 
 
The pattern shown in charts 4, 5, 6, and 7, is that the chart is a progression in time from initial 
planning, from the top down to the conclusion of a project when it has either failed or worked 
well for many years.  The risk indicated in positional location in these four “hypotheses 
charts” are from the theoretical highest risk of failure at the left to theoretically least risk at 
the right over the sixty seven projects. 
 
The first ten are in the planning and estimating time zone, and might be used as a predictive 
measure for a considered project investment. Anomalies are easy to see in this form, as a red 
flagged failure from an otherwise successful firm invites closer scrutiny.   
Shown in Table 18 are the factors in a time sequence from before to after project. 
 
Table 18 Sixteen factors in time sequence 
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The first eight are input factors that differentiate projects by characteristics that are visible 
before a project has commenced. These factors are elements of understanding and 
explanatory models. All are Qualitative, and are derived from the gradation of the factor, by 
Improper Linear Models, as with an APGAR score. 
 
These first eight factors, shown in Sheet 3 of Appendix are qualitative with classes ranked 
from most risk (and or least competent) at 0.1 to least risk (and most competent) at 0.5. The 
qualitative data can thus be entered into a mathematical model easily. The full table, with 
descriptions of each level of risk is shown as Appendix 16 Project Factors in the Appendices. 
 
The next two factors are based on numerical data, worked into simple models. Commodity 
Time Parameters Greatest risk to Least risk
Visible before project start
Planing Past record of firm >
Process focus of firm >
| Scale‐up ratio >
˅ Financial confidence >
| Innovation type >
˅ Government involvement >
| Value‐adding level >
˅ Information Asymmetry >
Estimating Visible after project build
| Commodity value >
˅ Pay‐back plan measure >
Building Project build factors
| Time management >
˅ Cost management >
Working Visible after project operation
| Production  performance typically > typically
˅ Return (actual pay back) poor outcomes > good outcomes
Outcome Life of Firm >
Life of Process >
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value is the average price for the commodity or commodities to be produced by the project 
over the 36 months prior to commissioning. They are thus indicative of the value per tonne of 
production produced. Pay-back plan measure is calculation of how long it would take to pay 
back the investment if the plant is built for the investment proposed, and works at nameplate 
capacity, and the commodity sells for the prices that have previously existed. These are 
explained in greater detail in the next section. 
 
As a project is built two factors attract attention, the time taken to reach commissioning, 
compared with the time proposed in the plan, and the cost of doing so, as compared to the 
initial budget.  Projects that take more time to complete, and require a greater budget than 
planned are at greater risk of failure than those that are close to time and budget. 
 
Once a project is operational the actual production performance compared to that proposed 
becomes evident. A significant shortfall is a risk indicator, and is related to project failure.  
The calculated actual payback time is similar to pay back plan, except that it uses actual cost 
of completion rather than proposed, and adjusts for actual production performance at the 
commodity price that existed in the 36 months after the plant began operation. 
 
The 10 factors that are visible to the outsider whilst a project is in a virtual or planning stage, 
can, given reference class forecasting models give a probable outcome, when only a small 
percentage of project cost has been invested. This is before the first steel is cut or joined, 
before the first concrete has been poured. The predictive indications are valuable to a 
potential investor, as well as an operator. 
 
4.4.1 Detailed description and working of project factors 
For the ten factors that are visible before the projects starts 
 
Factor 1: Past record of firm 
The past record of the firm, with a record of similar project outcomes is a good indicator of 
future outcomes.  A firm develops an organisational culture, which changes relatively slowly. 
People comfortable in the culture adapt to it and pass the culture on. Competence in a firm 
can grow gradually or decline gradually, but in the 18 year study, tended to be relatively 
stable. Firms with exceptional competence largely built upon their skills; and firms with more 
generalised competence either selected less challenging projects, or came to commercial 
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grief.  New firms were far more risky that established firms.  A few new firms were built by 
astute amalgamations of exceptionally competent management from previous successful 
teams, and prospered, but these were the exception. Many other firms with less skilled 
management, without a successful past record, suffered very poor outcomes.  The difficulty 
in assessing the competence of new firm is that it must be done by very careful examination 
of the new team’s skills, motivation and culture.  A firm with long and mostly successful 
record would be “mature” in Halbe & McNulty model terms.  
 
The scale runs from greatest risk at .1 to greatest competence at .5 by relatively simple 
classing. The observation by Warren Buffett that “risk comes from not knowing what you are 
doing” explains the concept well. 
 
 .1 Is a new firm, only traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in the previous 3-5 
years, without any record of major project success. No dividends have ever been paid to 
investors or shareholders. The assessment of their risk thus depends on evaluation of the 
skills brought together by the new management team, and how well they work together, 
which is a more complex study, outside this work. 
 
.2 Is a firm with a short history, traded on the ASX, with only short history of dividend 
payment over a short history (less than 5 years) of trading. Where a firm has had a complete 
change of directors and management; the old culture; and hence indicators to predict their 
actions is lost. (They would go back to being a .1)  A firm that has changed its name, and 
risen like a Phoenix from the ashes, with the same directors would remain a .2, but would 
attract a more careful and critical review in the asymmetric information measure. 
 
.3 Is a firm with an established history overseas, but in the particular project new to Australia. 
Firms with a long record of Australian investment and operations over multiple projects are 
not included. Firms with specialised focus in a particular transformation can bring 
exceptional competence to a new project, where as a firm with a questionable record in their 
home country can be at high risk; hence there is a strong interdependence with other 
measures. 
 
.4 A firm with a long track record over many years (more than 10), and where the firms good 
results were much greater than the occasional poor result.  A diversified resources firm has 
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strength in terms of balancing the economic and commodity price risk, but a weakness in that 
they cannot be focused in all the areas where they operate. The largest resource firms must be 
in this class as they are so widely diversified, but over time have made a few bad calls.  
 
.5 Firms with a long record of successful project outcomes have over a long time returned 
superior outcomes to the industry and market in general.  This is associated with exceptional 
competence in a relatively specific area of resource transformation, and thus is linked to the 
next measure. A measure of these superior outcomes is in the control over cost growth and 
project delay, and in meeting and exceeding nameplate capacity quickly after commissioning. 
   
Factor 2: Process focus of firm 
The development of a narrowly based core competence, refined by continual incremental 
improvement, is at the heart of any productive specialisation. Firms that specialise in a single 
process may build up a knowledge base and practical expertise that enables them to produce 
exceptional results with low risk. 
 
Firms that had a broad spread of business activities, often performed better in areas where 
they had their key skills, such as securing, transporting and shipping moderately transformed 
resources. When they tried transforming difficult ores; that required particular competence, 
their performance was often disappointing.  
 
.1 Is for a firm with no track record in the specific transformation process.  This is closely 
tied to the degree of process innovation. Processes that are have severe conditions of 
temperature, pressure, acidity, or potential for dangerous outcomes, like fire or explosion 
present a higher combined risk the new entrant. Processes that are not well developed or fully 
understood equally increase risk for inexperienced firms.    
 
.2 Is for a firm with limited experience in all key skill areas.  The key skills are those required 
to master the most challenging risks.  The skills gained in operation of one type of 
concentration plant, are reasonably similar to another type of concentration plant, and or a 
different resource. 
 
.3 Is for a successful firm, with a diversity of processing plants, and thus a broad skill set in 
mineral processing.  However they do not have specific skill and well demonstrated sets for 
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unusual or challenging projects that involve unusual and specific skills. Again this is strongly 
tied to the level of innovation. 
 
.4 Is for a successful firm, which has a demonstrated skill set closer to the challenges that are 
presented in the specific project.  A transformation project innovation in a field of expertise 
that was related to the new project presents less risk.   
 
.5 Is for a successful firm, with close focus on specific resource transformation process. They 
are often solely focused on just one specific resource transformation, and have an internal 
culture of continuous improvement and cautious innovation.  Their expertise in the 
transformation is their core business value. They cannot afford to get it wrong, and thus 
devote considerable investment and energy to prompt and successful outcomes.  These firms 
are core competent in their specialised area, and are often associated with better than average 
outcomes in their class of projects. 
 
 Factor 3: Scale-up ratio 
A firm building a moderately larger scale of an existing plant faces low risk. They would not 
be duplicating if the process had not worked well and made satisfying profits.  Conversely, a 
firm who have never built a $100 million plus plant before, and / or have no prior experience 
with the type of plant and process, have significantly greater risk.  Past record, process focus, 
and scale up ratio are combined into a risk profile. A firm with 5 in all has very limited risk; a 
firm with 1 or 2 in all is managing high probability of failure. 
 
The same may be illustrated with commercial aircraft pilots or brain surgeons. Their expertise 
is built up over a long time with progressively greater challenges and successes.  The pilot of 
a 400 tonne Boeing 747-400 probably starts learning in a 1 tonne single engine Cessna; and 
worked up; over many years in aircraft size, length of experience and professional 
responsibility. 
 
.1 Is for a new project that has no predecessor, thus is an infinite scale up. Logically this 
entails high risk.  If the team have exceptional skills it might work, but a $100 million plus 
resource process project is a bit like taking the first flying lesson in the 747. Not for the faint 
hearted investor. 
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.2 Is for a new project that is a massive scale up, more than 5 times from an earlier working 
example. If the scale up is a new technology, and the previous plant was the pilot plant used 
to “prove” the process, there is high risk level.  Pilot plants are for questioning and learning, 
not showing and demonstrating.  
 
.3 Is for a scale up of an existing, successful, commercial process plant by 2 to 5 times.  The 
fact that the earlier plant has been a commercial success, (the only rational reason to up-scale 
it), reduces risks significantly. 
 
.4 Is for the duplication of an existing plant, with all incremental improvements available, of 
similar size to double size.  The risk, apart from commodity price loss, is quite moderate. 
 
.5 Is for duplication of an existing plant, with any incremental improvements available, of 
generally similar size, as the previous plant was notably successful, and well adapted to the 
new resources.  This has the lowest risk. 
 
Factor 4: Financial Confidence 
The type of investment sought for a project is also an indicator of potential outcome. At the 
highest risk end of the spectrum the least well informed investors are targeted, with selective 
and strategic misrepresentation and attractively high interest rates.  At the other end of the 
risk scale are firms whose project success is so trusted that they can finance a new project at 
the most favourable rates, from investors who are well informed, such as the existing 
consumer of transformed resources.  
 
.1 Is for raising capital in high risk projects, with unusually high finance cost. Marketing to 
investors with limited knowledge of the local risks, via overseas bonds, or shares promoted 
with unusual methods and enthusiasm; is an indicator that the investors who are better 
informed have decided that risks are too apparent. Wording in the prospectus documentation, 
that absolves the promoters and or managers of responsibility for adverse outcomes is a third 
high risk indicator. No firm at this risk level was succeeded.  There was actually little 
uncertainty, failure was assured. 
 
.2 Is for shares floated on the ASX, where the risks were seen by the market, at the time, as 
reasonable.  The difficulties the underwriters had in achieving share placement been an 
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indicator of the perceived risk level. The nature of the venture, the experience of the 
management, and how this relates to risk; is covered in other factors. 
 
.3 Is for established firms, with sufficient track record, and assets, who can borrow on 
commercial markets as various degrees as a trusted firm. The smaller firms are borrowing at 
business interest rates determined by the banks estimate of risk, and the enthusiasm for 
lending at that time. Larger firms can issue “commercial paper”, secure attractive loans in 
financial centres, or issue bonds at close to AAA rate.  Smaller firms, with perceived higher 
risk pay more for their capital and proportionally with fees. 
 
.4 Is for larger firms, who are able to finance new projects from their cash flow streams and 
forms of lower cost capital.  The integration of the revenue flow from substantial sales, and 
capital needs, within their financial departments is one of the major advantages of the largest 
resource processors.  With well managed finances, and control over a significant share of a 
traded commodity a firm has the opportunity to manage the market to a degree, lowering risk. 
 
.5 Is where a firm with a track record of successful projects, can seek the majority of its new 
project finance, from the purchaser of the transformed commodity. This only works where 
the firm is trusted by the consumer and the contract is a long term supply. Liquefied Natural 
Gas is one such commodity, where the contracted price can be adjusted to cover the finance 
costs. This is very attractive capital, and indicates that the risk of failure is negligible. No 
project financed at this level failed.   
 
Factor 5: Innovation type 
The more radical types of innovation in a new process plant are strongly associated with risk. 
Only one firm in either of the highest risk level succeeded. The eleven others failed.  
 
.1 In projects with new technologies, and or processes with radical innovation had the 
greatest risk. All six projects in this class failed. 
 
.2 For New and radical technologies, with long and systematic pilot testing to work out the 
problems, and stage scale up of facilities is model proposed by Halbe & McNulty, to reduce 
risk. Of six projects in this class, five failed. The one project to succeed had the most 
extensive scale up pattern. 
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.3 For projects that had tested processes established and worked in commercial plants at 
scale, but with significant innovations. The significant innovations were often combinations 
of existing proven processes in a novel manner to solve a unique processing problem.  
 
.4 Is for projects that used mature technology with some novel elements. 
 
.5 is for projects that used mature and well tested technologies, with only incremental 
improvements usually introduced by the plant supplier.  This is the lowest risk, and was often 
chosen by competent firms. 
 
Factor 6: Government involvement 
Government involvement was detrimental to some projects where it sought or backed a non-
commercial outcome from the firm. Government involvement where they offered a valuable 
input to transformation, such as electricity or energy, at below commercial rates, for a long 
term, led to successful projects to produce Alumina and Aluminium.  
 
Thus .3 is the median point of minimal government involvement, which is the basic licence to 
mine and royalty payment agreement relevant to the commodity.  Lower numbers are for 
more negative involvements which increase risk, and higher numbers are for positive 
involvements that reduce risk.  
 
.1 Is where the contract with the State Government includes non-commercial activities that 
the resource project firm accepts to gain another more valuable concession; and / or where 
government desire is a political outcome that challenges commercial reality. 
 
.2 Is where commercially unfavourable terms were so onerous that the firm experienced 
difficulties; that might stop future investment or send the firm into financial hardship.  
 
.3 Is the normal lease conditions for the type of resource, without any further involvement. 
Between 1993 and 2010 the number environmental conditions have increased significantly. 
In parallel the capital cost of transformation projects has increased at a similar rate for a 
number of reasons.   
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.4 Is where favourable infrastructure and concession are made by a State Government to 
attract a desired industry. Case 16 had such conditions. 
 
.5 Is where State Government made the longest term and most beneficial concessions to 
attract an industry to their state. Selling electricity to an Aluminium smelter at below 
production cost is an example. Supply of natural gas at below export price to an Alumina 
smelter is another. The government buys a desired political outcome with an ongoing 
reduction of the major operational expense of the plant, at the expense of state taxpayers. 
 
Factor 7: Value-adding level 
There are strong beliefs and arguments to add as much value as possible within a state or 
national economy. Transforming $30 a tonne bauxite into $300 a tonne alumina, into $3,000 
a tonne Aluminium, and then perhaps a $30,000 a tonne car seems like a good idea, with 
significant creation of wealth.  Adding value increases technical complexity and risk. All 
failures were value adding projects. Projects that added minimal value were low risk. 
 
.1 Is where value adding was a condition of the lease to access resources.  The level of risk 
will vary with the commodity, and its price, and the costs involved in meeting the lease 
conditions.  
 
.2 Is where a process plant is built to produce a fully refined commodity.  In general this 
would be to produce a metal that could be sold via the London Metals Exchange (LME) 
standards of purity.   Refineries require reasonably specialised staff, and present difficulties 
when located away from attractive centres of population. 
 
.3 Is where the value adding process is a mature process, such as smelting gold Dore at a 
mine site. The gold may contain silver and or copper in variable proportions that are later 
refined out.  Alumina and Aluminium production are also in the class, as the processes for 
gold, alumina and aluminium production are 1880’s technologies that are well understood. 
 
.4 Is where an intermediate or transitional level of processing is taking place. Case 16 is the 
only example, where low cost natural gas was transformed to Ammonia, by a mature and 
trouble free process. 
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.5 Is where the firm has chosen to concentrate the ore only sufficiently to economically ship 
the material to a consuming refinery. Concentration is a process stage where the metal 
content in ore is selectively increased from parts per million to a concentrate with 20-50% 
metal content.  Concentration is a low risk. 
 
Factor 8: Information Asymmetry 
Abuse of Information asymmetry, leading to strategic misrepresentation with a perceptible 
avoidance of responsibility for outcomes is a danger signal for investors. Information 
asymmetry exists in the most competent, skilled and successful firms. They know how to 
conduct their transformation business better than almost anyone else. But they have a record 
of performance that engenders trust, and for which they are responsible. 
 
.1 Is where high level information asymmetry, usually associated with strategic 
misrepresentation is used to allocate almost certain risk and loss to one outsider party and 
maximise potential for reward and avoidance of responsibility to the other insider party. 
 
.2 Is where there is a limited responsibility for risky actions is accepted by those directing 
them.  Management who invested their own funds into a high risk venture and held onto them 
in optimism bias would be an example. Management with some investment have a vested 
interest in the gentlest crash of a failed project.  
 
.3 Is where average risks are balanced by average responsibility.  A large corporation 
undertaking a risk venture can ask a board member to take responsibility for the project. 
Should the project fail the board member loses their seat on the board, and the respect and 
reward that goes with the position. The firm accepts the responsibility for payments to 
suppliers, entitlements to workers, and doesn’t take on larger risk than it can manage. 
 
.4 Is where the risk level is lower than above, due less enthusiasm for risk and higher level of 
responsibility. They may make less profit than their more enthusiastic competitors, but they 
have fewer surprise losses. 
 
.5 Is where the risks are lowest, due to the skills and accountability of the firm. Firms that are 
competent, have transparent accounts, and regularly make profits and pay dividends can be 
held accountable with little risk to management. 
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Factor 9: Commodity value 
The value of the commodity can be the single most influential factor in project economic 
outcome, once the project is producing close to nameplate capacity, and with moderate 
operational costs.   
 
The commodity prices used for this numerical indicator are the average prices over the 
previous 36 months or 3 years based on ABARE or USGS data. 
 
Whilst the previous 3 years commodity prices are not a guarantee of the prices in the future 
first 36 months of operation, they are a simple indicator. 
 
Factor 10: Pay-back plan measure 
The data available to an outside viewer is far less complex that that presented for proprietary 
review.  It is less subject to “massaging the numbers” and can be used to provide a single 
simple metric of investment to potential repayment.  This metric is like the “Baltic Dry 
Index” (BDI).168 The BDI is an assessment of the cost of moving bulk commodities by sea.  
As the available shipping fleet only changes slowly, then the premium or discount freight 
price for iron ore, coal, grain, even cement, is an indicator of expected economic activity 
about 90 days into the future.    
 
If buyers of raw materials for production and construction believe that demand will rise, then 
the price for shipping rises. Alternately if the same buyers feel that economic activity will fall 
or be less rewarded, they consume local resources and/ or stocks on hand, and the price for 
shipping falls. Ships can only earn income whilst moving, so they have to accept whatever 
price supply and demand allows.  The BDI is a simple indicator, not a perfect indicator.  It 
dropped sharply in February 2011 as new ships were delivered, and flood in Queensland 
closed coal ports. 
 
In the same way the index of proposed project cost to reasonably expected income is a very 
simple metric that is indicative of what should happen if all expectations are met. 
 
A project has a capital cost that is stated and expected. The plant has a nameplate capacity, 
which in this example is expected to be 100%. The commodity price is an average of the 
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previous 36 months, and so represents a reasonable expectation of what might be in the 
future.   The operational cost of a process plant is variable, and hence the profit on each tonne 
transformed. However across diverse resource plants an average of about 50% is common. 
This is an expected cost to expected benefit measure. 
  
So this simplistic indicator is “how long it will take to pay off the project if half the expected 
income is profit, and everything else works the way we said.”  This will indicate projects with 
high costs and low potential profits, or vice versa, and how they rank against the median.   
This is a theoretical figure that can be used when project is being considered conceptually. If 
the “expected payback” time in months is unattractive, and the class of project has high risk, 
then it might be re-examined.  
 
Also if the project was in a class where there was a higher probability of cost over runs, 
construction delays, and performance under-delivery, then the risk is elevated. 
 
Project cost and time management statistics are insider data. The data publicly available to an 
outsider is fragmentary, and sometime contradictory.  Firms that can quietly bring their 
projects in close to time and budget often reveal limited information that would allow fine 
statistical analysis. 
 
Thus some results are recorded as 100% there is no data to show the exact figures; and no 
indication that the result was too far away. The real disasters are somewhat more transparent, 
in that the delays are so large they cannot be hidden, and the cost escalations so large they are 
frequently discussed in the media. 
 
4.4.2 For the two factors that are visible after the project is built 
Factor 11: Time management 
Time management is the factor of the estimated actual build time over the projected build 
time listed in ABARE data. The start and completion dates are as far as is available data from 
annual reports, or from ABARE data. The ABARE data is from 6 monthly publications, and 
noting that a project was no longer under construction, so some error is possible.  Firms are 
often a little vague as to when a project has been started; and equally unspecific as to 
completion and operational status. This may be partly to make exact estimation of project 
delays difficult to calculate, as it can lead to difficult questions from media, investors and 
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shareholders.  Time management can be expected to be related cost management, in that extra 
time usually indicates extra costs.  Whilst the evolved data is imperfect, it is equally 
imperfect over a long period of time, and collected by the same methods. Thus it is useful for 
a range of comparisons in later chapters.  
 
Factor 12: Cost management 
Cost management is a little more publicly transparent than time management. I have taken as 
the base point the original cost estimate first shown in the ABARE tables compared to the 
best estimate available of the actual project cost at completion.  The estimated project cost is 
divided by the original ABARE cost to give a percentage.  This results in a usually larger cost 
over-run than time over- run. This is an imperfect measure in that it compares only what 
firms told ABARE, rather than actual figures. However it is applied equally to all projects, 
and indicates projects whose costs grew in planning stages. 
 
A poorly considered project may suffer a significant increase in cost before it even started. 
This is often related to continuing cost growth in construction.  A project with a 300% cost 
increase is obviously at a severe disadvantage in a cost to benefit analysis, and would be 
expected to be at much higher risk of failure. 
 
Firms can deal with cost over-run in two ways. Where the cost over-run is for project that 
could send the firm broke, there is a temptation to move cost over-run from capital 
expenditure to operational expenditure. This can result in a modest cost over-run, but a build-
up of operational expense that can be fatal to investors. This will be explored in later 
chapters.  
 
Alternatively where a firm is very large and profitable, and the cost of the write off will be 
partly balanced by reduced tax payments there is a temptation to show every dollar invested 
in capital on a bad project to maximise the write off.  This is not to say every firm did so, but 
there are financial temptations to do so.  
 
 
4.4.3 For the four factors that are visible after the projects is operational 
What actually happened after the project was complete is relatively public.  By incorporating 
production volumes and commodity prices, a relatively impartial measure of economic 
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outcome can be shown.  
 
Factor 13: Production performance 
Resource processing plants are designed with an expected capacity to transform raw 
resources into a concentrated and value added product able to be economically shipped to 
market.   The nameplate capacity is stated output of product to a given standard.   
 
Production performance is the reported actual output of the plant in the first 36 months of 
operation as a percentage of the stated nameplate capacity.  
 
Factor 14: Return (actual pay back) 
The time to pay back the completed project with the calculated income is also a very simple 
metric that is indicative of project success or failure. A project has a capital cost that is 
reported in annual reports and press reports.  Annual report figures are preferred as there are 
penalties for miss-statement.  However the cost can be variable depending on whether the 
cost of fixing a sub- functional plant is allocated to capital works or operational expense.  
Capital cost is usually kept to the minimum figure practical, as the gap between projected 
costs and actual completed cost is a very easily understood metric of poor performance.   
Directors seeking to raise new funds for a troubled project have to put the most attractive 
presentation on results, if they are to succeed.  
 
Thus capital cost is more likely to be the actual amount paid to the contractors at the time 
they stopped work or completed the project.   The gap between completion and operation at 
close to nameplate capacity can be moderately short, or agonisingly long.  Moderate ramp up 
time is an indication of the competence of the management in fully understanding the ore and 
process.   
 
Agonisingly long ramp up times have a compounded financial pain.  The first is that the 
expected profitability to pay back in investment is not available. Seeking extra finance to 
cover the gap is not easy, and the project is known to be in trouble, and more risk adverse 
financiers, at lower interest rates are unlikely to invest.  Finance is more likely to come from 
investors who have their earlier equity at risk, who are being asked to put more good money 
after that at risk to save it. 
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The second financial pain is that long ramp up times usually involve discovery of significant 
design faults. These must be rectified in haste, and at much higher cost that doing the job 
right the first time. The contractors engaged in such work, realising the project risk will want 
to assured of prompt payment, and may be in a position to charge high prices for what is an 
emergency rescue.  
 
The plant actual production, as far as can be calculated from public domain information is 
shown as a percentage of stated nameplate capacity, which can be from zero where the plant 
never completed or operated to over  100%. The commodity price is an average of the 36 
months in the years after the plant commended operation, (or construction was completed or 
terminated for the non-operational plant). This represents a reasonable expectation of what 
could have been achieved in the vital first three years of operation. 
 
Where the plant reasonably quickly (90-180 days) reaches close to nameplate capacity, and 
the commodity price has risen, will likely succeed. Where it has only reached a fraction of 
nameplate capacity and the commodity price has fallen, the investors are at great risk.  
 
The operational cost of a process plant is variable, and hence the profit on each tonne 
transformed. However across diverse resource plants an average of about 50% is common. 
This is an expected cost to expected benefit measure. 
 
So this simple indicator is “how long did it take to pay off the project” if half the estimated 
income is profit.  This will show projects with high costs and low profit delivery, or vice 
versa, and how they rank against the median.   This figure that can be compared to the 
estimated project payback plan; as one is a projection, the other the outcome. If the “actual 
payback” time in months is well beyond the median for a class of projects; then it will 
probably be a failure. 
 
Factor 15: Life of firm 
A firm is a legal business entity with a name and often an Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) listing. It can “live” and grow for centuries. The largest mining firm in the world is 
reputedly BHP-Billiton, BHP on the ASX.  This firm grew from the Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Limited, which was incorporated in 1885. Their first operation was a silver and 
lead mine at Broken Hill in far western New South Wales.  Their first 48,256 kg consignment 
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of high grade ore yielded 35,605 ounces of silver.  This was influential in the success of the 
10th August 1885 initial share offer. The firm has evolved and grown. Unsuccessful firms 
descend into bankruptcy and de-registration. These firms have died, their liabilities 
extinguished. Some firms, having consumed the investor’s capital can arise like the phoenix 
from the ashes, with new names and new prospectuses.  
 
.1 Is where the firm who commissioned and managed the project has gone into receivership, 
gone bankrupt, been de-listed on the ASX, been taken over for a residual or otherwise 
extinguished its public liabilities. Investors have lost almost all their capital. 
 
.2 Is where the firm exists, but in a state where low production and limited capital make it 
like a corporate zombie; not really alive and not quite dead. The investors have effectively 
lost almost all their capital, but the loss has not crystallised. 
 
.3 Is where the firm with valuable assets, in plant, licence to resources and human capital, but 
limited cash flow, is taken over to acquire new capital and management. The investors loose 
a share of their firm, but usually retain the majority of their capital, sometimes see it 
appreciate. 
 
.4 Is where the firm has variable results depending on new project outcomes and the prices 
for its commodities. The firm is alive and fighting trying to meet changes in market demand. 
 
.5 Is where the firm has a history of superior to average returns, and hence enjoys a good 
share price. The firm is alive and growing, often evolving to meet new market demand and 
conditions. 
 
Factor 16: Life of Process 
Processes, like firms have a life and evolve and grow in the successful embodiments. 
 
The quote “Nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come” attributed to Victor 
Hugo, has applied to past innovations that have transformed resource processing. The use of 
cyanide in gold extraction, the Bayer process for alumina, the Hall-Herault process for 
aluminium, the Flotation process for mineral concentration have all been new ideas that over 
time have displaced the prior art.  These processes had dynamic life and transformed the 
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industry. Recently hydraulic fracturing has transformed the oil and gas industry in the United 
States, and now world-wide.  In 2010, it was estimated that 60% of all new oil and gas wells 
in the world were using hydraulic fracture processes.169 Conversely five projects have 
invested a total of $4,588,000,000 in pressure acid leaching of laterite nickel ores, with very 
poor outcomes.   
 
.1 Is where there are no more similar process projects in Australia since this project or series 
of projects in the time since failure was widely appreciated.  
 
.2 Is where there are no more similar process projects by this firm since this project or series 
of projects in the time, since failure was widely anticipated. 
 
.3 Is where other firms have successfully duplicated this process outside Australia. 
 
.4 Is where the firm has built a second similar plant and or expanded an existing plant. 
 
.5 Is where there is a project pipeline of similar plants in Australia and worldwide.  
 
 
4.5 Methodology for resolving four hypothesises 
 
The methodology for resolving the four hypotheses is that the appropriate non-linear model 
factors are selected from the eight indicating factors that are visible before a project has 
begun, for the hypotheses being examined.  These factors are arranged from those that it is 
hypothesised pose the greatest risk on the left, to those with least risk at the right. Four 
distributional spreadsheets (Sheets 4 to 7 in Appendix) show the indicators and outcome, so 
that a visual comparison across all 67 projects can be reviewed. Comparisons between the 
successful and failed projects are made.  Case studies are then detailed to contrast and 
compare success and failure. These case studies examine as many of the sixteen parameters 
of the four models proposed in Chapter 3 as are relevant and conclusions are drawn. 
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5. COMPETENCE AND INNOVATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 deals with the two core concepts of competence and innovation in relation to 
success and failure. Competence was unsurprisingly associated with success, and innovation 
sadly associated with failure. Chapter 6 deals with two concepts which explain anomalies that 
arise from Chapter 5, such as why otherwise successful firms failed at innovation; or how 
Government involvement in value adding gave best and worst outcomes.  One example, Case 
7 was the outstanding worst performed in every category, and probably represents the most 
egregious example of what to avoid. This is shown in Table 19. 
 
Table 19 Case studies and linkage to Hypotheses and Models 
  
 
 
 
5.1.8 Hypotheses and expectation: 
In this chapter the 2 hypotheses proposed will be tested by the methodology shown in 
Chapter 4, and the data listed in the Appendices.  
 
1.) That project success was associated with firm competence.  Four factors are 
No. Case Study Firm New process Govt Involve Asymmetric 
Competence Innovation Value Add Info
17 NWS T5 Best Incremental Limited Limited
15 CoP Darwin Strong Incremental Limited Limited
64 Cannington Strong Limited Limited Limited
40 ISASMELT Strong Best Little Little
7 AMC Worst Worst Worst Worst
8 HIsmelt Puzzling High Adverse Adverse
24 Wagerup 2 Strong Limited Positive Limited
1 BHP HBI Puzzling High Adverse Adverse
48 Olympic Dam Troubled Incremental Negative Adverse
45 Sunrise Dam Strong Limited Limited Limited
4 Bulong  Weak High Limited Adverse
60 Bendigo Weak Some Limited Adverse
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considered; the past track record of the firm, the focus or specialisation of the firms’ 
activities, the difference in scale between past successful plant and new plant, and the 
confidence the firm enjoys when seeking project finance.  It is expected that firm competence 
will be strongly linked with successful project outcome. The resolution sought would be to 
see if any firm with a high firm competence had failed projects and to look for other 
hypotheses factors that might explain this unexpected outcome.  
 
2.) That new process innovation was associated with project failure.  Two factors are 
considered in defining the newness of the innovation and the risk involved. First the 
innovation type, from new and radical to incremental on mature, only the two most radical 
rankings of innovation are considered. Secondly the scale up ratio where incremental steps 
reduce risk and large plant as first off accentuates risk. It is expected that new process 
projects with higher risk will be strongly linked with unsuccessful project outcome. As all but 
one of twelve most innovative projects failed four differentiating factor are considered that 
seem to explain why one succeeded and why at least nine of eleven failed. The differentiating 
factors are Individual ownership and responsibility, initial process simplicity, multistage scale 
up, and niche demand for the innovation.  
 
There is still the anomaly of otherwise successful firms who have taken some of the steps 
associated with reduced risk and failed, which leads to the 2 explanatory hypothesis in 
Chapter 6.   
 
3.)  That successful government involvement in value adding processes was related to 
process maturity. It was strongly negative for more innovative processes, and moderately 
successful for mature processes. Mature processes, such as the 130 year old Bayer process for 
Alumina production are well understood, and are low risk due to low information asymmetry. 
With new processes, or those where there was limited economic and process understanding 
the role of government involvement was associated with some of the largest failures, 
including those involving otherwise successful firms.  
 
 4.) That information asymmetry leading to strategic misrepresentation was associated 
with project failure. 
Where there is a significant asymmetric information differential between the resource owner 
and regulator, (Government) the investor, and the process operator or proponent, risk is 
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elevated.  This can lead, through greed or need, to a strategic misrepresentation and project 
failure. 
 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 1: “That project failure was associated with lack of firm competence” 
The management theory concept of Core Competency was developed by C. K. Prahalad and 
Gary Hamel. It is a way the firm and its employees work. It is defined by three key criteria: 
1) It is not easy for competitors to imitate. 
2) It can be reused widely for many products and markets. 
3) It must contribute to the end consumer's experienced benefits and the value of the 
product or service to its customers. 
 
The application of this theory to resource processing invites some critical review and 
evolution of theory. Firm competence comes from firm and employees knowing 
exceptionally well what you are doing, based on similar recent and successful experience, 
refined by practice and incremental improvements; and therefore minimising’s risk. 
 
The firm competence theory has five key criteria: 
1) That the firm has a track record of notably successful, even exceptional, project 
implementation in a particular field. This is, by definition exclusive, and hence few 
competitors will be able to imitate. 
 
2) That the firm has a focus on a limited field of established skill and demonstrated technical 
competence; allied with a program of focused technical and skills developments.  Whilst this 
concept may be applicable in many products and markets, it is in practical application a 
specific linkage between a firm’s focus and a specific transformation process, at which they 
endeavour to be world’s best. This draws upon a long history of noticing the productivity 
benefits of the specialisation of labour. 
 
3) That these firms scale up existing successful plants and processes to new and better plants 
by a moderate ratio and incremental improvements. In doing so, they minimise risk and build 
knowledge in the process. Scale up in chemical engineering from lab scale to fully 
operational plant requires an evolving multi step process. Scale up ratio is perhaps an under-
appreciated factor and metric. 
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4) That superior past performance of competent firms is recognised by well-informed 
commodity buyers and professional capital managers for their superior outcomes. Firms 
perceived as firm competent can finance new projects from customers and financiers under 
preferential terms due to the low perceived risk. 
 
The counterpoint is that firms perceived as “not knowing what they are doing” pay high 
margins for the risk. As an indication this was between 8 and 13% in the 1995 to 2005 period. 
In hindsight this was not enough as the most risky projects defaulted and paid back little.  
 
Governments have a poor track record at “picking winners”. In this study the only projects 
backed by State and Federal Government were the worst failures. 
 
5) That the firm and its projects regularly made profits. This applied to medium sized 
competent firms with a specific process focus. The counterpoint was that firms that had never 
made regular profits were very poor risks for mega projects. But there was an anomaly with 
the largest and most diversified firms. BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto have a broad range of 
largely profitable activities. They seem to have developed their firm competence in high 
profit areas; specifically winning rights to access easily harvested resources, transportation 
and marketing; rather than technically challenging processing areas.  Both are predominant in 
iron ore and coal, which in Australia are more logistics than processing. BHP-Billiton 
experienced failure in four of four new process projects yet succeeded in two other traditional 
process projects.  Most of their profitable activities, investments and returns were in iron ore 
and coal, outside this study.  Rio Tinto failed with one new process project yet succeeded in 
seven other traditional process projects.  This anomaly will be examined in the next three 
hypotheses. 
 
5.2.1 Distributional data of factors that make up inputs for prediction 
Firm competence is a significant factor in all resource processing projects, so the reference 
class is the full set of all 67 projects.  Firm competence is shown in sheet 4 of the Appendix.  
 
Distributional data is displayed as positional format, with worst indicators (with most obvious 
risk) to the left of the sheet and best indicators (with least obvious risk) to the right of the 
sheet. This inputs data is derived from published public domain reports, and case studies, and 
based on the predictive “firm competence” model, where the indicating factors are show in 
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items 1 to 4 with a sum of these shown as “Least to most competence” in line 13. 
 
This may be compared with the financial calculations, items 9 and 10, with project build 
measures, items 11 and 12, and with project performance measures, items 13 and 14, and 
finally with project outcomes in lines 28 and 29. 
 
Whilst there are acknowledged anomalies, which will be explored in following hypotheses, 
the general correlation between the predictive indicators and measured outcomes is robust.  
The greatest risk from low firm competence is loaded strongly to the right of the spreadsheet 
with the worst outcomes. Averages across all 67 projects are shown at the right of the d sheet. 
 
The fifty more competent firms achieved 99% average of production against nameplate 
capacity, the seventeen least competent only 33.3%. This factor is the major difference 
between success and failure. When other factors that contribute to how long, using the 
simplistic model explained in Chapter 4; it would take to pay back the investment the 
differential is more dramatic. The average competent firm project by the prediction method; 
paid off the investment in 52.6 months, a little over 4 years. The average unsuccessful less 
competent firm by the prediction method, theoretically, would have taken 98 years. 
 
The break point shown at 1.4 is shows failure and success. 1.2 would be a better failure 
prediction point, with the other 3 hypotheses explaining why projects with 1.2 to 1.4 rating 
failed. To a lesser extent commodity price fluctuations and unexpected process problems are 
the extra factors, but they are covered in the commodity value data shown, or mentioned in 
the case studies. 
 
Some of the firms that had difficulties were competent at project implementation, but less so 
at making profits. WMC Resources and Mount Isa Mines (MIM) were firms that succeeded 
with complex projects yet were taken over by firms with better profit competence. 
Conversely the two largest firms were exceptionally competent at profits but were challenged 
by new process projects. 
 
An investor who chose projects with a firm competence over 1.5 would have taken minimal 
risk and made a profit. These forty six” safe” projects were 68.5% of the total. Any 
investments below 1.3 were high risk. Only Case 56 did not destroy almost all the 
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investment. 
 
5.2.2 Distributional data on execution, performance and outcome  
This is quantitative analysis, based on numbers taken from trusted public sources, (such 
company as annual reports) and is similar to reference class forecasting. 
 
Of the seventeen least competent, (by predictive model) all but one (Case 56) failed. Eleven 
reduced the investment made to almost zero; six were sold for between 5 and 10% of original 
investment. Ten sent the owners broke, and in two more (56 & 13) the firm is no longer in 
business. All six plants that were sold required significant new investment, by new owners. 
Only two (56 & 13) produced at close to nameplate capacity, with new management and 
investment. Another (10) reverted to an old process that had worked before the failed 
innovation. The other three (3, 9 and 60) produced at a fraction of nameplate capacity. This is 
shown below in Table 20. 
 
Table 20 Least Competent outcomes 
 
 
 
Case Project Project Firm Plant Plant
Terminated Broke Scrapped Sold
1 HBI Bondarie Crude Steel 1 1
2 Southern Pacific Copper Refinery 1 1
3 Murrin Murrin Nickel Cobalt 1 1
4 Bulong Nickel Cobalt 1 1 1
5 Cawse Nickel Cobalt 1 1 1
6 Stuart Shale Oil 1 1 1
7 Australian Magnesium Stanwell 1 1 1
8 Hismelt Crude Steel 1 1
9 Ravensthorpe Nickel Cobalt 1 1
10 Yabulu Nicel Cobalt Refinery 1 1
11 Beenup Mineral Sands 1 1
13 Phosphate Hill Fertiliser Plant 1 1
33 Skardon River Kaolin 1 1 1
46 Mt Todd Gold Mine 1 1 1
52 Windamurra Vanadium 1 1 1
56 Fosterville Gold Mine 1
60 Bendigo Gold Mine 1 1 1
14 10 11 6
 137
The original investors lost almost all their capital in fifteen of seventeen least competent 
projects, with (56 & 13) being the exceptions. Here, and in most cases where an orange block 
indicates a firm that fell into financial trouble, good management negotiated a transfer of 
ownership to firms with the capital to take over the operations. 
 
The differences between 50 successful projects and 17 unsuccessful projects are significant. 
The average figures are skewed by the spectacularly bad numbers of Case 7, but construction 
delay of 89% rather than 8.9%, and cost over-run of 315% rather than 22.6% show the 
marked difference between failure and success. 
 
According to the simplistic metric for time to payback the project investment before profit 
can be generated, the more competent 50 cases averaged 52.6 months to payback. The less 
competent on average would have taken 1,178 months or 98 years to get to break even. 
 
The metrics on project execution, or building the plant, are shown as time management and 
cost management, as items 11 and 12 in Sheet 4 of Appendix. Time management of 100% 
indicates that the actual time taken to build the plant was the same as the prediction given at 
project initiation. Cost management of 100% indicates that the capital apparently invested to 
build the plant was the same as the prediction given at project initiation.  This does not 
perfectly account for projects that saw the cost estimate grow during planning. Projects that 
rose in price whilst still on paper, were those with lower competence, and unsurprisingly 
performed poorly, and usually had cost escalation and delay during the execution. In the only 
project not to complete (7) an estimate is made based on percentage complete at the 
termination. Half the build time had been used and almost all the capital to achieve 5% 
completion, so the outcome was negative by a degree approached by no other project. 
 
The metrics on project performance, or production output in the initial 36 month period, are 
shown as item 13, production performance. Here the percentage of production, compared to 
the stated nameplate capacity is shown. This is calculated over the first 36 months of 
operation taken from commissioning.  An exception is in Case 45, where the immediate start 
up performance was so exceptional in the first 12 months that this figure is used.  A ramping 
up of production, where output rises over time to meet nameplate capacity, is expected. This 
allows for teething troubles and integration of the multiplicity of systems in a complex 
process.  Firm competence is at the highest level enabled nameplate capacity to be exceeded 
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in the first 90 days. Cases 45 and Case 15 were able to do so. Cases 65, 49, 64, 66, 43, 42, 
and 53 exceeded nameplate capacity in the first 36 months and went on to be trouble free and 
profitable for their competent firms.  
 
Production performance is one factor; the variable commodity price is second factor, shown 
as change in the first 36 months in item 9. Production and price, leads to income, which can 
be used in a simplistic metric to measure the time taken to pay back the actual investment. 
The details are in covered in Chapter 4.  This does not cover the variable and largely non-
publicly visible costs of plant operation.  Plants that run exceptionally well from start-up 
usually have moderate operating costs, sometimes below that estimated. Plants that have 
significant problems in reaching a fraction of predicted production usually have crippling 
operational costs. Desperate and expensive actions are taken to try and get them working. The 
“fix it” cost is a major contributor to financial failure in the first 36 months. Item 10 is the 
estimate of how long the project would have taken, by the simplistic formula described in 
Chapter 4, to pay back investment if the plant performed at nameplate capacity. This 
compares with item 14 of estimated actual payback, given the actual production performance 
and commodity prices. 
 
Logically those projects with shorter payback plans and shorter actual payback performances 
are to the right of the spread-sheet, where firm competence is highest and risk is lowest.  
 
The metrics on longer term project outcomes are shown as items 13 and 14 and discussed 
further in case studies and conclusions.    
 
It may be argued that firm competence is less critical in simpler operations, utilising mature 
and well understood processes, or those projects that have especially rich ores. Alternatively 
competent firms might wisely choose these lower risk options. Warren Buffet’s quote “I 
don't look to jump over 7-foot bars: I look around for 1-foot bars that I can step over” 
captures this idea. 
 
On average with the 50 successful projects the commodity price rose by 16.4%, for the 17 
troubled projects it only increased by 6.7%.  Whilst for a few troubled projects the 
commodity price was critically negative (52 and 13), it was a saviour for others (56 and 3). 
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Of sixty seven projects, fifteen failed; these are shown with red or yellow marker on spread 
sheet.  The three with yellow were restarted under new management. Fifteen projects were 
owned, and built by firms that ran into financial difficulties. These are shown with orange 
marker and were taken over, and continue operating.  Four projects were built, not to increase 
production, but to reduce environmental emissions and or increase plant efficiency. These are 
shown with the green marker. Two projects with dark blue marker have closed recently. Case 
43 reached the end of viable ore as expected. Case 30 was a casualty of the sustained drop in 
Aluminium prices after 2009. 
 
In a wide view of the data all the red projects are tightly grouped at the far left of the 
distributional spread sheets. Failure is graphically co-related with lack of firm competence. 
Yet the orange projects are grouped more broadly across the left 60% of the distribution. 
 
The green projects are distributed more to the right of the table, and are show as the 
motivation for the investment was to make significant environmental improvements, rather 
than increase productive capacity. Making an efficiency improvement in an alumina or 
aluminium refinery increases profit over time, even if capacity is unchanged. Building a 
sulphuric acid plant (Case 12) enables a pyro-metallurgical smelter to continue to process 
sulphide ores and meet air quality standards. 
 
More competent firms, by virtue of their reliable production and favoured credit terms, have 
the cash available to invest in long term efficiency. Firms with less competence will often 
have a critically leveraged cash flow, due to production difficulties and unwilling creditors. 
This gives an added advantage to the competent firm unavailable to the less competent firm 
fighting to survive for a few more months. 
 
5.2.3 North West Shelf Train 5 (Case 17). $2,600,000,000 invested. 8.3% over budget, 
2.8% delayed delivery. 100% of 4,400,000 tonnes of LNG produced.  Built 2005 – 2008. 
To build the most firm competent project in this study took a lot of time and investment. 
 
Woodside had started in 1989 with LNG Train 1 (2.5 million tonnes a year), in 1989 another 
almost identical LNG Train 2 (2.5 million tonnes a year), followed by LNG Train 3 (2.5 
million tonnes a year) in 1992. The 2004 LNG Train 4 (Case 14) built between June 2001 and 
October 2004 to transform 4.4 million tonnes per year of natural gas into LNG for export, had 
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been a disappointment.  This project was originally projected to cost $2.3 billion, but ended 
up costing $2.7 billion. This was a 17.4% cost over-run, and took 39 months to complete. The 
cost and availability of labour was and is a constraint. Technical problems took the plant out 
of service on three occasions in the first 24 months. Woodside, a firm noted for its 
competence, sound management and shareholder value; took action to ensure that the 
difficulties were not repeated in NW Shelf Train 5.    
 
All these plants processed, compressed and cooled millions of tonnes of Natural Gas, largely 
methane, to a -162° liquid with 1/614th the volume. This was shipped from the Burrup 
Peninsula about 13 km NNE of Dampier in Western Australia to customers in Japan, Korea 
and China. 
 
Train 5 was a replication of Train 4, but to manage the local labour shortage Woodside used 
offshore manufacture of “pre-assembled modules” (PAM’s). These 75 pre-assembled 
modules, weighing 24,000 tonnes in total, were floated to the site, landed, moved into 
position and installed. The heaviest single module weighed 1,835 tonnes.170  
 
PAM’s are effectively the taking offshore of chemical engineering plant construction. The 
local input may be design, and bolt together assembly of the modules.  The 75 modules in 
this case were manufactured on the Indonesian island of Batam located 20km from 
Singapore. The 415 square km island enjoys free trade zone status, and has developed into a 
strong industrial centre, housing hundreds of factories. 171   
 
These PAM’s have pressure tested pipe work, insulation, electrical and instrumentation 
requirements installed. The modules were delivered in sixteen separate shipments on heavy-
lift and roll on, roll off ships. The break-downs that had troubled Train 4 were not duplicated. 
Woodside completed the plant in 37 months, for $100 million less.  
 
This project fits the firm competence model well. 
 
Track record: Woodside has a 23 year track record of building and operating LNG plants of 
between 2.5 and 4.4 million tonnes per annum. With few exceptions they have performed 
well. The exceptions are fixed and do not happen in the next plant. 
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Firm focus: Woodside has a firm focus in offshore sourced gas, with some condensate and 
oil inclusions. Their “principal activities” are listed on the ASX web site as “Management 
and operation of hydrocarbon exploration, development, production, transportation and 
marketing; implementation and operation of the North West Shelf Gas Project; exploration 
and development of gas, oil and condensate reserves.” The market is competitive, failures and 
delays are unacceptable, and performance brings great financial rewards. They are a focused 
firm. 
 
Scale up: The process plants have been the same size for the last 12 years. Costs have been 
held down and efficiency and reliability increased. It is hard to find a better example of 
avoiding scale up risk, or that when it occurred it was at scale up point between train 3 and 4. 
 
Financial: Woodside is able to finance new projects from funds secured against long term 
contracts.   The approximately $32 billion invested in the Pluto LNG “is underpinned by 15-
year sales agreements with Kansai Electric and Tokyo Gas. Both companies became project 
participants in January 2008, each acquiring a 5% interest in the foundation project.” 172 
 
Profit: Woodside is the lead of six partners in these LNG projects. The other five partners are 
BHP-Billiton, BP, Chevron, Shell, and MIMI. MIMI is a joint venture between Mitsubishi 
and Mitsui, two of Japans leading trading houses.  All routinely record profits from these NW 
Shelf LNG ventures. 
 
5.2.4 Darwin LNG Plant (Case 15) $1,750,000,000 invested. 8.7% over budget, 50% 
delayed delivery. 100% of 3,500,000 tonnes of LNG produced.  Built 2003 – 2006. 
The US based Conoco Philips Darwin LNG facility (Case 15), with the benefit of hindsight 
be an even more firm competent project than Case 17. It was built between June 2003 and 
February 2006 to process 3.5 million tonnes per year of LNG. It is said to have cost $1.75 
billion, and was delivered on time in 32 months with a 16.7% cost increase. The plant uses 
aero derivative gas turbines for the compression and refrigeration services. The plant was 
able to exceed nameplate capacity shortly after commissioning, and is claimed to have 
shipped LNG two months ahead of schedule.  For a green-fields project, by a foreign firm, in 
a new location, with a resource of different character than previously processed, the project 
performed beyond projection.   
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The investment by Woodside in Case 17 was $591 per tonne of LNG, by Conoco Philips in 
Case 15 it was $500, a saving of almost 20%.  Three LNG projects under construction at 
present for processing coal seam gas, Queensland Curtis LNG, Gladstone LNG and Australia 
Pacific LNG have chosen the same “Optimised Cascade” process. 
 
The Conoco Philips Darwin LNG plant also fits the firm competence model well. 
 
Track record: ConocoPhillips have a 44 year track record of building and operating LNG 
plants with their first in Kanai Alaska in 1969. They have long used their aero derivative 
turbine technology. 
 
Firm focus: ConocoPhillips is an oil company, with specific developments in LNG plants 
and technology. They are more diverse than Woodside, in that they have legacy oil fields, and 
oil sands in North America. Internationally they are known for LNG technology and projects. 
 
Scale up: The Kenai facility is a million tonne per year plant, so the scale up to Darwin is 3.5 
times. 
 
Financial: ConocoPhillips as a reliable supplier is able to negotiate long term contracts with 
firms like Tokyo Electric and Tokyo Gas for LNG supply into favourable finance for new 
projects. As LNG plants are relatively dependable shippers of a commodity with a fixed price 
over a long term, the financing of projects has been seen as low risk. 
 
Profit: ConocoPhillips may be the most profitable LNG plant operator in Australia. The 
Darwin plant had the lowest capital cost, per tonne of LNG produced annually. The cost of 
$500 invested per tonne transformed was 84.6% of Woodside’s NWS 5 project and 78% of 
the NWS 4 project. The rapid ramp-up to more than name plate capacity in the first 90 days is 
another indicator of a low cost plant.  
 
ConocoPhillips utilise their unique Optimized Cascade technology for their Darwin LNG 
production. The budget includes the 26” diameter, 500 kilometre long undersea pipeline and 
a 3.7 million tonne per annum LNG plant.  LNG is sold to Tokyo Gas and Tokyo Electric, 
who are also partners in the development. 
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The plant at Darwin cost $1,750,000,000, of which $355 million was Australian 
contracted.173 ConocoPhillips claimed considerable innovation, and technical advance with 
the use of aero-derivative turbines for refrigeration service. 
 
The plant operators claim to have built the project, and shipped LNG 2 months earlier than 
projected. In the first year the plant was available 95% of the year, and was able to exceed 
nameplate capacity shortly after start up.174 ConocoPhillips built their first Optimized 
Cascade process LNG plant in Alaska in 1967 to supply Tokyo Gas Co Ltd and Tokyo 
Electric Power Company Inc. At the time it was the largest plant in the world. It is still 
operational, and the two Tokyo power and gas companies are still the customers and financial 
underwriters of the new projects. 
 
ConocoPhillips focused on one task, and one technology to satisfy their customer. 
Incremental innovation with each new plant increased the thermal efficiency, and decreased 
the risk.175  
 
5.2.5 Cannington Silver, Lead, and Zinc plant (Case 64). $460,000,000 Invested. 2.2% 
over budget. Completion on time. Built 1995 – 1997 
The Cannington mine and process plant built by BHP, 200km South East of Mt Isa is an 
example of firm competence built up over 110 years. The outcome was better than the 
projection, and the investment grew more rewarding as production surpassed the plan, costs 
of production fell, and annual output value became a multiple of the original investment. 
 
The project aimed to produce 175,000 tonnes of lead, 50,000 tonnes of zinc and 750 tonnes 
of silver per year. This initially required a plant that could process 1,500,000 tonnes of ore. In 
time as the best grades were consumed the ore processed rose to 1,800,000 tonnes in 2001, 
2,100,000 tonnes  in 2002, 2,700,000 in 2004176 and  3,100,000 in 2006. 
 
Production increased to 213,425 tonnes of lead, 56,281 tonnes of zinc, and 966 tonnes of 
silver, in 2012-13 financial year.177 This production had a sale price of $1.3 billion dollars, at 
a time when this project was reputed to be the largest single silver mine in the world, 
producing 6% of all silver, and 7% of all lead,178 with the lowest cost of production per tonne. 
 
BHP has long had a long track record and firm focus on rich lead silver and zinc mines. The 
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firm was founded and traded on the Adelaide stock exchange in 1885. There first 
consignment of 48.25 tons of ore produced more than a tonne of silver (35,605 ounces at a 
Melbourne smelter).  This Case 64 project is matched against the five firm competence 
criteria. 
 
Track record: BHP grew from the original silver, lead and zinc mine to become a steel 
maker, and a diversified firm in energy and minerals. They have divested assets that were sub 
optimal, such as the Broken Hill mine, and were only interested in re-entering this base 
metals sector when they had an unusually profitable opportunity. The Cannington project had 
to compete for resources as a business case, against a wide range of alternate investment 
opportunities.  The selection of the resource and the skill at expanding the processing indicate 
this process worked well in this case. 
 
Firm focus: BHP was in 1995 and is today a diversified firm. They were not focused on base 
metals, as were Pasminco, who were the operators of the Broken Hill mine at this time. BHP 
was focused on a profitable supply chain for all their commodities. Pasminco became 
insolvent in 2001.Their successor Zinefex had difficulties and merged to become Oz 
Minerals in 2008, which was then taken over in deep financial distress by China Minmetals in 
2009.   BHP’s focus on profitable operation of base metals operations was an important firm 
focus difference. The separation of silver lead and zinc from ores is a mature process evolved 
and improved for nearly one hundred years. 
 
Scale up ratio: The operation of an underground mine and a concentration plant are 
essentially similar for a range of metals recovered from ores. BHP had experience in both 
from comparable operations in copper processing at this time. 
 
Financial confidence:  BHP was one of the largest resource firms in the world in 1995, with 
a record of profits over many years. If the needed to have raised capital for the project, it 
would have been on the strength of their balance sheet, as well as the quality of the resource  
 
The 1997 Annual Report predicted that “The mine is expected to reach its full capacity of 1.5 
million tpa by mid-calendar year 1998 following completion of the main hoisting shaft.” In 
the 1999 Annual Report they revealed that “The mine's nameplate capacity of 1.5 million tpa 
was reached in January 1999.  The processing plant has exceeded its nameplate capacity on 
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a number of occasions and continues to be fine-tuned to maximise recovery to concentrate 
over the full range of ore blends.”  They had taken the time to understand the multiplicity of 
ore types, and that with that achieved the capacity of the plant to process more ore than was 
proposed. Later increases on ore throughput showed that with further upgrading the plant 
would, over the next 9 years, process more than twice the ore throughput originally planned, 
though at lower grades. 
 
Profit: Few plants annually produce concentrate with more than 2.8 times the value of the 
initial plant investment; and BHP is proud of this project. A mine that has 110 kg of lead, 40 
kg of zinc and ½ a kg of silver in each tonne of ore is likely to be profitable, and it was. 
Carrington ore with this metal value in each tonne was worth $1,065 at January 2014 values. 
BHP-Billiton is the largest mining firm in the world and one of the most consistently 
profitable. 
 
5.2.6 Conclusions 
Firm competence is the ability of a business entity to successfully complete the task they 
have proposed; meeting or exceeding the aim, to achieve a favourable outcome … one better 
than the investors might reasonably have expected, compared to the median outcomes. This is 
based on their past practice in the field of endeavour. 
 
That there should be a strong correlation between the past demonstrated competence of a firm 
and successful project outcome may be obvious. However a lack of firm competence was not 
given due consideration in fifteen of sixty seven private sector resource processing plants, 
and all failed.  
 
The firm competence model was evolved to match what was observed in the positional 
representation shown in sheet 4 of appendix. Projects which displayed the least competent 
outcomes were to the left, and most competent to the right.  
 
Firm competence in mature and well understood processes is common. Alumina plants are an 
example. Firm competence in new process innovation is amazingly rare. Only 1% of 
investment returned a profit. As firm competence in implementing the new and unknown is 
so rare and so valuable it is core of this work. 
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The lack of firm competence in achieving the agreed outcome, on budget and in time, in 
public sector projects appears much worse. Government investment was made only in 
projects that failed. 
 
Firm competence is measured and rewarded by the best informed investors and customers. 
That the competent firm has a positive disparity in knowledge of how to achieve a desired 
outcome is obvious. There must be information asymmetry between the most competent 
firms and the rest of the market. This information asymmetry, in intellectual property, skills, 
and organisation must grow to stay ahead. However the competent firm derives no value 
from strategic misrepresentation. They have no need; it is the tool of the incompetent. 
 
Firm competence is variable across a broad range of performance and outcomes. Firms may 
be exceptionally competent in some areas and much less so in others. The most competent 
firm at new process innovation (MIM) lacked financial competence and was taken over. The 
most competent firm at implementing difficult and complex chemical engineering processes 
(WMC) also was taken over. The firm with the most project failures is the largest and most 
profitable mining firm in the world.  
 
Even the most profitable firms will be competent only in a few areas. If this is their core 
business and they avoid or manage their weaknesses, they may prosper. The hero Achilles in 
the Trojan War was vulnerable only on one heel. Yet the arrow there killed him. Sadly 
Australia’s leading mining firms seem to have an “Achilles heel” with new process 
innovation and now avoid it.   
 
The difference between the fifteen least competent projects, as measured by the indicating 
criteria and the more competent 52 projects is stark. The fifteen least competent all failed. 
The fifty two more competent all succeeded. The average performance indicators for 
contrasting least and more competent are shown in Sheet 4 of the appendix. Table 21 
summaries these outcomes. Case 7 has not been included in these averages as it was only 5% 
complete when the firm ran out of capital and was the only project never completed. It is the 
worst example in every hypothesis, and is the most negative example in all. 
 
Table 21 shows the comparison between the fifteen least competent firms and the other 52 
more competent firms. 
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Table 21 shows a comparison of outcomes of least to more firm competent projects.  
 
 
The average of 28.5 % of production meant that the projects could never pay off their 
investment.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis 2: “That new process innovation was associated with project failure”. 
5.3.1 Distributional data of factors that make up inputs for prediction   
New process innovation applied to twelve projects of sixty seven. Eleven failed and one 
succeeded remarkably well.  Whilst there were many reasons for failure, eleven of fifteen 
failures were in new process innovation. If new process innovation were a disease, one would 
go to some lengths to avoid it, as it was fatal more than 92% of the time.  New process 
innovation is shown in sheet 5 of Appendix. The distributional display view shows 
distribution ordered by predicted outcome value, according to the model.  
 
Distributional data is displayed as positional format, with worst indicators (with most obvious 
risk) to the left of the sheet and best indicators (with least obvious risk) to the right of the 
sheet. It should be noted that the two high risk factors of innovation type (identifying those 
with greatest or most radical innovation) was matched with scale up ratio, which multiplies 
the risk for innovation, but also brings into the high risk group other projects with less 
innovation, but very large or infinite scale up. Thus the innovative projects are identified with 
a mauve colour in line 3. 
 
This inputs data is derived from published public domain reports, and case studies, and based 
on the predictive “New process innovation” model, where the indicating factors are show in 
items 3 and 5 with a sum of these shown as “Simple risk number” in line 10. 
 
This may be compared with the financial calculations, items 9 and 10, with project build 
measures, items 11 and 12, and with project performance measures, items 13 and 14, and 
finally with project outcomes in line 25 and 26. 
Firm Competence 15 least 52 more Ratio
Time management over 144.0% 108.0% 5.5 x worse
Cost management over 225.0% 122.0% 5.7 times worse
Production performance 28.5% 99.8% less than 1/3rd
Pay back time months 1,413 54 26 times worse
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There are still significant anomalies, which will be explored in following hypotheses the 
general correlation between the predictive indicators and measured outcomes is robust.  The 
greatest risk prediction is loaded strongly to the right of the spreadsheet with the worst 
outcomes.  
 
Innovation is a strong indicator of risk, but lack of innovation is not as good a predictor of 
success as firm competence. The one innovative project that succeeded invites further 
detailed examination in the case studies as to find what the difference were. New process 
innovation failures have left a negative model in investor’s and plant operators’ minds. 
 
The break point in prediction between .4 and .6 is simply a break between obvious failure and 
success. As will be revealed in the case studies, the difference between Case Study 8, HIsmelt 
and Case Study 40 ISASMELT, for the two indicators, were relatively small. They might 
have been ranked the same by another party reviewing the case studies, as they have much in 
common in time, and technology, but not outcome.  They are like non identical twins in a 
longitudinal medical study, where one lives and the other dies. They are thus much contrasted 
in the case studies, and were significant in formulating the models for the last three 
hypotheses. 
 
The firms that had difficulties with more complex project implementations and project 
finance, WMC Resources, Mount Isa Mines and Zinefex all show up with projects that 
caused them difficulties in this risk ranking. All three were taken over by firms with better 
financial backing, and the projects operated profitably. Equally two large firms that were 
exceptionally competent at project finance, and management of income from commodity 
sales, were challenged by new process projects; BHP-Billiton has four new process 
innovation failures and Rio Tinto one important example. Why this was so is explored in the 
following hypotheses. 
 
An investor who only chose projects with an innovation risk number over 1.5 would have 
taken minimal risk and made a profit. But they would have missed the only successful 
innovative project. To a large extent this is what the operators and market have concluded, 
innovation is too risky. They would like to be second or third to try something new; after it 
has been proven to work. New process innovation had a failure rate of 99.1% of the total of 
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capital invested in innovative new projects ($12,278 million). Only 0.89% ($110 million) led 
to success. 
 
This is an appalling outcome in the industry that drove the local economy in the last two 
decades.  No new process innovation project was started in Australia after 2005, and there are 
no new process plants to transform resources planned as of 2014. All plants being built are 
duplicates of prior existing plants, using proven technology at similar scale. 
 
5.3.2 Distributional data on execution, performance and outcome   
This is quantitative analysis, based on numbers taken from trusted public sources, (such 
company as annual reports) and is similar to reference class forecasting. 
 
Of the nineteen at highest risk by type of innovation and ratio of scale up included all twelve 
new process innovation projects (by predictive model) and seven other projects, including all 
failed projects. The four projects that succeeded were all by firms that later encountered 
financial difficulties, but then went on to be productive and valuable assets. None of the 
nineteen are now producing profits for the original firms. Yet the twentieth is one of the most 
consistently profitable operations in Australia, possibly the world, and the fourteenth is the 
one project most duplicated and repeated of any of the sixty seven. 
 
The thirteen at most risk all failed. The subtlety in this distribution is not why the 13 most 
risky failed. It is why four projects (Cases 40, 13, 56 and 65) out of the six in the group 14-19 
were quite good investments. 
 
The simplest explanation is that it was in how innovation and scale up ratio were managed. 
Of the nineteen highest risk projects one, Case 40 produced great value. Fifteen produced 
significant loss. Of these fifteen, three projects went on to produce moderate returns after 
firm failure. These three Cases, 13, 56 and 65 were difficult for the original firm, but now 
produce close to nameplate capacity for new owners. The value of the distribution table is 
seeing so clearly where the contrasts lay. The contrast between Case 8 and Case 40 is 
explored in the case studies that follow and in the models for innovation evolved. 
 
The group of thirteen most risk projects (1-13) show poor production output, 50% or less; and 
long theoretical times to pay back investments; an average of 130 years, compared to a little 
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over 4 years for low risk projects. 
 
The original investments for the thirteen greatest risk projects were largely destroyed. For 
investors in the next greatest risk group (14 to 19), four of six lost little but failed to gain the 
benefits of the growth the projects generated once under new management.  So they were less 
desirable investments from the view of a superannuation fund, which simply seeks a solid 
and largely risk free return on capital over a longer time. This is an unwelcome outcome, as it 
would be known to superannuation fund managers. Based on these outcomes it would be 
imprudent for such funds to invest in any innovation or large scale up project. 
 
5.3.3 ISASMELT (40) $110,000,000 invested. 210,000 tonnes of copper produced.  Built 
1992 - 1993 
ISASMELT is the only successful outcomes of initial publicly funded research. In 1973 
CSIRO began developing a more energy efficient and environmentally safer smelting 
technology to separate metal from ore. 
 
They teamed up with Mt Isa Mines in 1976 to build new smelting reactors that use special 
combustion tubes or lances to force superheated air and fuel below the surface of the ore 
mixture. This mixes the ore around and melts it evenly.  
 
Mt Isa Mines and Ausmelt have been licensed by the CSIRO to market this innovation in 
Australia and around the world. It is used to separate copper, lead, nickel, zinc and tin from 
mineral ores.179 
 
The first full scale plant was built in Mt Isa in 1991 to smelt 60,000 tonnes of lead per year. 
 
The second plant, also in 1991, was built for Britannia Refined Metals, of Northfleet, United 
Kingdom, and was a secondary Lead Smelter, with a 30,000 tonnes per annum capacity. The 
third was built in 1992 for Phelps Dodge, located in Arizona, USA and was a copper smelter 
with a capacity to transform 700,000 tonnes per annum of copper concentrate.  
 
The fourth plant, and the subject of this case study was built in 1992-3 and was to transform 
approximately 1,000,000 tonnes per annum of concentrated ores into 210,000 tonnes of 
copper. As far as can be seen from this distant point in time, and of a completely in-house 
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development, the project was built on time, on budget, then proceeded to deliver the 
nameplate capacity. 
 
This process plant was a slight scale up of the Arizona plant, and as such involved little risk. 
The UK plant was a half scale plant of the first plant, and was thus also low in risk. 
 
The fact that Mount Isa Mines (MIM) proceeded to sell another seven similar plants to 
customers around the world over the next 18 years, as well as further variants for secondary 
copper and lead smelting indicates that their close focus on perfecting the process was 
successful. 
 
ISASMELTs’ resolution of technical and operational problems, as shown in the 1993 plant, 
was as a direct result of 12 years research and systematic moderate scale up. 
 
The first small scale pilot plant was built in 1980 to test the operation of a two stage process 
for lead concentrates. Five major findings came from the research between CSIRO and MIM. 
These were: 
1.) Lead fuming could be controlled over a wide range of slag compositions and 
temperatures. 
2.) Increased oxygen content of lance air, decreased the fuel requirements, decreased the 
fume production, and lead to no significant increase in lance wear. 
3.) Refractory wear was less than expected; and higher during reduction than oxidation. 
4.) Slag reduction was demonstrated in batch operation, and proceeded quickly using 
lump coal addition. 
5.) Zinc fuming was very temperature dependant. 
A United States Patent 4,514,222 for “High Intensity lead smelting process” was awarded on 
30th April 1985, with Mount Isa Mines as the assignee. 
 
The successful ISASMELT case study was from a “competent enough firm” that later was 
taken over. There was no government involvement, and little information asymmetry. Thus 
only the new process innovation parameters are considered.  
 
Individual Ownership and responsibility: ISASMELT is an evolution of the 1973 
SiroSmelt pyro-metallurgical furnace, developed from earlier bench work in half kilogram 
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sized crucibles by Dr John Floyd.180  A 50 kg pilot plant followed.  
 
In 1981 Dr Floyd decided to leave CSIRO, who allowed him to licence and utilise the 
intellectual property, in which they had limited interest, and further develop it for non-ferrous 
applications. In 1983 Dr Floyd was joined at Ausmelt by his CSIRO colleague Brian 
Lightfoot.  
 
At the same time, and in parallel, MIM were interested in the process for lead smelting, and 
obtained CSIRO licence and permission to adopt the name 'Isasmelt' for any processes 
developed on their sites. Mount Isa Mines also needed to replace their obsolete Reverberatory 
Copper Smelter, and had initiated collaborative investigation of SiroSmelt as an alternative 
route for copper smelting. 
 
Thus there were two groups competing for similar markets with the same seed technology, 
till 2010 when Finish firm Outotec purchased the majority of shares in Ausmelt. Both 
Ausmelt and ISASMELT were successful in marketing and licencing their similar 
technologies around the world.   
 
Initial process simplicity: The ISASMELT process was initially simple, being built by John 
Floyd at CSIRO in 1970 at 500-gram scale in ceramic crucibles, which confirmed that rapid 
reduction rates could be achieved with gas injection. Realising that efficient mixing required 
a reactor with similar cylindrical geometry to the crucible-scale tests Floyd commenced the 
development of a 50-kg scale pilot plant comprising essentially a refractory-brick lined 
cylindrical drum with a cast ceramic lid, housing a slag bath 300 mm diameter and 250-350 
mm deep, a water-cooled vertical top-entry lance initially fired with natural gas and 
technical-grade oxygen to provide both mixing and submerged-combustion heating. Early 
test results proved so promising that in 1973 CSIRO provided Development Pool Funds to 
promote commercial development. 181 
 
Different applications of the process were worked by John Floyd at Ausmelt and by Bill 
Denholm at CSIRO for MIM in 500 gram bench scale prototypes, with practical results. The 
process was simple and could be implemented at low cost with representative outcomes. The 
process was promising at ½ a kg, and more so at each scale up and incremental improvement. 
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Multistage scale up: ISASMELT had seven stages of pilot plants, between 1970 and 1993. 
ISASMELT grew from a simple, successful ½ kg bench scale model to a 50 kg trial, and by 
1983 a small trial and demonstration plant, this was expanded in 1985 and commercial in 
1993, and from then twenty more plants around the world. The scale up stages over the years 
is shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22 Scale up of smelting prototypes. 
 
 
Niche demand for innovation: The demand for ISASMELT is strong for lead and copper 
concentration. 5 plants are under construction, four with 3,340,000 tonnes of copper smelting, 
and one of 160,000 tonnes of lead smelting capacity being built. Over the last 21 years twenty 
two process plants have been built or are in the process of being built.182 
 
Profit from the process: The process made profits for all the plant operators, and for the 
firm holding the licence.  
 
5.3.4 Australian Magnesium Corporation Limited (Case 7) $1,000,000,000 invested. 
94.4% over initial budget never completed delivery. 0% of 97,000 t Magnesium 
produced.  Built February 2002 – June 2003 
This case shows the most extreme lack of firm competence in the unusually negative project 
outcome. It is also the worst example of failure in radical innovation. It received the greatest 
level of Government investment, 32% of its budget. There was significant information 
asymmetry, and evidence of strategic misrepresentation. This it is a case study to be used in 
all four hypotheses, and all twenty model parameters will be considered. Australian 
Magnesium Corporation (AMC) failed to complete the project and never delivered any 
Date Stage  Tons p.a.
1970 SiroSmelt 500 g
1973 SiroSmelt 50 kg
1973 Aircooled lance
1980 4 tonne per hour sulfide plant
1981 John Floyd leaves CSIRO
1983 Lead Smelting demo plant 12,000
1985 Lead Slag Reduction plant 30,000
1991 Primary Lead Smelter 60,000
1993 ISASMELT Copper Smelter 210,000
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production. The demonstration plant produced 240 tonnes of Magnesium over 26 months. It 
is the only case in sixty seven projects over 18 years to fail so completely. 
 
The project work started in February 2002, with a projected 35 months to plant operation.183 
The figure of $1.0 billion is an estimate of what was actually lost. The Melbourne Age of 19th 
April 2003184 reported “originally planned $1.8 billion raising for the Stanwell project, 
including nearly $400 million in federal and state funding commitments” and “last August, 
the cost of the engineering, procurement and construction was $987 million”. The Auditor 
General of Queensland185 estimated the project cost as $1,847,000,000, and the data shown in 
Table 23. 
 
Table 23 Source of capital for AMC 
 
 
It ended with only 5% of the project complete and the money, just under a billion dollars, 
almost all gone. As much of the investment, $320 million, came from State and Federal 
Governments, it will be referred to in all hypotheses. This project was the only project built 
with direct involvement of and $75 million in funding186 from CSIRO. The four year 
alliance187 with Australia’s largest publicly funded research body, demonstrated the highest 
level of Government involvement. 
 
Track record: Australian Magnesium Corporation grew from a previous magnesia 
operation. The magnesia resource was rich, pure and easy to harvest, 437,223 tonnes was 
extracted at Kunwarara in 2001. The 2001 ANM Annual Report indicated sales revenue 
$72.7 million; that resulted in a consolidated loss $16.9 million. The firm had a cash balance 
of $11.5 million; and a proposed project for 1.85 billion plus. This is less than the ideal track 
record of management financial performance to reassure investors, in what turned out to be 
Australia’s most complex chemical engineering project. There was limited firm background 
Source of funds $ Millions
Bank Finance Facility 902
Normandy Mining Equity 100
State and Commonwealth Government 320
Investors buying AMC Securities 525
Total for project 1847
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of plant operations or experienced chemical plant operators or engineers, within the firm; 
who had resolved difficulties with similar complex new process plants in the past.  
 
Firm focus: Whilst the firm was focused on their unique enterprise, they had no prior team 
experience beyond calcined or dead-burned magnesia process, to build technical or 
managerial expertise needed to operate a new process refinery before being starting. The 
skills displayed in raising capital by misplaced optimism, strategic misrepresentation, and 
information asymmetry seemed to have been better developed than skills in project 
management or process plant cost estimation. CSIRO had not previously been involved in 
what was effectively a joint venture to implement the process they had developed.  
 
Scale up: The 97,000 t.p.a plant was theoretically a 65 x scale up of the 1,500 t.p.a 
“demonstration plant”.  This would only be valid if the “demonstration plant” in fact 
produced the nameplate capacity or close to it, reliably. Whilst the AMC project had a body 
of laboratory bench work by CSIRO, this was followed by a $73 million to $135 million in 
cost demonstration plant that produced less than 10% of nameplate capacity and never ran for 
more than 6 days before breakdown in the 26 months it was operated. Thus the investment in 
the Magnesium project was a bold leap forward at best. At worst it was negligent business 
strategy to build a large scale plant when the “demonstration plant” was performing so 
poorly. To scale up a process that works well in pilot scale has risk. To scale up a process that 
doesn’t work reliably is risk taken to a point of almost certainty of failure. 
 
At the time of project start, the plant would have represented more than 22% of world 
demand, (432,000 t p.a. according to USGS) and so was a very large scale plant. There were 
significant problems, under performance and fragility of operations in the smaller scale 
demonstration plant. To progress to a full scale plant without these problems being fully 
resolved, seems in retrospect, unconscionable.   The CSIRO process was unique, apparently 
innovative, and unusually complex. A number of interdependent steps and recycling 
processes, not typically used in resource processing; each had potential to frustrate the 
operational process flow.   
 
The problems experienced with early Alumina process plants in Australia when processing a 
new resource, were experienced by AMC.  
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Financial: AMC sold remarkably optimistic projections, to unsophisticated investors, which 
seemed unrepresentative of what was in fact happening in the “demonstration plant”. This 
was appreciated by informed investors. The first equity raising for $680 million, organised by 
Merrill Lynch failed. A second only raised $525 million and that largely due to guaranteed 
capital return, care of a government loan. For this AMC was to pay an 8 per cent yield. 
Institutional investors, who might have formed more accurate assessments; chose not to 
participate in either of the equity issues, wisely as it turned out. The Queensland stockbroking 
arm of Dutch bank ABN Amro, offered its retail clients even more of an incentive. They 
would get bonus shares if they subscribed to the issue. Race car champion Dick Johnson led 
an extraordinary advertising campaign, unusual in a share market practice, largely to “first 
time investors” through Northern Queensland and the Northern Territory.188 Four thousand 
individuals in Central Queensland, who had never purchased securities before believed the 
representations and lost their money. The most informed investors, and construction firms, 
chose to take a prudent step backwards, the least informed were aggressively targeted, and 
funding only fell across the line, short of the capital required to actually build the plant, with 
a government investment and guarantees. 
 
Profit in any of the measures: There was never more than a 5% complete plant, no 
production, and no income. There was no profit from the business of producing magnesium. 
In contrast the business of separating investors and government from their funds was almost 
perfect. 
 
Individual ownership and responsibility: The Magnesium research was contracted by 
AMC to CSIRO. CSIRO’s Light Metals Flagship invested their funds and reputation into 
trying to reach a successful outcome. As an organisation promoting research and new 
processes of value to the nation, this was a trial by fire, and the notable failure of has been 
keenly felt. There are no individuals identified who owned the research, or were named in 
presently available press releases in association with it. There was no apparent responsibility 
with AMC or CSIRO for the outcome. The CSIRO Flagships budget was cut $24 million 
after 2003. The Light Metals Flagship ceased operation in July 2011. 
 
Initial Process simplicity: The MG Process to transform Magnasite to magnesium metal was 
complex 5 stage operation that required: A hydrogen plant, a hydrochloric acid plant, a water 
treatment plant, a methanol recovery plant, chlorine recycling plant and a glycol/ammonia 
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recovery plant.  It had leaching, purification, filtration, dehydration, crystallisation, 
centrifuging, calcination, electrolytic cell and foundry stages.189 Whilst this may have been 
elegant chemistry on a well- equipped capital city research laboratory, it turned out an 
impractical option on a green-fields site in rural Queensland.  The pilot plant lacked buffers 
for many of the processes, and only ran for a few days before shutdown or failure. The initial 
process was complex beyond the capability and financial resources of the proponents.  
 
By comparison to the simple Pidgeon process, used in China to produce most of the world’s 
magnesium metal, the AM process was complex, and has not been implemented by any other 
firm since. The Pidgeon process was developed in 1940 in Canada based on a 1938 thesis 
from Padua in Italy. The first plant was built in 1941 and operated successfully for 63 years. 
In 2012 China produced 640,000 tonnes of the total 750,000 tonnes by the simple process.190 
 
Multistage scale up: The MG process seems to have had 3 steps up scales. The first 
prototype was in the CSIRO probably at Clayton laboratories, at bench or similar scale. The 
second was the $72 million demonstration plant. This had the aim of “provided AMC with a 
facility to showcase and verify to financiers, customers and stakeholders the AM Process 
technology and the operability of that process.”191 
 
Designed to produce 1,500 tonnes of magnesium metal annually, in the entire 26 months it 
operated the plant produced only about 240 tonnes of metal, or less than 10 per cent of its 
planned annual output. Its longest continual period of operation was just six days.192 The third 
stage was the 97,000 tonnes per year plant never completed.  The scale up from a 125 tonnes 
a month plant to an 8,083 tonnes a month plant is 1 to 64. But the scale up from a 9.23 tonnes 
a month plant (which was the average production over operation) is 1 to 876.  The outcomes 
indicate that this is not a good model.  
 
Niche demand for the innovation:  The demand for high value magnesium metal for light 
weight automotive use has not eventuated as CSIRO and AMG had hoped. 85% of the 
world’s magnesium is now produced in China, mostly to alloy in small quantities with 
aluminium. The use of magnesium in automotive castings in America is 2012 is about 47,000 
tonnes, spread over 16.4 million light vehicles; on average 2.8 kg per vehicle. The peak use 
of magnesium in automobiles was in 1971, when 42,000 tonnes was consumed, almost all by 
Volkswagen who had been using about 20 kg of magnesium in their engine blocks since 
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1936.193 At the time AMC was building the Stanwell plant nine other firms (Anaconda, Crest, 
Pilbara, South Australia, Tasmania, Mount Grace, Hazelwood, Woodsreef and TasMag) had 
registered plans for similar projects with ABARE, and were attempting to raise funding. 
 
Mature and well understood process that has evolved: The MG process was new, unique 
and patented.194 It had not evolved in a commercial sense, in that there was only 240 tonnes 
of demonstration metal made, and the process has not since been copied, licenced or 
duplicated. The low level of production and short campaign intervals with the demonstration 
plant, indicate a process that like Macduff in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, “was from his mother’s 
womb Untimely ripped.” 
 
Mature firm with complete value chain: AMC was not a mature firm, and the value chain, 
symbolised by the $50 million investment by Ford, did not materialise, nor was it taken by 
any competitor. Magnesium use in light automobiles has declined over the last forty three 
years.  
 
Mutual benefits from decades of agreed collaboration: As there was no production, there 
were no benefits and no time scale to share them over. No similar magnesium metal product 
has taken this unique market share, so it is doubtful if it actually existed. 
 
High level of reward for information asymmetry: The gap between what was projected, 
and what actually happened was large, but perhaps not a complete surprise to the proponents.  
 
CSIRO projected that the 96,000 tonne production would “generate more than $400 million 
(Australian) annually in export income.”195 This would require a selling price of $4,167 
(Aust) per tonne, which was based on the historically low Australian dollar, then trading at 53 
US cents, and unusual optimism as to market demand. The Australian dollar increased in 
value (to 79.4 U.S. Cents by 2004), demand for extra magnesium production did not occur, 
and the price of magnesium metal fell from $2,500 U.S. per tonne in 1999 to $1,900 a tonne 
in 2003196 
 
It is anticipated to produce at US$0.64 per pound and at project prices, projected to provide 
an ROI of around 16 per cent197. There was never more than 5% of the plant, no production 
and no return on investment. 
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In the 2000 Annual Report it was stated:  The magnesium metal activities culminated in the 
completion of the Feasibility Study confirming the economic and technical attributes of 
AMC's proposed 97,000 tonnes per annum Stanwell magnesium metal plant and its potential 
as one of the lowest cost producers of magnesium metal in the world. No firm has sought to 
produce Magnesium by the MG process, which indicates that low cost is not widely 
perceived as credible. 
 
Yet the outcome was not a complete surprise. The italic text is from the risk section of the 
October 2001 prospectus, AMC stated that “there can be no assurance that construction will 
be completed and the Stanwell plant commissioned on time and within the capital cost 
estimate.” These twenty three words protected the proponents from liability.   
 
On 25th June 2003 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) today 
announced that it has commenced an investigation into disclosure by Australian Magnesium 
Corporation (AMC). They revealed what “insiders” had known for some time, that “since the 
outset, it has been clear that the AMC venture carried significant risk. The existence and 
extent of this risk was the subject of substantial disclosure in the company’s prospectus.” 198 
 
High level of information asymmetry and power imbalance: Almost a billion dollars had 
been spend, the proponents retained the remuneration for their skills, the investors lost almost 
all their capital, no one went to jail, and  very little money was recovered. 
 
The question might be asked: “Who benefited?”  To follow the money trail “what was 
claimed to have been achieved” and “what was listed as spent” are taken verbatim from page 
3 of the 2003 Annual report. 
 
“When project work ceased in June 2003, approximately 70% of the project had been 
engineered, 80% of the equipment items had been ordered or priced (most of which were in 
line with estimates) and less than 5% of site construction had been completed. 
 
Major costs and expenses on the project included $194 million spent on equipment, $86 
million on engineering, $60 million on bulk materials, installation and temporary assets, and 
$272 million spent on project operations and commissioning management, fees, charges, 
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insurance and other project expenses.” 
 
The largest single expense, at $272 million, on a project stated as having a high risk of failure 
and non-completion, was administrative. The (insider) management group who were best 
informed as to the risks and probabilities, but were protected from liability for the outcome; 
seem to have directed the majority of funds to managerial expenditure. 
 
A small example relates to the chairman of Australian Magnesium. In addition to his 
remuneration of $170,385 for managerial skills in 2003 year he also collected $182,500 for 
advisory services. His advice was in relation to: Capital-raising programs, Government 
liaison, Bank relations, Investor relations and Market development. 
 
As a disgruntled investor, Pierpont199 noted that: Australian Magnesium had to mothball its 
$900 million project at Stanwell because it couldn't raise any more capital. The Queensland 
government refused to invest any further in the project. The banks scooped out $50 million in 
commitment fees and then walked away. The disaster left investors quite hostile. There wasn't 
much point developing markets if the project couldn't produce. These comments, published in 
“The Australian Financial Review” were not challenged.  
 
The $340 million spent on equipment, engineering, materials and assets was exchanged in 
2004 for a Deed of Transfer and Release (from financial obligations) valued at $11.6 million, 
or 3.4 cents in the dollar. 
 
Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation: Almost a billion dollars of 
investment, left project assets valued at just $11.6 million. A curious soul might ask “where 
did the other 99% go?” No other project in the sixty seven projects over eighteen years failed 
to complete. No other project had a firm so incompetent at converting investment into 
proposed outcome, who chose so radical and unworkable an innovation, and received so 
much government investment. 
 
In August 2001 an initial bid to raise $680 million in equity funding, on top of a $930 million 
debt package, failed. A second raised $525 million, $155 million short of the initial target. 
The Federal government provided a $100 million loan guarantee while the Queensland 
government offering a further $100 million of subordinated debt.   
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The proponents were rejected in their fundraising by professional investors and service 
providers. They then sought funds from the least informed investors, with projections remote 
from outcomes. 
 
The four tonnes per day pilot plant produced just 240 tonnes in 26 months, and never ran for 
more than 6 days, so it is unsurprising that the emphasis was on management fees, and not on 
construction of a 265 tonne a day that might well have been even more problematic. Every 
other $100 million plus investment process plant was completed, a 5% completed plant, at 
financial exhaustion, is the exception. 
 
The Case study in chronological order: 
Queensland Metals Corporation Limited (QMC) had mining and exploration licenses 
covering 1.2 billion tonnes of magnesite ore from the Kunwarara deposit, 60 km north-west 
of Rockhampton. QMC had entered into a collaborative research project with the Australian 
government owned research group, CSIRO. A $73 to $135 million pilot plant at Gladstone 
worked on the patented process which involves leaching magnesite in hydrochloric acid to 
produce magnesium chloride. After purification and drying, it was to be smelted in an off-
the-shelf Alcan electrolytic cell that required 99.9 per cent pure magnesium chloride.  
 
CSIRO estimated that the 96,000 tonne production would “generate more than $400 million 
(Australian) annually in export income.”200 This would require a selling price of $4,167 
(Aust) per tonne, which was based on the historically low Australian dollar, then trading at 53 
US cents, and level of market optimism. 
 
In December 1998 and June 1999 ABARE reports a “Magmetal Project” was listed as a new 
project to cost $720 million, and to commence operation in 2002. By June 2000 the projected 
cost had risen to $1.13 billion dollars and commencement was to be in 2003.  A cost increase 
of 57% and delivery slip of a year … in a year does not indicate a high level of competence in 
the early stages of planning.  
 
In May 2003, the project had stalled with cost overruns of $200m and, according to the CEO, 
“the future of the project was under review". At this point it had received $320 million in 
loan and grants from the Federal and Queensland governments and Ford provided $50 
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million. The bank debt package of $902 million could only able to be accessed "following 
completion of substantial engineering work and equipment procurement.” The banks were 
paid $50 million in fees for this unused option.   
 
By 5th June 2003 the firm had then run out of capital and any faith by the investors that an 
outcome could be reached; and requested the suspension of its securities”. The project was 
placed on care and maintenance.  The $74 million left in the bank by the end of June was 
utilised in ongoing management expenses and restructure. When project work ceased in June 
2003, less than 5% of site construction had been completed.201 
 
The loss for 2003 financial year was $812,600,000. “Debt forgiveness” in 2004 was recorded 
at $122,500,000 as revenue.202 The Deed of Transfer and Release, signed between the AMC 
Group of Companies, the State of Queensland, the Commonwealth of Australia, Queensland 
Treasury Holdings, Newmont and Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd on 6 July 2004 eliminated 
borrowings of $182.2 million in exchange for primarily cash of $45.5 million and Stanwell 
Magnesium Project assets of $11.6 million.  
 
The loss for 2003 financial year was $812,600,000. “Debt forgiveness” in 2004 was recorded 
at $122,500,000 as revenue.203 
 
When project work ceased in June 2003, less than 5% of site construction had been 
completed.204 The process has not been subsequently copied, duplicated or licenced. 
 
5.3.5 HIsmelt (8) $1,020,000,000 invested*. 12% of 800,000 tonnes of pig iron produced.  
Built 2003 – 2005; Operated 2005-2008; Closed 2009; Dismantled 2013; Transferred to 
India 2014.  (* The $1,020,000,000 seems to represent the total invested over the years at 
Kwinana, with the 2002-2008 stage being valued in an 2002 ABARE listing as 
$400,000,000.) 
 
In 2013 Rio Tinto harvested 266 million tonnes of iron ore, and shipped 259 million 
tonnes205, with an approximate value of $135 a tonne on contract206; this would give an 
income of just under $35 billion. This is the jewel in the crown of Rio’s operations; as they 
ramp up production to 290 million tonnes for 2014. Retaining, and expanding the firms 
majority share of profitable business has been a long term focus.  Rio Tinto started its iron 
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ore business in the Pilbara in 1966, with Mt Tom Price.  
 
The need to meet the wishes of the Western Australian Government, in respect of new leases 
and “secondary processing obligations” were first addressed in 1981. CRA and formed a joint 
venture with Klöckner Werke to pursue the steelmaking and smelting reduction technologies.  
Over three decades, there were three “research” phases with three joint venture partners. 
There was long term iterative research process, with many worked prototypes. After two 
decades of trials a less than successful commercial stage was followed by dismantling and re-
locating the plant to India. 
 
Between 1984 and 1990 the first smelt reduction concept (using the 60 tonne steelmaking 
converter) led to the construction of a second Small-Scale Pilot Plant (SSPP) located at the 
Maxhütte steelworks, Bavaria. With a capacity of 10-12,000 t.p.a, the design was based on a 
horizontal, rotating Smelt Reduction Vessel (SRV) that used bottom tuyeres for injection of 
coal, oxygen, fluxes and iron ore.207  The SSPP operated from 1984 to 1990 and, according to 
Tio Tinto “proved the viability of the technology.”  Klöckner withdrew in 1987, and in 1989 
CRA formed a 50:50 Joint Venture with Midrex Corporation. 
 
In 1991 third phase of the Process development was the HIsmelt Research and Development 
Facility (HRDF), constructed at Kwinana, Western Australia; with a design capacity of 
100,000 t.p.a. This was “to demonstrate the process and engineering scale-up of the core 
plant and to provide operating data for commercial evaluation” which sounds more marketing 
than research. 
 
A horizontal vessel, (second phase) was operated from October 1993 to August 1996. 
However “the complexity of engineering a horizontal vessel limited its commercial viability.”  
Midrex (owned by Kobe Steel) withdrew 1994.  A $100 million investment for producing 
100,000 tonnes per year of steel was shown in ABARE 1993 report, which matches HRDF. 
 
A water-cooled vertical vessel; the SRV designed in 1996. The improvements included top 
injection of solids, a simplified hot air blast lance, and a fore hearth for continuous tapping of 
metal and water-cooled panels to overcome refractory wear problems. 
 
The HRDF vertical vessel was commissioned in the first half of 1997 and operated through to 
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May 1999. The vertical vessel (SRV) demonstrated major improvements over the horizontal 
vessel in terms of refractory wear, reliability, availability, productivity and simplicity in 
design. 
 
The Rio Tinto website states that “the vertical vessel operation confirmed the process was 
ready to be scaled up to a commercial plant.”  
 
During 2002, an unincorporated joint venture was formed between the Rio Tinto (60%), 
Nucor Corporation (25%), Mitsubishi Corporation (10%), and Shougang Corporation (5%) 
groups - for the purpose of constructing and operating an 800,000 t.p.a HIsmelt Plant. 
Located in Kwinana, Western Australia, the merchant pig iron facility was designed and 
engineered with a 6-metre hearth diameter Smelt Reduction Vessel.  
 
On 14th May 2002 the Australian government provided a grant of A$125 million for the 
development of multi-user infrastructure associated with the plant.208 In May 2003 Dr 
Gallop, Premier of Western Australia said the State Government had committed $30 million 
for purchasing land and upgrading port facilities associated with the project. In stage one, 
the HIsmelt plant would produce 820,000 tonnes of pig iron per annum, increasing to 1.64 
m.t.p.a by 2006, in stage two.209 
 
Construction of the plant commenced in January 2003. Cold commissioning of the 6-metre 
plant commenced in the second half of 2004. Hot commissioning at the HIsmelt Kwinana 
Joint Venture plant commenced in Q2 2005. Starting from November 2005 the plant was 
scheduled to take 3 years to ramp up to its name-plate capacity. The final hot metal 
production rate of 105 tonnes per hour, or 800,000 tonnes per year would consume 700kg of 
coal per tonne of hot metal.  
 
It is difficult to tell when a plant transitions from research to commissioning to commercial 
production. In 2006 a production rate of 65 tonnes of hot metal per hour with a coal rate of 
900kg per tonne of hot metal was reported. In 2007, 80 tonnes of hot metal per hour with a 
coal rate of 810kg per tonne of hot metal were reported. 
 
However output, as a percentage of nameplate capacity remained at low levels shown in 
Table 24. Had the commissioning gone as shown in Table 25 the production figures and 
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returns would have been very different. The price that is shown is the average price for scrap 
iron in USA, taken from the USGS reports, and may be a little different to payments Rio 
Tinto received. Table 24 shows what was produced. Table 25 shows what should have been 
produced according to the HIsmelt commissioning plan.  
 
Table 24 Actual production and estimated sale value. 
 
 
Table 25 Proposed productions and estimated sale value. 
 
 
HIsmelt was described “as a revolutionary new iron-making process developed by Rio Tinto 
Group. Fine iron ores and non-coking coals are injected directly into a molten iron bath, 
contained within a Smelt Reduction Vessel (SRV), to produce high quality molten pig iron. It 
can be considered both as a potential replacement for the blast furnace and as a new source 
of low cost iron units for the electric arc steelmaking industry.”210 The HIsmelt@ 
Technology was promoted as offering: “lower operating costs; lower capital intensity, lower 
environmental impact, greater raw material and operational flexibility“to the steelmaking 
industry.  Other benefits were in processing iron ore fines that might be high in phosphorous, 
and use of lower grade non-metallurgical coals. The process was to produce 4.5kg sized 
“pigs” of iron with low levels of slag. These pigs would be used in Electric Arc Furnaces 
(EAF) as a substitute for hi grade ferrous scrap iron. For this reason the price of scrap steel 
Year Capacity Output US Scrap Sale value
2005 4.50% 9,000 $188.51 $1,696,590
2006 11.13% 89,000 $214.00 $19,046,000
2007 14.36% 114,870 $249.00 $28,602,630
2008 10.28% 82,218 $349.00 $28,694,082
$78,039,302
Year Capacity Output US Scrap Sales value
2006 60% 480,000 $214.00 $102,720,000
2007 90% 720,000 $249.00 $179,280,000
2008 100% 800,000 $349.00 $279,200,000
2009 100% 800,000 $208.00 $166,400,000
2010 100% 800,000 $335.00 $268,000,000
$995,600,000
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world’s leading steelmaker. These are all factors that should contribute to commercial 
success for a plant that was technically capable of delivering the promised benefits. 
 
The 26th March 2009 press announcement213 by Rio Tinto, to close its “deeply uneconomic” 
$400 million HIsmelt plant in Kwinana has led to 100 job losses. The mining giant 
announced today the troubled plant would be shut for at least a year, blaming the closure on 
a drop in pig iron prices and a bleak market outlook.  
 
The statement seems to be at odds with facts. In 2009 the price for crude steel was briefly 
depressed, but was higher than it had been for fifteen of the last nineteen years. It was shortly 
followed by scrap iron prices almost doubling, as shown in Table 34.  This table also show 
that in the time that Rio Tinto was developing the technology the wold of steel making 
changed, with China becoming the world’s largest steelmaker. However, China imports only 
6.8 million tonnes of ferrous scrap, of the 104.7 million tonnes traded in 2011. 
 
Had the plant scaled up to nameplate capacity it would have produced crude steel generating 
an income of approximately $995 million. The significantly sub optimal plant performance 
probably generated an income of approximately $78 million in its four years of operation. 
The failure to function beyond 14% of nameplate capacity seems to have been much more 
significant than the price of the commodity. The 800,000 tonnes of product would have only 
been 11.7% of Chinese scrap imports, or 0.7% of world consumption.214 By 2011 the price 
for pig iron had almost doubled, but the plant was still not re-opened. 
 
This case shows a puzzling outcome for an otherwise notably competent firm, who proceeded 
with detailed research and development over nearly three decades, and had adequate capital. 
It is an innovation failure with much in common with the one innovation success, and was the 
one of two projects with direct Government finance, and significant information asymmetry. 
This it is a case study to be used in all four hypotheses, and all twenty model parameters will 
be considered. 
 
Track record: Rio Tinto is the fourth largest mining company listed in the world with 2012 
revenue of $51 billion. It is a multinational diversified resources production and trading firm 
with five divisions, Iron ore, Energy (coal), Rio Tinto Alcan – aluminium, bauxite and 
alumina, Copper and diamonds. It has never been a producer of steel. 
 168
 
Firm focus: Firm focus is on the long term access to key resources, like iron ore, and coal, 
and the bauxite to aluminium supply chain. Whilst a very professional business, there is no 
obvious commitment to radical new process innovation, other than HIsmelt. The mine of the 
future project appears to be a clever utilisation of many of the best existing technologies, 
incrementally improved and worked into an operations system. Rio Tinto ship more iron ore 
from the Pilbara than BHP-Billiton. 
 
Scale up ratio: The scale up ratios over the significant time frames of research and 
development fit the success model closely. However scaling up a plant that seems not work 
as planned, or provide expected benefit, or has potential to make a profit seems an anomaly. 
The key difference in scale up between Case 40 and Case 8 is that every early 
implementation in Case 40 seemed to work well, and was scaled up. The early 
implementations in Case 8 seemed to reach a failure point with departure of an experienced 
partner. The process then re-started with an alternative embodiment along the general theme. 
Thus there was no scale up building on success, rather scale up learning from failure. There is 
no fault in learning from failure. But when the whole exercise ends in failure, was it failure 
that was developed. Was failure acceptable as the process not the outcome was the objective? 
 
Financial confidence: Rio Tinto has enjoyed strong performance, with the exception of the $ 
38.1 billion Alcan purchase in 2007, which was badly mistimed. They would still enjoy 
strong financial confidence, and be able to raise capital at favourable interest rates, over any 
normal project time scale. 
 
Profits: Rio Tinto was before 2007 the second most profitable mining firm in the world. 
They are noted for tightly run and well managed operations. This project was the exception. 
It did not perform technically as expected and absorbed Federal and State capital. Rio Tinto 
would have been able to claim R&D Tax concession over much of the life of the project. So 
whilst this project made no profit, it transferred much of the cost to the Commonwealth. 
 
Individual Ownership and responsibility: HIsmelt over the long term of its life lacked 
obvious ownership beyond the corporate objectives, and few senior individuals who started in 
1981, would still have been in control in 2014. Rio Tinto through their HIsmelt associated 
websites still promotes the process as ongoing, viable, and of value, though the experience at 
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Kwinana in 2008-09 was quite the opposite. There seems to be no individual champion, or 
personal responsibility for what has happened. 
 
Initial process simplicity: The simplicity of the process that became HIsmelt is difficult to 
ascertain, as it has gone through four distinct embodiments, with 3 sets of joint venture 
partners over the 24 years 1981-2005. Two of these partners have after a period of 
collaborative operation withdrawn. These were the two with the most detailed knowledge of 
steel production. This might be seen as a negative assessment of the commercial potential of 
the process by those best informed to make an evaluation.  
 
In a paper titled “Direct Smelting: Why Have So Few Made It?”215 The authors list technical 
and financial difficulties that proponents of similar processes have experienced. These 
authors included HISmelt management and Rio Tinto’s Chief Technologist Robin Batterham. 
They comment “The time-scale for developing this type of technology is more like 20 years 
than 3-5 years.”  At the time (2002) Rio Tinto had been working on the process for 21 years. 
More interesting is the comment “The reasons why so few succeed in this area seem to be 
strongly related to the soundness of the starting point.  If the reasons for trying (and the 
degree of ongoing support) are not up to the task, history suggests failure is virtually 
guaranteed.”  As technical and economic failure was the outcome, it is reasonable to 
question if the starting point was sound? 
 
Multistage scale up: The Rio Tinto developments that lead to HIsmelt were in stages that 
built on the prior work with new partners at each stage.  Rather than multistage incremental 
scale up of a simple working process, these seem to be relatively large scale implementation, 
each one ending in failure and some learning for the next embodiment. The 1991-1997 plant 
of 100,000 tonnes preceded, and had many features of the 800,000 tonnes per annum plant 
that is this case study. By 2003 HIsmelt had 22 years of experimental and practical 
experience, which if based on a simple innovation like ISASMELT should have led to a 
similar successful outcome, but it did not. The outcome of the final 2003 - 2008 project was a 
commercial and technical disappointment. Production of 14.36 % of name plate capacity in 
the third year of operation (2007) after 26 years or research and development is difficult to 
interpret as success. These stages are shown in Table 27. 
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Table 27 Stages in HIsmelt development 
 
 
Niche demand for innovation:  The demand for direct smelting technology is still potential 
and theoretical. Of the firms that HIsmelt saw as competitors, only one has had a degree of 
success, and all firms have suffered similar tribulations.  Siemens VAI’s Corex process has 
been implemented by Jindal Steel in India, as well as in Korea and South Africa. It is the 
most commercially successful so far. The Russian Romelt process, The Japanese Dios 
Process, and the American Iron Dynamics process have not yet passed the “promising” but 
non-commercial stage. The demand so far seems smaller than anticipated; and the difficulties 
as great as HIsmelt found. 
 
The niche for direct smelting appears to be in countries with significant local gas supplies 
that are difficult to export, and hence of very low value. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya and 
Venezuela are examples. It is also attractive to nations with coal and iron ores with 
undesirable characteristics for conventional steelmaking such as India. Western Australia has 
exceptional quality iron ores available, a well-developed LNG export infrastructure, and a 
very limited market need for local iron ore production. There was limited niche demand to 
drive the project to completion.  
 
Date Stage  Tons p.a.
1981 CRA JV with Klockner Werke
1984 to Smelt Reduction Converter 60?
1990 Small Scale Pilot plant 12,000
1987 Klockner Werke withdrawal
1989 CRA JV with Midrex
1991 HRDF design build 100,000
1993‐96 Horizontal Vessel operation 100,000
1997‐99 SRV Vertical water cooled 100,000?
2002 New JV partners
2003 6 metre smelt reduction vessel (build)
2005 6 m Smelt Reduction Vessel 800,000
to 3 year ramp up
2008 Close due to GFC
2011 Jindal Steel and Power deal
2014 Plant to be moved to Orissa  India
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Mature and well understood processes evolved: Whilst direct smelting and top submerged 
lance technology dates back to SiroSmelt in the early 1970’s, it has not seen widespread 
success in iron reduction. As there are no commercial HIsmelt like  iron smelting plants in 
operation, after more than 3 decades the process is yet to mature, and by virtue of the poor 
performance shown in Table 5.3.5A is not yet well understood enough. 
 
Mature firms with complete value chain: Rio Tinto is a mature and respected firm, with 
one of the largest operational value chains in its Rio Tinto Alcan division. However they have 
not shown any interest, beyond the work in partnership with existing steel makers, to become 
involved in a steel making value chain of their own 
 
Mutual benefit from decades on agreed collaboration: Rio Tinto has been in four stages of 
agreed collaboration with joint venture partners. Two were terminated by the other partners, 
and two have yet to bear commercial fruit. The agreed collaboration with the Western 
Australian government to meet secondary processing obligations may have given Rio Tinto 
the outcome they sought, but did not give the Western Australian government the outcome 
they were hoping for. 
 
High level of reward for information asymmetry: Rio Tinto makes the majority of its 
profit from Western Australian iron ore operations. They have retained and expanded their 
operations in the Pilbara, and met their secondary processing obligations with the long 
running HIsmelt program. If one looks at outcome derived against cost invested over three 
decades it has been a remarkably economical and effective investment. They invested less 
than a third of BHP’s HBI plant, and received $125 million in Federal and $30 million in 
state grants. The rewards for managing a preferred outcome were considerable. 
 
High of information asymmetry and power imbalance: The level of information known to 
Rio Tinto in 2003 about the state of technology in their preferred direct smelting process, 
after twenty two years of research and development were very much superior to anything 
known to the Western Australian government. Whilst the Western Australian government 
own the iron ore resource, and negotiate the leases, they are an entity with a $25 billion a 
revenue stream, less than half that of Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto is probably the largest single 
contributor to that states revenue stream.  
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Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation: The revenue from Pilbara iron ore is 
estimated to be $35 billion of their 2012 total revenue of $51 billion. Meeting the secondary 
processing obligations ensured uninterrupted access. 
 
Asymmetrical information used to manage ignorant power: The Western Australian 
governments wish to produce crude steel from local iron ore fines, and export the product, 
was not as economically sound as the bauxite to alumina to Aluminium model. The two large 
resource firms that built crude steel plants to meet the secondary processing obligations both 
reached the same negative outcomes by widely different paths. The iron ore fines are now 
exported with other lump production, and a royalty is received on this by the government.  
 
Selective strategic misrepresentation to promote investment: The investments in HIsmelt 
came from joint venture partners in undisclosed sums and from State and Federal 
Government. What benefit the joint venture partners have received is as obscure as their 
inputs. The majority of investment seems to have come from Rio Tinto, and was either 
written off their liability to pay Federal company taxes or written off under more favourable 
Research and development concessions, again against their Federal tax liabilities.  
 
5.3.7 Conclusions 
These three projects that involved high levels of process innovation achieved widely diverse 
outcomes. The first (40) received only commercial investment and succeeded exceptionally 
in stages over time. The other two (7 and 8) received State and Federal project funding and 
failed at different speeds.  
 
Two (40 and 7) have a common seed from the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO) in the original development of the innovations.  The third (8) 
uses a lance furnace design that has some similarities in appearance to (40). 
 
The key points for ISASMELT are that:  
 The innovation had a brilliant and much respected1 individual founder, whose name 
is still associated with the process. Success had a proud father, who worked and 
invested, and fought through the “childhood and adolescent years” of his process. 
                                                 
1 John Floyd was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) in 1997 and received a Clunies Ross National Science 
and Technology Award in 1995. 
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 The innovation was bottom up, small in scale, low in budget, modified and improved, 
largely by original inventors. The inventors broke free of their state research 
organisation, and devoted their working lives to the commercial exploitation of the 
process.  
 The innovation was initially able to be implemented at moderate cost, and was 
functional at the time it was adopted. Evolutionary Improvements, process scale up 
and adaption to new materials and applications followed sequentially and in many 
modest steps.  
 Early implementations worked well and gave small scale but real commercial 
benefits, in resolving process problems with base metal refining and recycling. Each 
new stage built on, and improved on, prior success. 
 The innovation was quickly recognised as intrinsically valuable, but not by CSIRO, 
and was the subject of fierce commercial competition. The rapid development of 
flotation, which transformed productivity at Broken Hill, in the decade after 
Federation, was driven by similar competing innovators and their developments. 
 The industry that needed the innovation; quickly recognised the potential and began a 
systematic process of research and development. 
 One firm (MIM) who wanted the innovation for their own application; and 
successfully applied it in increasing stages; then marketed the outcome 
internationally.  
 
In contrast Australian Magnesium Corporation Limited (AMC) contracted research by 
CSIRO in 1987 “to investigate cost-effective processes for producing high purity anhydrous 
magnesium chloride suitable for feeding to a modern magnesium electrolytic cell such as the 
Alcan Multipolar design. Patents on magnesite dissolution and purification were filed as a 
consequence of this work216.” 
 
The key points for the AM Technology are that: 
 The innovations are not publicly associated with any named innovator, or team of 
known collaborators. CSIRO does not welcome inquiry on this topic. In this case the 
failure is an orphan, apparently fathered by a committee, who were paid by the hour, 
and then redeployed to other work. The project “owners” were promoters rewarded by 
funds raised and managed, not process grown and strong financial outcome. 
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 The complex and multistage innovation was developed as a service on a cost plus 
basis, and was not fully functional outside a well-equipped research laboratory at the 
time it was promoted. Limited improvements and practical adaption followed.  
 The economics of the project were poorly defined, and in the building of an initial 
mega plant, indicated that “the numbers did not add up” except at very large scale. In 
practice the numbers never came close to adding up. A process that only “adds up” at 
huge scale is not robust or practical, and the numbers have probably been massaged to 
get them to add up. An outsider might ask “Can we model the numbers to see the 
outcomes?” An insider committed to the project might have to massage the numbers 
till the required outcome is shown. The first is research, the second perverse and self-
interested advocacy. “Massaging the numbers” is an insider practice to manipulate 
statistics, data, or numerical measures so that they appear to support a particular 
interpretation or to be better than they are and produce a desired result. This is using 
asymmetric information for strategic misrepresentation. 
 The demonstration plant operation revealed poor operability, and very limited 
production percentage of nameplate capacity. Failures, both technical and 
commercial, at small scale were hidden and scaled up. Small projects might tolerate 
criticism, large projects engender defensive groupthink. 
 The innovation was not widely recognised as intrinsically valuable. It was not the 
subject of commercial competition. It had not been duplicated since. 
 The magnesium production industry has not adopted the innovation, or sought to 
licence it. 
 After two decades there is no apparent local or international interest let alone 
competition. AMC has changed its name to Magontec Limited217 and lists its 
activities as “Manufacture of magnesium alloys and development and 
commercialisation of magnesium alloy technology”   
 
The key points for HIsmelt are that:  
 The innovation developed in three stages of relatively large scale trial and process 
evolution. There were three sets of joint venture partners, with more direct interest 
and experience in steel production, over a twenty two year period. Direct smelting 
reduction was a goal seen as valuable by many international firms, who followed a 
similar longer time scale. The long time line and lack of early success required a 
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corporate commitment over decades. There are no visible driving individuals in the 
HIsmelt project in the way that Dr John Floyd was in ISASMELT. 
 The innovation seems to be top down, relatively large in scale, with an adequate 
budget, modified and improved in stages, by a large firm over a long time. The 
Australian inventor Rodney James Dry of Technology Resources Pty Ltd is named in 
a number (34) of HIsmelt patents218. But his responsibility or power to drive a 
successful outcome quickly within such a large organisation is not known. 
 The innovation was initially (1984-1990) implemented at moderate cost, at a brown-
fields site in Germany, but was quite different to the HIsmelt patent of 2000.  The 
horizontal vessel had similarities to the puddling furnace patented by Henry Cort in 
1784. It fed coal and ore in from beneath, tapped metal and slag off to one side, and 
was fed with hot air at 1,200° C. The HIsmelt plant of 2003-2008 was a vertical 
vessel with a lance feeding oxygen enriched hot air, in many ways similar to that used 
by ISASMETLT. The ore and coal are fed in from above at an angle, and slag and 
iron are tapped at different levels from different sides. The significant evolution, and 
creation of unique intellectual property, indicates that the first plant did not work as 
well as hoped. 
 If the significant change over a long time period are accepted as an indication that 
early prototypes were less than fully successful, then the early implementations did 
not work well and gave few commercial benefits, in resolving process problems with 
base metal refining and recycling. The final 2003-2008 plant performed at such a low 
level production and was closed as “deeply uneconomic” so it would be logical to 
think that earlier plants were even less desirable, except as research tools. There is no 
evidence that any of the plants worked well and gave economic benefit in a 
commercial sense. 
 The innovation that would flow from an economically successful direct reduction 
plant was recognised by a number of firms over the last two to three decades, but has 
been the subject of relatively restrained commercial competition. The benefits have 
been seen as less than compelling with few possible exceptions. India has low quality 
local iron ores and coal that make direct reduction more attractive. The demands for 
the HIsmelt licences, given the poor outcome from the plant operation, as yet seem 
potential. 
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MIM was driven to develop and build better lead smelters and copper smelters for their long 
standing Mt Isa operations. MIM was formed in 1924, and after many difficulties reached full 
production in 1931. They have extracted, processed and refined lead, zinc and silver, copper 
and gold for the last 70 years. In their first 20 years of operations they had some significant 
problems with process plant that did not work out as expected. Over time and painful 
experience they developed local expertise.  MIM wanted to develop better plant with their 
own funds that they would then build and operate. 
 
AMC were driven by the opportunity to transform some of the low value magnasite available 
at their Kunwarara site. AMC was formed in 1983 and successfully established and operated 
the QMAG Magnesia plant. They had no previous experience with advanced mineral 
processing or complex metal refining. AMC wanted to raise funds from investors to build a 
new type of plant, that contractors would build and they would operate with newly hired 
staff.   
 
What drove Rio Tinto to invest in steel making technology, other than to meet secondary 
processing obligations is not clear. They had not in the past been involved in steel making, 
and have no published plans, or business strategy to make such investments. The Joint 
Venturing arrangements were always with firms who were in the steel making business. In a 
simple analogy, Rio Tinto wanted to be engaged in a very long scale plan to make a lunch 
they did not want to eat, in partnership with someone who would eat it. 
 
MIM took on a relatively simple, well tested and developed process that they would improve 
and adapt to lead, secondary lead (recycled lead from batteries and lead slags) then to copper 
concentrates. The process was robust, and adaptable to a range of ores, wastes and fuels. The 
plant was low in cost, simple to produce, and used well established materials. The first 
production plant was estimated to cost $100 million. 
 
Rio Tinto started with German scrap melting technology, and ended up with an Australian 
direct reduction process that did not work as well as projected. One might ask “Was it the 
journey or the goal that was important?” 
 
MIM had slowly scaled up the size of plant over 13 years before commissioning the Case 40 
ISASMELT plant in 1993.  Whatever difficulties and modifications were needed had been 
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made on the smaller scale plants over 12 years of research and development. 
 
AMC completed their demonstration plant at Gladstone in 1998. Problems with the process 
are said to have delayed the completion of test work by six months, only to be completed at 
end of 1999.219 Given the low output of the plant, and limited durability it is surprising that 
the AMC 2000 Annual Report stated on page 4 “The successful operation of the Gladstone 
plant provided a sound basis for the feasibility study for the Stanwell Magnesium Project.” A 
few lines below the same report states “AMC is in the process of finalising funding for the 
commercialisation of the Stanwell Magnesium Project.  When commissioned, the 97,000 
tonne per annum magnesium metal and alloy plant will be the world's largest and one of the 
lowest cost producers. “ 
 
It is difficult to understand how the operation of a $72 million “demonstration plant” that 
produces less than 10% of its capacity can be linked to such favourable and unequivocal 
projections of operation costs and performance of an unbuilt plant based on the same process.   
 
This topic will be further explored in the section dealing with “optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation”. 
 
Rio Tinto invested $1,020,000, apparently over twenty seven years. Whether this included the 
$155 million received from State and Federal Governments is unclear.  If one were to suggest 
that the goal was to meet secondary processing obligations, then it was a remarkably cost 
effective investment over a long time scale. 
 
At the least Rio Tinto and AMC had much more enthusiastic and promotional “optimism 
bias” than MIM.  MIM were able to market their developments around the world, based on 
the performance of their operating plants.  
 
 The contrast in how the two firms used and reported their small scale demonstration plants is 
instructive. MIM used the knowledge from their 1983 12,000 tonnes per year plant to build 
their 1991 60,000 tonnes per year primary lead smelter at Mt Isa. The 1985 Lead slag 
reduction plant lead to similar sized secondary lead smelters in UK (1991) and India (2000). 
The value AMC derived from their plant is best in their own words, from page 4 of the 2001 
Annual Report. “The Gladstone magnesium demonstration plant, in addition to its training 
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and test work activities during the year, the site received visits from more than 300 senior 
bankers, brokers, insurance experts, project engineers and politicians as part of AMC's 
investment, due diligence and planning procedures for Stanwell.  This intensive process 
provided, amongst other things, a great opportunity to showcase our operation and skills and 
in many cases the means and process of accelerating the progress of aspects pertaining to the 
subsequent construction of the Stanwell plant.” 
 
The value that Rio Tinto received beyond satisfying the Western Australian Government’s 
requirements is difficult to quantify. 
 
MIM was marketing to existing smelters, to buy a process that they used themselves 
profitably. AMC were marketing to finance providers and powerbrokers; seeking to raise 
capital. Rio Tinto was meeting a state government obligation to maintain their iron ore leases. 
 
Cases 7 and 8 are in contrast to Case 40 in almost every respect in every model shown on 
Sheet 8 of Appendix.  They are almost opposites at every point on Sheet 9 of Appendix. 
 
Case 40 was the lowest budget and best outcome. Cases 7 and 8 utilised $2 billion of 
investment, much from governments and produced negative outcome.   
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6. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN VALUE ADDING AND 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There must be government involvement in every resource project as the state owns the 
resource for the benefit of the people. They seek to extract economic and political value from 
the terms under which they allows access.  Royalties, typically between 4.7% and 7.8% are a 
valuable and regular income for states.  Value adding to processing resources within the state 
enables further streams of taxable economic value, more widely spread wealth creation and 
high paid jobs. These have direct and indirect revenue implication, and economic multiplier 
effects for the state.  Governments also set and enforce the environmental standards for the 
operation. These change over time, and are now much more comprehensive than in the past. 
 
Governments seek both economic and political return from resource access. These can be 
contradictory, in that maximising economic return can be based on best past practice for the 
type of resource.  Political advantage may ideological, or pragmatic. Governments have long 
held values and may require support of particular interest groups. 
 
Uranium mining has been intensely political, especially in South Australia. The Government 
has urgently wanted the royalties and economic activity, from Olympic Dam. But they have 
sought to manage the uranium issue, with local processing and value adding. That this has led 
to an outcome that may be less than optimum for the state and the operator, and is explored in 
the Olympic Dam case study.    
 
Gold mining is only moderately political, with State Governments largely content to collect a 
share of revenue. The modern exception is in the growing opposition to the use of cyanide in 
the extraction process in NSW. The largest mine in NSW is the Cadia Hill copper and gold 
mine with a $2 billion investment. They chose not to refine the gold or copper but ship them 
as concentrate. This reduces risk and capital investment for the operator, but increases rail 
freight and port charges.  The concentrate is shipped in containers with between 25 and 26% 
copper by mass and 75 to 80 grams per tonne of gold220. The other 73-74% is fine crushed 
rock. The value of the concentrate is around $2,000 per tonne, or about $34,000 per 17,000 
kg container. 
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Value adding is the processing of a resource to the most refined and highest value 
commodity, which is hopefully integrated into a local manufacturing value chain. To give a 
simplistic example, bauxite is valued at around $30 a tonne, alumina at around $300 a tonne; 
and aluminium until recently was around $3,000 a tonne. Transforming the aluminium into a 
motor vehicle could increase the value, the input of skilled human labour, by between 
$30,000 and $60,000 more per tonne.  
 
The opposite to value adding is concentrate shipping. In this process an ore is concentrated to 
a balance between transport costs and the value to the refiner for their needs and processes. 
The metal content might be between 20% and 30%, and poly-metallic ores are common. 
Refining ores often represents an environmental challenge, as well as a technical and 
economic risk. The purchaser in China, Japan or Korea accepts these risks and develops the 
refining technology. The concentrate usually feeds an existing refinery that may be closely 
linked to the next steps in the value chain. 
 
Australia is the world’s largest exporter of low valued bauxite, with 73 million tonnes 
shipped in 2012. Bauxite has traded as low as $19 per tonne (in 2003)221 and as high as $39 
(in 2011).222   Through government value adding requirements, Australia is also produces 
20.4 million tonnes of alumina in 2011-12. Approximately 17.1 million tonnes of alumina 
was exported in 2011-12, with estimated revenue of $6.03 billion for the year; or about $352 
per tonne. 
 
Starting in the 1960’s The Western Australian Government tied access to Bauxite to 
establishment of an alumina refinery. Other states followed, and this has become an accepted 
practice. Whilst there are some financial stresses on a number of Alumina refineries in 2013, 
over nearly 50 years the linking of profitable value adding in return for access to bauxite 
deposits has been successful. This is explored in the alumina case studies. 
 
Australia has the second largest reserves of bauxite in the world, about 22% of total. Far more 
precious is nickel, valued at between $22,890 (2011) and $17,600 (2010).223 Australia is the 
leading resource holder, with 28.4% of world total.224 This is larger than the next two 
resource holders, Brazil on 11.9% and New Caledonia on 9.7%. Yet failure to master 
processing of laterite ores has seen nickel exports stagnate. 
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Australia is the largest exporter of iron ore in the world, with 525 million tonnes in 2012225 
contributing $ 62.7 billion of export revenue226. 
 
In contrast to the successful government intervention the mature technology of alumina 
production, there was little Government interest in the five innovative laterite nickel cobalt 
process plants that failed in the 18 year period.  There was strong Western Australian 
government intervention, to develop new and innovative steel making technologies; along 
similar lines to what had been achieved with bauxite and alumina. But this involvement 
achieved quite an opposite result.  
 
Thus the comparison in government intervention is; why did it work so well for bauxite to 
alumina and so poorly for iron ore to crude steel? 
 
A secondary consideration is why the South Australian government has received so little 
benefit from so much involvement in the Olympic Dam case. 
 
A third consideration is why Refining failed so often (15 projects of 44) and Concentration 
was so risk free (all 23 projects succeeded.) All failures were refining operations.  
 
 
6.2 Hypothesis 3:  “That the role of government involvement in value adding was 
negative for more innovative processes” 
 
6.2.1 Distributional data of factors that make up inputs for prediction   
Government was involved in all sixty seven projects. This was largely benign application of 
standard lease conditions for fifty projects. There was mutually beneficial working of a well-
tested collaboration model with large corporations in value adding in eleven bauxite-alumina-
aluminium process projects. There was malignant involvement where they sought non-
commercial value adding outcomes that doomed or retarded five projects. 
 
The first group are in the lower risk majority to the right of sheet 6 of the appendix. They   
mostly succeeded worked, and where they failed, this was more associated with lack of firm 
competence. 
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The second group are highlighted with a purple marker in line 13. The involvement worked 
rather well for many decades from the mid 1960’s to 2008 when the world changed. The 
changes were not the fault of, or within the control of government. The world economy, and 
especially the role of China had changed in ways that were large beneficial for Australia, 
except for processed aluminium price.   
 
The last group are in positions 1 to 5 on the left of the sheet. In these cases what the 
governments wanted was not achieved, and the scale of the failure meant that the outcomes 
would be most unlikely in the future. These included the only two projects (Cases 7 & 8) in 
which State and Federal Governments made cash inducements of over $100 million. 
Government may not be able to pick winners, but they were able, with uncanny accuracy to 
back some of the largest failures.  
 
Governments like to “think big” thus had the greatest negative impact where a large plant 
with high technology made a miraculous transformation, or made a complex (Case 48) from a 
politically unacceptable commodity (copper with uranium enclosed) into a “good” product 
like copper with the last traces of Uranium removed, and uranium that would be sold to 
selected markets. 
 
An investor who avoided projects that had government involvement other than standard lease 
conditions, avoided large scale up, and all value adding, would have face few risks. No 
concentration projects failed. The alumina and aluminium plants built when the government 
involvement worked well; are today poor investments.  
 
Investing where the government is not, is a better policy in the long term. Governments do 
not involve themselves to make investor rich; they become involved to achieve social and 
political objectives. At best make the investor only poorer in the long run. 
 
Where the government invests capital, the investor should run and not look back. In the two 
cases it occurred, it was an indication of failure to follow. 
 
6.2.2 Distributional data on execution, performance and outcome  
In the five cases of malignant involvement, the construction delay and cost overrun was, on 
average 2.6 times worse than projected. The production output of nameplate capacity was an 
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average of 34%. The outcome was four failures and the profitless stalling of the largest value 
mine in the country.  
 
In the eleven cases of alumina and aluminium the firm competence of the operating firms, 
and the maturity of the process were indicators for a good enough outcome. Construction 
delay was on average only 8%, cost overrun 18%. These are comparable with the averages 
for the fifty more firm competent projects. The production output of nameplate capacity was 
an average of 87%. This is measurably, but not badly below the 99% achieved by the 
averages for the fifty more firm competent projects. 
 
6.2.3 Wagerup 2 refinery upgrade (Case 24) $285,000,000 invested. 9.6% over budget, 
on time delivery. 440,000 tonnes of extra Alumina produced. Built 1997-1999 
The Wagerup alumina refinery upgrade is an example of the seven alumina projects between 
1993 and 2007. Six (Cases 21, 25, 27, 28, and 30) were upgrades to existing refineries, only 
Yarwun (29) was a new operation. An upgrade is a vote of confidence in a business that is 
making money and can make more by doing the same at greater volume. There is little risk or 
uncertainty, or there was until mid-2008. Just after Rio Tinto had paid a premium price of 
$38.1 billion US for Alcan, the market for Aluminium and hence Alumina collapsed. 
 
Between August 2008 and March 2009 the price of Aluminium fell from $3,300 US per 
tonne to $1,300 US per tonne and has only slowly crawled back up to a little over $1,600 per 
tonne in early 2014.  All this was a storm cloud on a far distant horizon when Alcoa 
originally began operations at Wagerup in 1984. The refinery is in close proximity to the 
Alcoa’s Willowdale bauxite mine in the Darling Range and 70kms from the Bunbury port. At 
this stage expanding an alumina refinery was like the first sentence of "Anna Karenina" by 
Leo Tolstoy. "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." 
 
Today the refinery has the capacity to produce 2.6 million tonnes of alumina from bauxite 
mined at Willowdale. This ore is transported by conveyor and refined to produce smelter 
grade alumina, which in turn is transported by rail to the Bunbury port for export to 
aluminium smelters around the world. 
 
The 1994-95 expansion (Case 21) was apparently brought in on budget and in the 12 months 
projected.  The second, (this Case 24 the 1997-1999 expansion) experienced an apparent 
 185
9.62% cost growth, but was delivered in the 24 months projected. Data on successful plant 
expansions is relatively slight, as they are internal projects, built within an existing, and 
operational structure.  In terms of invested dollars in to tonnes per annum of alumina out, 
Wagerup 2 was the best investment in Alumina refineries in this period.  Table 27 shows 
dollars invested to tonnes of new production. Case 27 the QAL efficiency upgrade was for 
environmental improvements, rather than increased production. Table 28 shows the bauxite 
to alumina projects in the database. 
 
Table 28 Bauxite to Alumina projects 
 
 
It is interesting to note how cost per tonne escalated in the early 2000’s and this has 
continued. A third stage expansion was proposed with a cost of $3 billion dollars. This was 
put on hold in 2008, and is unlikely to be re-visited soon. 
 
In the period between 1964, when Alcoa opened their first alumina refinery in Kwinana, and 
2008, when the market changed there were 44 years of stability, when firms and government 
understood the process and the outcomes. In this happy time the secondary processing 
obligations to transform a proportion of the bauxite harvested into higher value alumina, as 
the contract to access the resource worked well. Both side received the benefits they 
expected, and governments thought the model was universal, rather than case specific. 
 
Wagerup 2 was the pinnacle of a mature and well understood process, built by an experienced 
team, who had repeatedly and incrementally improved their skills on one brownfields site. 
The drop in cost per tonne from $750 to $648 indicates a mastery of the detail, best achieved 
by constant practice in a focused field of endeavour. This was at least as much an example of 
evolved “firm competence” as an optimum of positive outcome from government 
involvement in mandated value adding. 
Case Project Years built Investment New Output $ per tonne
21 Wagerup # 1 1993 $150,000,000 200,000 $750
24 Wagerup # 2 1997‐1999 $285,000,000 440,000 $648
25 Worsley Alumina 1997‐2000 $1,000,000,000 1,250,000 $800
28 Pinjarra Upgrade 2003‐2006 $550,000,000 600,000 $917
29 Yarwun Alumina Refinery 2001‐2004 $1,500,000,000 1,400,000 $1,071
30 Alcan Gove G3 Expansion 2004‐2007 $2,700,000,000 1,800,000 $1,500
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Alcoa of Australia had been focused on transforming the initially challenging local bauxite 
resources into refined alumina for 33 years when this project started. They were part of the 
value transformation chain started in Pittsburgh USA in 1888 when 24 year old Charles 
Martin Hall started the Pittsburgh Reduction Company with $2,000 that his 33 year old 
partner Alfred E. Hunt had raised. Charles assisted by his older sister Julia Brainerd Hall had 
invented the process in a shed behind their home two years earlier. 25 year Paul Heroult in 
France had made the same discover in similar basic surroundings in the same year. Hence the 
Hall-Heroult process name. 
 
In the first years of production they reduced the market price of Aluminium from $4.86 a 
pound to 70 cents, and made a profit. This firm became "The Aluminum Company of 
America", or Alcoa in 1907.  At 70 cents a pound, aluminium was useful higher cost, but 
lower weight alternative to steel. It found limited application in automobiles and then more so 
in aircraft. Two wold wars, fought increasingly with aluminium aircraft drove the building of 
massive refining capacity that in 1946 was looking for new applications. 
 
From locating new supplies of bauxite, every step in the transformation into an aluminium 
soft drink can, or aluminium window frames, Alcoa, and other large competitors 
encompassed the complete value chain. This contrasts the steel industry where Vale of Brazil, 
Rio Tinto and BHP-Billiton of Australia supply iron ore to steel smelting mills in China or 
Europe. The steel mills supply rolled sheets to consumers who might then make a car, or long 
products like rails or structural steel for buildings. The steel value chain is broken at each 
major transformation step. 
 
Between 1964 and the completion of Wagerup 2 in 1999, Alcoa had entered into many 
secondary processing obligation agreements with the Government of Western Australia. Both 
sides understood the other, and could depend on the outcome based on past delivered and 
shared outcomes. Alcoa made a profit from the Alumina; the W.A. government received the 
benefits of investment in plants, and local employment and supply contracts. Both sides 
agreed to the deal, and received the outcomes they expected from the collaboration. There 
was a low level of information asymmetry, and no need for strategic misrepresentation. Both 
sides did what they had done for decades, and had little reason to think it would change. 
The low value of Bauxite, typically $20-30 per tonne, means that the logistics and cost of 
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shipping it would be high proportional to sale price. Willowdale is more than 100 km from 
coastal ports. The logistics cost as a percentage of the value for a $300 product like alumina 
is 10 to 15 times more attractive. 
 
The success of almost all examples of government involvement in value adding, by 
secondary processing obligations, with bauxite and alumina, over many years, obscured the 
failure of the same concept applied to almost every other commodity. Value adding makes 
sense when it builds on natural advantages, and where the operator makes a profit. This was 
the case with Australian alumina and aluminium till 2008. 
 
Alcoa matches the parameters as a competent firm. There is little innovation or information 
asymmetry. To get maximum value from the case study it will be examined by the parameters 
of Government involvement and Asymmetric information models. It is a positive example for 
both. 
 
Mature and well understood processes evolved: The process of transforming bauxite to 
alumina by Alcoa in Australia was by 1997 one of the most mature and well understood 
processes.  
 
Mature firms with complete value chain: By 2007 Alcoa had been in every stage of the 
Aluminium value chain for a century. 
 
Mutual benefit from decades on agreed collaboration: Alcoa stared this collaboration in 
1964, and both sides have positive expectations of the other based on long experience and 
practice. The agreement is an accepted custom. 
 
Low level of reward for information asymmetry: As the agreement is an accepted custom, 
to break the trust would have a high cost and low reward. There is very little information 
asymmetry in this process or arrangement. Both sides know just how it works. 
 
The project made a profit: Till 2008, and probably after that as it was a lower cost 
producer. 
 
Low of information asymmetry and power balance: As above, there is little information 
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asymmetry and a comfortable balance. 
 
Limited motivation for strategic misrepresentation: The problems facing the alumina 
industry are common to both firm and government; and outside Australia. 
 
Open and commercial access to resources: A number of firms process Alumina in Western 
Australia under the same agreements. 
 
Little information noise on good projects: There is very little publicity given to these 
projects. The publicity starts when they fail, as the Alcan Alumina plant at Gove did in late 
2013. Yet after some noise and movement in the media it was accepted that the reasons were 
economic and could not be altered, and the story went quiet again. 
 
Profit as expected: Were delivered for the firm and benefits to Government. 
 
6.2.4 HBI project at Boodarie (Case 1) $3,370,000,000 Invested. 349% over budget. 83% 
delivery delay. Built 1995-1999. Written down 2000. Closed 2004. Demolished 2011. 
The Boodarie HBI project saw $3,370,000,000 (Aust)227 invested to produce between 
2,000,000 and 2,300,000 tonnes per year of Hot Briquetted iron pellets. This transformed iron 
fines with 62% iron to briquettes with 92% iron content228. The plant was opened in 1999 
written down as loss by BHP in 2000 and closed in May 2004. It was scrapped and 
dismantled in August 2006229 and finally demolished with explosives in 2011.230 But the 
access to Pilbarra Iron Ore under favourable conditions was retained and expanded. The 
financial loss from the project was largely transferred to Commonwealth taxpayers through 
careful structuring that seemed to anticipate project failure. The benefits to the people of 
Western Australia were negligible, and possibly negative in the longer term. 
 
The project was to meet the secondary processing obligations that enabled BHP to access, 
harvest and ship iron ore. To continue and expand access to the ore they had to build a 
process plant and they did. Between 2001 and 2011 BHP-Billiton increased iron ore capacity 
from 69 million tonnes a year to 122.7 million tonnes a year.231 At the peak prices of $150 a 
tonne achieved that year and in 2008232 this was an $18.4 billion dollar income stream. 
 
ABARE September 2010 gives an average price for iron ore as $137.45 a tonne.  At the same 
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time the cost of producing a tonne of iron ore, including all infrastructure costs was estimated 
at $35 / t233. The harvested ore is on or near the surface, and is close to specification. The 426 
km down-hill rail link to the port is a crucial logistic factor. This is the BHP owned and 
operated Mount Newman Railway that runs to Port Headland. It hold the world’s record for 
the heaviest freight train operation, a 7.3 km long train of 683 wagons and 8 locomotives, 
with a total mass of 99,734 tonnes, carried 82,000 tonnes of iron ore on 21st June 2001.  
Using the ABARE 2010 price this one train load was valued at $11.3 million. 
 
Pilbara ore deposits are of exceptional quality, easily recovered, requiring minimal 
beneficiation. The ore is possibly the highest profit, lowest risk commodity it is possible to 
mine and ship. Access to this resource is a prize for which almost any price or loss would be 
paid.  
 
The upward variability over time of how much the HBI project would cost, or when it would 
produce, as supplied to ABARE was a warning signal as to what followed. This is shown in 
Table 29. 
 
Table 29 Growth in Boodarie HBI cost over time as shown in ABARE reports. 
 
 
The reason for this Hot Briquetted Iron project, even as early as 1994 234 was political. BHP 
did it to access the valuable ore. They succeeded. But the contract did not specify that the 
project should work or be economical to work. It was not and failed. 
 
On 31 March 1994, the Western Australian State Government agreed to delete all secondary 
processing obligations in respect of these agreements in exchange for a new secondary 
processing obligation and limits on production from three mining areas: Mining Area C, 
Yandi and Jimblebar. The new secondary processing obligation requires BHP Minerals Pty 
ABARE Proposed  Proposed Proposed
Date Output Completion Cost $ U.S.
1995 2 Mt DRI Mid 1997 750,000,000
1996 2.2 Mt HBI Mid 1997 1,500,000,000
June 1997 2.25 Mt HBI 1998 1,700,000,000
Dec 1997 2.25 Mt HBI 1999 2,400,000,000
1999 2 to 2.3 Mt HBI Completed 2,600,000,000
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Ltd, alone or in association with others, to spend $400 million (in 1993 dollars) on the 
further processing of iron ore or on an alternative investment approved by the Minister for 
Resources Development.  Further processing is defined to include the production of iron and 
steel, direct reduced iron, hot briquetted iron, iron carbide sinter or pellets.  No time limit is 
given for this investment. The Agreement provides for the consideration of alternative 
investments in lieu of further processing if further processing proves not to be technically or 
economically feasible.  Until this obligation has been fully discharged, production from 
Mining Area C, Yandi and Jimblebar will be subject to tonnage limitations. The Western 
Australian State Government has agreed that the obligation to invest a further $400 million 
(in 1993 dollars) will be treated as satisfied when the construction of the first train of the HBI 
Plant at Port Hedland has been completed and commissioning has commenced (i.e. when the 
first hot briquette of iron from that train is produced). 
 
The cost estimate of producing the HBI was around $80 (US) per tonne and the sale price 
was initially around $135 (US) per tonne235. Thus profits per year might be in the region of 
$121 million (US) per year, which seems non-commercial, give the final size of the $2.6 
billion U.S. capital investment. To achieve even such modest returns the new process must 
work perfectly from commissioning, which is rarely the case with new technology 
implemented at large scale.  The ramp up in production through 1999 to 2003 was troubled 
and consumed unplanned operation expenses. This is shown in Table 30. 
 
Table 30 Production as percentage of nameplate capacity 
 
 
The losses incurred in this failed project were written down against BHP-Billiton’s Australian 
taxation liabilities by $2.6 billion.  This accounting had the effect of reducing the company 
tax paid on other successful projects. The Australian Taxation Office fought a vigorous action 
to recover $2.2 billion. This action was unsuccessful in 2010. Thus the losses incurred were 
Year Production % of Nameplate
1999 314,000 13.65%
2000 556,227 24.18%
2001 1,236,000 53.74%
2002 1,026,000 44.61%
2003 1,936,000 84.17%
2004 694,000 30.17%
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indirectly borne by Australian taxpayers.  
 
The consideration that the project might not work, technically or economically, seems to have 
occurred relatively early on. BHP was writing down the project in 2000 as production 
struggled to reach 24%. The project finance structuring was exceptionally competent at 
planning for the losses that eventually occurred. The quality of this aspect of project planning 
was only publicly realised in March 2010, when BHP comprehensively beat the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO) in the conclusion of a long running case.236 The ATO had sought payment 
of $2.2 billion in tax.  
 
The long-running case relates to two bad debts that were written off by BHP Finance after 
loans were made to two subsidiaries. One loan was for the ill-fated construction of a plant in 
Western Australia to produce briquettes from iron ore fines (particles) in a bid to turn them 
into a valuable product -- and to satisfy an obligation imposed by the WA government that 
BHP had to be involved in secondary processing of iron ore. 
 
The project suffered several setbacks from its inception in 1995 until 2000, when the 
financing company decided to write off $1.8bn of the $2.2bn owed. This development also ran 
into problems and BHP Finance wrote off $310.9 million in the 2000 financial year. One of 
the issues in both the original case and the appeal was whether BHP Finance was actually in 
the business of lending money. The court heard the company had no employees and paid 
management fees to BHP. The tax office argued it was merely an "appendage" to BHP, and 
not in the business of lending money, but the court rejected this argument. 
 
This case is a negative example of a “new process” project, a “government involvement in 
value adding” project, and an “asymmetric information” project. From a commercial 
perspective the access to the iron ore leases was the main game; and the game player with the 
most knowledge and game skills won. There is no suggestion that BHP behaved other than 
within the relevant state and federal laws, regulations and agreements; for the ultimate benefit 
of their shareholders.  
 
BHP made steel between 1915 and 2002, when they spun off their steelmaking plants as 
independent entities. They quit steel-making as it was unprofitable and declining. They were 
better informed as to the economics of iron and steel production within the world market than 
 192
any other local firm. It was not a business they wanted to be in.  This was in contrast to the 
willingness to add value to bauxite to alumina and aluminium by firms who were making all 
these steps as part of their then profitable businesses. 
 
BHP made the investments, structured the tax losses, built the plant, and produced HBI. They 
met the obligation and gained the resource access. BHP had achieved what they sought, they 
did as Government required. 
  
What did the government hope to achieve?  In a statement237  of 21st July 1999 The W.A. 
Premier Richard Court and Resources Development Minister Colin Barnett opened the plant. 
 
The Premier said that when the first shipment of briquettes left Port Hedland bound for South 
Korea in May this year, a dream long held by successive governments to add value to 
Western Australia’s iron ore exports was realised.  
 
“While Western Australia has long been an important player in the world’s iron ore industry, 
it is through downstream processing of the State’s vast reserves of iron ore that the true 
potential of the industry will be achieved,” he said. 
 
Mr Barnett said development of the HBI project fulfilled BHP's secondary processing 
obligations as outlined in the Iron Ore Processing Agreement Act 1994, negotiated between 
the State Government and the company. 
 
He said one of the Government’s primary objectives was to maximise further processing 
opportunities for the ongoing benefit of the Western Australian community. 
 
“In order to achieve this objective, the Government has introduced reforms to progressively 
deregulate the energy market causing gas prices to fall around 50 per cent in the Pilbara,” 
Mr Barnett said. 
 
“The Government also maintains the vision of a sophisticated steel industry for Western 
Australia and to achieve this end, the Department of Resources Development is working with 
several international companies to investigate steel and other value-added iron ore projects 
for the Pilbara and Mid-West regions.” 
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In retrospect this is not the most well considered Government vision. Steel production is 
dominated by nations who generate the greatest economic returns from transforming the steel 
into useful manufactured products for their own or export markets. China, The European 
Union, Japan and the United States represent 70% of world steel production. China alone is 
almost half the world market. South Korea has a population twice that of Australia, but 
produces 14 times the volume of steel. They have a vibrant export economy with 
shipbuilding and passenger vehicles, as well as exports of merchant steel. 
 
The concept of investing energy into melting iron ore once to increase the concentration from 
63% to 92%, then shipping it to a market where it would once again be melted to produce a 
final product is not the best use of resources. It uses almost twice the energy of melting once 
at the steel plant. 
 
In 2000 BHP used the resources shown in Table 31 to produce 556,227 tonnes of 
“BoodarieTM iron” of which 326,037 tonnes were shipped. The values shown in this table 
are “best estimates” of the market value in 2000, and may differ from the actual price paid.  If 
this is even close to what BHP were recording in their private internal costing, it would 
explain why they were writing off the investment in the same year. The government initiative 
to add value, on these estimates, seems to have directed $3 in value that could otherwise been 
sold or exported, to produce a $1 of a value added commodity. This seems to be a unique 
definition of value adding applicable only to a government with vision. 
 
BHP operated the plant to gain access to a resource that would $18 billion a year a decade 
later. Their vision was much better informed. That there was information asymmetry is 
obvious. Whether there was strategic misrepresentation is questionable. There is no public 
record of the government asking BHP if the project would work. BHP’s obligation was to 
their shareholders. Telling government facts they do not want to hear may not have been a 
priority. 
 
Table 31 Resources consumed to produce HBI iron 
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The Western Australian Government appeared not to have the quality of information or 
understanding as to markets, production costs or profits in business that BHP did. They did 
not achieve the benefits they sought, and left a poisoned legacy for high value adding 
technology projects. BHP achieved their goal, and passed on most the cost of the wasted 
exercise to the Australian taxpayer. They still do not wish to make steel in Australia. 
 
The production of crude steel, Direct Reduced Iron, Hot Briquetted iron or similar is a mature 
and well understood process, when carried out by firms with long established competence. 
Midrex a division of Japanese Kobe Steel supply the technology for 60.5% of the worlds’ 
production of 74 million tonnes of DRI.238 This represents 4.7% of world steel production in 
2012.   
 
The DRI processes works best in nations that are cut off from world trade, have large 
supplies of natural gas they cannot sell or otherwise usefully use; and have a need for an 
indigenous steel supply for defence and national development. Three of the five Midrex 
plants that began operation in 2012 were in Iran; at IGISCO in Yazd, a second module at 
Khorasan in Mashad, and the first of two modules at South Kaveh Steel in Kish.  Iranian 
trade is restricted by sanctions imposed by the U.S. government, or under U.S. pressure by 
the international community through the United Nations Security Council.  
 
The processes selected by BHP and Rio Tinto were unique, novel and untested. They were 
the opposite of a mature and well understood process evolved over multiple worked 
embodiments. The Midrex processes, like alumina refining, were evolved, low- risk, known 
Input Volume Unit Value $ Estimate 2000
High Grade Iron Ore Fines  1,764,940 tonnes 30 $52,948,200
Power  218,267 Mwhr 80 $17,461,360
Natural Gas  17,044 TJ 2500 $42,610,000
Water  3,063,527 tonnes
Magnesium Oxide  2012 tonnes
Graphite Emulsion  521 000  litres
$113,019,560
Output
HBI 326027 Tonnes 135 $44,013,645
Loss on production $69,005,915
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processes with little information asymmetry.  Whilst BHP was a mature firm, it was one that 
had chosen to exit steel making for good reasons. Rio Tinto has never been a steel producer 
and after 33 years of research and development has shipped its failed and deeply uneconomic 
DRI process plant to India. They were not part of a value chain as was the case with alumina. 
The collaboration with the Western Australian Government was one of indirect and rather 
perverse benefits. Neither firm wanted to make crude steel, or made any profit from crude 
steel, but they achieved the iron ore access they sought. Both sides sought one sided benefits, 
the state up front, the firms, long term. The level of information asymmetry was significant. 
There was no record of performance by the firms in these endeavours on which government 
could base a predictable outcome. The firms at best did not tell the government what it did 
not want to hear. Thus there was a high level of information asymmetry, and possibly 
strategic misrepresentation by omission. 
 
This case study raises questions for all four models and hypotheses, so all twenty parameters 
will be briefly addressed. 
 
Track record of implementation: BHP-Billiton is a competent and successful firm in 
resources accessing, extraction, concentration, logistics, marketing and financial matters. It is 
the world’s largest mining company, and has been trading with growing success since 1885. 
It has a poor record at implementing radically innovative processing technologies, and is not 
particularly adept at complex processing technologies. This is now understood within the 
firm’s management. They choose to do what they are good at, and selectively now avoid 
what they are less skilled at. 
 
Firm focus in particular endeavour: Like Rio Tinto they are diversified, but Iron ore and 
energy, particularly coal are both firms financial strength. BHP and Rio Tinto are both 
focused on accessing and transporting relatively low value commodities like iron ore and 
coal. In the field of moving and selling $100 to $200 a tonne bulk resources they are 
exceptionally focused and skilled. In the period 1993 – 2010 BHP-Billiton started four of the 
twelve new process innovation projects. All failed. This is not where the firm is focused or 
see their future. They are demonstrably not good at it. 
 
Step scale up ratio from previous success: BHP had previously run conventional steel 
production plants, which they diversified away from due to the low or negative profits. No 
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large pilot or demonstration plant was built for the relatively new and unproven HBI 
technology. From their research and engineering studies, BHP was confident of success, and 
that most significant technical issues had been addressed.239 In this they were mistaken.  
 
Financial confidence engendered by firm: BHP-Billiton is able to finance any project they 
choose at favourable interest rates. 
 
Profit: BHP-Billiton make significant profits from their core commodity iron and coal 
business, and most other endeavours. They have no track record of success or profit from 
new process innovation. This project made no profit, only billion dollar loss.  
 
Individual Ownership and responsibility: The HBI process used the Finmet process, 
developed by Fior de Venezeula and Voest Alpine of Austria.  This was developed from the 
Fluidised Iron Reduction (FIOR) process developed by Esso Research to utilise low value 
natural gas. There were no operational FIOR plants, and the one operational plant in 
Venezuela was not built at the time BHP started the HBI project. There was thus no 
individual inventor in Australia, or possibly the world to champion the project or take 
responsibility for its operation. 
 
Initial process simplicity: The Finmet process is complex, multistage, and uses hydrogen at 
high temperatures and pressures. Only one plant in the world exists, in Orinoco Venezuela, 
which has been subject to major problems with the 12 atmosphere gas pressure system. It 
appears to operate at about 40% nameplate capacity. Unlike the ISASMELT process this 
process is not easy to duplicate in a lab at low cost, and thus lacks initial process simplicity. 
 
Multistage scale up: There was none. From research and engineering studies to the largest 
man-made object in Australia in one expensive infinite scale up. In retrospect this seems to 
maximise risk and invite failure. 
 
Niche demand for innovation: At the time, a use for iron ore fines was sought. The problem 
no longer exists. The fines are shipped to the customer in China and they can use them. The 
demand for HBI iron is more limited and ephemeral than originally projected. 
 
New process, not well understood: The process was in 1995, demonstrably new, and not 
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well understood. Today it is not new, and few would seek to understand, given the outcomes. 
 
Mature firms with complete value chain: BHP had a full value chain in steel till around 
this time, when it exited the low margin steel making business. They had been the major local 
steel maker for eight decades and could see where the local market was heading. They chose 
to exit. The HBI plant production was for export and to meet secondary processing 
obligations. It would be an interesting, though rhetorical question to ask: “Given how 
experienced BHP was at steel making technology and associated economics, why did they 
choose the Finmet process, and implement it in such a high risk manner? 
 
One sided benefits sought up front: It could be argued that both sides sought self-beneficial 
outcomes that would be paid for by someone else. The W.A. Government wanted a value 
adding steel industry paid for by resource firms. The resource firms wanted to meet their state 
obligations, and largely pass the cost to the Commonwealth taxpayer. This was not a well- 
considered “virtuous circle”, but a “vicious circle”. Both terms refer to a complex chain of 
events that reinforces itself through a feedback loop.240 
 
High level of reward for information asymmetry: As BHP met its state obligations, and 
after a long court case passed on most of the costs to the Commonwealth taxpayer, there was 
a high level of reward for the information asymmetry. 
 
High of information asymmetry and power imbalance: BHP had the definitive 
information asymmetry over the WA government in that they were the major steel producer 
in the country. They were also many times the financial power of the state, and able to stand 
up to the Commonwealth on tax payment issues, and win. 
 
Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation: BHP and Rio Tinto were compelled 
to implement business undertakings that seemed outside their preferred commercial direction. 
There is reason to believe that these ventures could never be profitable, and were in 
implementation commercial disasters.  
 
Asymmetrical information used to manage ignorant power: In retrospect the application 
of the value adding model that worked so well with the aluminium production chain was not 
applicable to iron ore fines. The firms had to manage the mandated actions by the state. They 
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did. There was no written obligation that the plants should work. They did not. 
 
Selective strategic misrepresentation to promote investment: BHP sought no external 
investment, but managed their investment through remarkably tax effective internal 
structures. The Australian Taxation Office vigorously opposed these schemes, but lost. 
 
6.2.5 Olympic Dam Expansion (Case 48) $1,600,000,000 invested. 91% of 116,000 t of 
Copper and 1,500 t of Uranium oxide produced.  Built 1996 - 1999 
 
Olympic Dam is the world’s largest uranium deposit and it is estimated to contain 
approximately one third of the world’s total Reasonably Assured Resources (RAR).  
 
This is also the world’s largest RAR of uranium recoverable at costs of less than US$80 a 
kilogram, with more than 40 per cent of world’s resources in this category.241 Australia is 
estimated to have about 13 per cent of the world’s economic resources of copper, the second 
largest after Chile and ahead of Peru, Mexico, the USA, Indonesia and China. 63.7% of this 
copper is under Olympic Dam, 55.4 million tonnes of it, 242 theoretically worth $450 billion. 
 
For every tonne of copper, there are 19 kg of uranium, about 3.5 ounces of silver and 0.4 of 
an ounce of gold. The separation of these four valuable resources from the average of 51 
tonnes of tough rocks containing them, and each other, is a challenge and a curse.  
 
With late 2013-early 2014 low value for Uranium, of around $35 a U.S. Pound, BHP Billiton 
has a large copper deposit with a politically difficult uranium impurity.  Most of the resources 
is 350 metres below the desert, and will require removal of 2,050,000,000 tonnes of rocks 
over 5 years to begin to access the ore. Table 32 shows recent production. This may be 
contrasted with production shown Table 33 from 8 years earlier under different management. 
 
Table 32 2012-2013 Financial Year Production and estimated value 
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Mineral processing at Olympic Dam began in 1988, initially producing 45,000 tonnes per 
annum (t.p.a) of copper plus associated products of uranium oxide, gold and silver. Between 
1997 and 1999 there was a major expansion (Case 48) of the mine and minerals processing 
plant and in recent years annual copper production has averaged about 180,000 tonnes, with 
4,000 tonnes of uranium oxide, 80,000 ounces of gold and 800,000 ounces of silver.243 
 
The Olympic Dam expansion of 1996-99 saw $1.6 billion invested, but it was not till 2004 
that the complex refining plant was fully sorted out. In this time random process problems 
and unexpected commodity price events damaged WMC’s cash flow, and led to their being 
taken over in 2005 by BHP-B. These random events were the solvent fires of 1999 and 2001 
that stopped production. 
 
In 1995, when the planning for the expansion was taking place, copper was selling at $3,000 
a tonne. It fell to $ 1688 in December 1997 and was as low as $1,378 in March 1999.244  
Prices remained below $2000 till November 2003.  WMC was bleeding cash from plant 
repair, lost production and low prices. By June 2006, a year after BHP-B took over, the 
market had changed. The price rose from $2,524 in June 2005 to $8,045 in May 2006. 
 
The rate of return on investment in this project was not good to start with. The complexity of 
the process plant was dictated by political demand for shipping copper without any uranium 
in it. The fate that WMC suffered is probably fresh in the mind of BHP-B management who 
have in 2012 declined, despite intense political pressure, to invest again in a $30 billion 
expansion with high value adding refining. 
 
WMC was an exceptionally competent firm at finding a valuable resource, and implementing 
a complex processing plant to transform it. That this would often involve unforseen 
Commodity Mass Value Proportion
Copper (t) 166,200 $1,227,719,400 72.32%
Uranium (t) 4,066 $310,654,598 18.30%
Gold (oz) 113,246 $141,557,500 8.34%
Silver (oz) 880,000 $17,600,000 1.04%
Total estimate $1,697,531,498
 200
difficulties is part of being at the cutting edge of new plant operation.  WMC was diligent and 
determined in working through these types of problems, and making the process work. They 
were unable to make enough profits to cover resolving the difficulties at Olympic Dam and 
Phosphate Hill at once. BHP-B took over WMC in June 2005, and unexpectedly enjoyed 
exceptional profit as the production from the worked up plants rode a wave of commodity 
price increases.   
 
WMC might have managed the impact of a difficult plant at Olympic Dam and the 
unexpected loss of revenue from commodity price drop; if it had been their only iron in the 
fire. But they had a second major plant with as many difficulties and an awful drop in price; 
at the same time. 
 
In parallel, WMC decided in December 1996 to invest $700 million to build a 975,000 tonne 
a year plant to produce high-analysis ammonium phosphate fertilizer.  They specified $500 
million of plant, and had it installed on time and close to budget. The problems were in 
getting it to work and selling the production at a profit.  
 
In the first year of operation, at Phosphate Hill (Case 13) only one third of nameplate 
capacity was reached and the $278 per tonne price that had been anticipated had fallen to 
only $154.  So instead of an estimated income of $271 million there was probably an income 
of around $50 million. Much of this would have been absorbed into the frantic work to bring 
the plant up to capacity. 
 
Table 33 Production returns before and after upgrade 
 
 
 
1996 Upgrade 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2012
before extra WMC WMC WMC WMC WMC WMC BHP‐B
Nameplate Copper 116,000
Total Production 75,444 138,272 200,423 200,523 178,120 160,080 224,731 168200
Extra production 62,828 124,979 125,079 102,676 84,636 149,287 92,756
% of Nameplate 54.16% 107.74% 107.83% 88.51% 72.96% 128.70% 79.96%
Nameplate Uranium 1,500
Total Production 1,652 3,221 4,539 4,379 2,890 3,203 4,404 4,066
Extra production 1,569 2,887 2,727 1,238 1,551 2,752 2,414
% of Nameplate 104.60% 192.47% 181.80% 82.53% 103.40% 183.47% 160.93%
 201
The result was that WMC had two complex plants, absorbing scarce capital to make them 
work, producing less output, which then sold at a lower price than anticipated. The irony is 
that the random price variation for Phosphate Hill’s production moved steadily up to $948 per 
tonne by 2008. The obligations for complex and high performance value adding, which was 
accepted in 1982, was a way to sell Copper, Gold and Silver that were free of uranium. 
 
This case study raises questions for two models and hypotheses, Firm competence and 
Government Involvement in Value adding so eight parameters will be addressed. 
 
Track record: WMC had a track record of successful, but barely profitable operations at 
Olympic Dam. They had been operating since 1988 a plant a production rate of 45,000 tonnes 
of copper, 1,700 tonnes of uranium oxide and 70,000 ounces of gold.  The expansion in Case 
48, built between 1996 and 1999 was to produce 116,000 extra tonnes of Copper and 1,500 
extra tonnes of Uranium oxide. It involved new solvent extraction technology, which they 
sorted out after two difficult to explain fires. The ore body at Olympic dam is complex, and 
the requirements to separate out the Uranium from the copper onerous. WMC showed a 
technical firm competence at a high level, especially for a firm that was processing as many 
diverse resources as they were. 
 
WMC were competent at their Western Australian sulphide nickel operations, competent at 
their poly-metallic copper, uranium, gold and silver deposit at Olympic Dam, but were not at 
the top level of technical competence with a complex process and new plant like Phosphate 
Hill. Whilst they had operated small fertilizer distribution facilities, and a sulphuric acid plant 
at Kalgoorlie (Case 12) they had not operated a multi process plant producing high 
specification fertilizers. They had also not been very profitable in their fertilizer distribution 
business.  Whilst it might be argued that anticipating random variations in commodity price is 
far more luck than skills, this was not an area where WMC had either skills of luck. 
 
Firm focus:  WMC was a little more focused than BHP-Billiton, but both were diverse firms 
with multiple process trains running at once. They were not the acknowledged masters or 
innovators in any of them.  WMC was somewhat more focused on undertaking difficult 
processes on complex resources and making them work. In this the only firm who they could 
be compared to was Mount Isa Mines (MIM). MIM also was taken over.  Neither firm could 
be compared to firms like Tronox or ConocoPhillips who were masters of superior process 
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technology, and able to implement this in a focused area with exceptional results. 
 
Scale up: Olympic Dam was an expansion and a manageable scale up from existing plant.  
The capital involved was rather large compared to the value of the firm and the profits were 
smaller that had been hoped. The second large project at Phosphate Hill, in parallel, with 
difficulties, and low profits was probably “a bridge too far.”245 
 
Financial: WMC was about one tenth the size of BHP in 2005. Their cash flow from 2004 
operations had risen from $676 million during 2003 to $1,422 million during 2004. BHP's 
Net operating cash flow in 2005 was 8.9 billion. 
 
Mature and well understood processes evolved: The process plant installed by 1999 had 
some new elements in the solvent extraction that WMC in time and after some expensive 
fires resolved. It was not a new process like the AMC Magnesium project, but it was not a 
mature project like the Wagerup 2 Alumina refinery. The cost and complexity or operating a 
poly metallic refinery requiring high levels of separation between the copper and uranium, in 
a remote desert, may have been under appreciated by the government.  
 
Mature firms with complete value chain: WMC was a mature firm, but did not control the 
value chain, nor could them much influence it or model future events. WMC sold refined 
commodities into the market and rode the waves.  
 
Mutual benefit from decades on agreed collaboration: WMC derived little benefit from 
Olympic Dam in the time they operated it. Sir Arvi Parbo, WMC Chairman is quoted as 
saying “we didn’t make any money out of it” Hugh Morgan CEO of WMC “speculates that 
WMC put more cash into Olympic Dam in real terms than it took out.”246 The South 
Australian Government receives around $60 million a year in royalties. Neither side has 
received anything like the rewarding outcomes they hoped for. This may be the largest 
reserve of Uranium in the world, and Australia’s largest potential Copper mine, but it has 
been in close to a loose-loose stasis for nearly three decades, with no sign of early resolution. 
 
Low level of reward for information asymmetry: The information that WMC built up, 
relating to the low profits that could be made by operating a complex refining operation in 
remote and difficult conditions were not secret. They were not what government wanted to 
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hear. They wanted to hear that Olympic Dam was the panacea to the state’s economic 
problems, and that business would invest billions to make their model of reality come true. 
Business has declined to do so, but with diplomatic statements. The value of the operation is 
linked to world demand for uranium. The Fukushima disaster of 11th March 2011, and a 
retreat from nuclear power generation in Europe and USA may make the world largest 
reserve of uranium a liability rather than an asset; but neither firm nor government will say 
so. 
 
6.2.6 Conclusions 
Case 24, the Wagerup 2 Alumina plant expansion, showed how well the model of 
government mandated secondary value adding can work. From 1964 to 2008 this model 
added value for the states and the firms. After 2008 only the fall in Aluminium, and hence 
alumina price spoiled the model and saw the first closure of the Alcan Gove alumina refinery 
in 2013. The four parameters of the proposed Government involvement in value adding 
success model are based on the great success achieved with alumina refineries. 
 
Case 1, the BHP Boodarie HBI project is the opposite model, where the model of government 
mandated secondary value adding failed. The project was not economically viable, the firm 
did not want to do it, they did so to achieve a more valuable concession, and a perverse 
outcome was delivered. The four parameters of the proposed Government involvement in 
value adding failure model are based on the destruction of value achieved with crude steel 
plants. 
 
Case 48, the Olympic Dam expansion project (96-99) is an intermediate in the model. It has 
not failed, but is less that the success desired by state or firm.  It is midway between the 
success and failure models. Unless the state critically examines its model of government 
mandated secondary value adding, and what can be economically achieved the present 
unproductive stasis may continue. 
 
In all three cases the value of the commodity has been one of the most important factors. The 
bauxite –alumina-aluminium value chain is different to the coal and iron ore to steel chain. 
Iron ore and coal are both $100 to $200 a tonne commodities that are best combined at the 
point where steel is made, shaped and utilised. Bauxite is a $30 a tonne commodity and the 
energy input to enable the conversion to alumina takes place separately to final, and equally 
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energy intensive final stages of aluminium production. Aluminium is “frozen electricity” and 
alumina is “crystallised natural gas”. Alumina at around $300 a tonne is cost effective to 
transport from where the bauxite is available and the gas cheap to where the electricity is 
surplus and well below average cost. 
 
The production of crude steel, as HBI or DRI involves melting the metal once to produce the 
semi-finished product, and shipping a product to another country where a similar energy 
input is applied a second time to melt it again to make finished steel. This was and is only 
economic in unusual circumstances, where natural gas or to a lesser extent low rank coal is 
very low in price, and the final stage in the electric arc furnace has low cost electricity. These 
circumstances did not apply in Western Australia. The problem of what to do with fines was 
resolved as firms and customers managed to ship them, and process them economically. 
 
Value adding is politically attractive, but has become economically less attractive over the 
time fame of this study. Australia has a natural advantage in possession of the resources, and 
a demonstrated competence at recovering them, and concentrating them for shipment. The 
consuming nations now have more sophisticated process plants that can accept concentrates, 
and economically refine them at the point where they are utilised.  Australian process plants 
have not demonstrated significant economic advantage in refining, and few refineries have 
been built since 2005. 
 
The positive government involvement in value adding in alumina and aluminium worked out 
as planned for more than four decades. Then changes occurred in the markets for energy and 
the market for the final product.  The price that could be achieved for the final product fell by 
half and stayed down, and the cost of energy, especially natural gas went up, and stayed up. 
 
Both processes are energy intensive, with tonne of alumina consuming around 14.5 
Gigajoules of heat, usually from natural gas. Aluminium consumes around 15 thousand 
kilowatt hours of electricity per tonne. There are about 2 tonnes of alumina in a tonne of 
aluminium; so the tonne of aluminium ultimately has 29 GJ of gas embedded in addition to 
the electricity. The variable prices for natural gas and the input this has on Alumina is shown 
in Table 34.  
 
The price of heavy bunker fuel oil is show at 15.5 cents a MJ, being based on a price of $620 
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U.S. per tonne ex-Singapore.  This was the fuel used at the Gove Alumina refinery, where the 
plant was closed in 2013.  
 
Table 34 Energy invested in Alumina and Aluminium 
 
 
In Table 33 the cost of 2.5 cents a GJ, suggested by DomGas, a W.A. peak energy user 
group247; is for 2005, and $8 is for 2013. Most Alumina refineries would have long term 
supply contracts at perhaps even more favourable rate, but when these expire will need to 
renegotiate under a regime where the market price has increased significantly. The 10 cents a 
MJ is around the export price now being achieved for LNG shipments, and these gas 
producers would need to be convinced to sell to an alumina refinery at a much lower cost 
than the international market offered. The 18 cents per GJ is the 2014 spot price for LNG 
delivered to Tokyo.  
 
In July 2008 the price of Aluminium was $3,071.24 and alumina was $384.40248 , by 
February 2009 Aluminium had fallen to $1,330.20. Alumina followed down to $253.54 in 
June 2009. In February 2014 Aluminium is between $1,800 and $1,900 Australian. 
 
As the alumina to produce a tonne of aluminium will cost around $750, electricity price is the 
major cost in producing aluminium. In Western Australia, (simply as an example) the 
domestic electricity price is 43 cents a kW/hr, and the official “large business high voltage” 
rates are 19 cents in peak, and 13 cents off peak. An aluminium smelter requires 24 hour a 
day, uninterruptable supply, preferably for between 1.4 and 2.2 cents a kW/hr. The Kurri 
Kurri smelter in NSW, which paid 2.7 cents a kW/hr249 closed in June 2012. 
 
Table 35 shows a variation of electricity supply prices to an Aluminium smelter and the 
Data Cost 14.5 GJ Input % of sale In Al
2005 2.5 14.5 $36.25 10.98% $72.50
US 4 14.5 $58.00 17.58% $116.00
2013 8 14.5 $116.00 35.15% $232.00
Export 10 14.5 $145.00 43.94% $290.00
Tokyo 18 14.5 $261.00 79.09% $522.00
Bunker 15.5 14.5 $224.75 68.11% $449.50
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impact it has on production cost.  
 
Table 35 Cost of electricity used to produce a tonne of aluminium at various tariffs. 
 
 
The cost of production, and distribution of electricity is widely variable, but estimates of 
between 3 and 5 cents a kW/hr for the production of electricity from black or brown coal are 
common. The price paid by aluminium smelters is usually “commercially confident”, but one 
example would be the Portland Aluminium smelter in Victoria. To win this investment for 
the state, Premier John Cain committed Victorians in 1984 to supply electricity for 1.4 cents a 
kW/hr for 30 years (1986-2016). The cost of this “less than half price” subsidy is estimated at 
$4.5 billion.250  
 
Thus the form of government involvement in value adding that has succeeded has done so at 
a price of discounted electricity and natural gas, ultimately underwritten by the taxpayers and 
domestic consumers of the state. If they continue to support, or “co-invest” even more 
generously in the face of rising energy costs, then government desired value adding will 
continue. Where government balks at the cost of the subsidy required, as the Northern 
Territory did with the Gove alumina refinery, then the refineries close. The detailed analysis 
of the benefits a state citizen receives, paying both taxes and buying electricity at 30 times the 
price it is sold to a smelter is not well established. 
 
An analogy may be made with a sign on the wall of an engine performance shop “Speed costs 
money, how fast do you want to go?”  Value adding costs money from the state economy, 
every day of the life of the plant. How much value adding do Government really want to pay 
Cents / kWh For 1 t of Al
1 $150
1.4 $210
2 $300
2.2 $330
2.7 $405
3 $450
4 $600
5 $750
13 $1,950
19 $2,850
43 $6,450
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for is now a question. 
 
Government involvement in Cases 1 and 8 was unusual. It mandated these projects as a 
condition of another more valuable lease. The plants were built and they shipped a small 
proportion of their projected production. The lease conditions were met. The plants closed 
and were demolished. $3.4 billon had been spent, with a negative outcome for local research 
and innovation. No new process was evolved, no new production exported, no new jobs 
created, no value was added.  
 
Case 7 was a creature of a government wish to plan and manage a command economy. It 
utilised public sector research and the largest public investment made in resource innovation. 
It was the embodiment of the Light Metals Action Agenda. Here government was trying to 
create new high tech industries that met their preferred models of development. The failure 
was unique. A billion dollars was invested and only 5% of a plant built. The residual value 
was just over 1%. No other project was as absolutely under-performing and so under- 
delivered. 
 
Case 48 is the most valuable mineral resources in the country. Table 49 shows the value of 
the identified resource in the ground; the earlier Table 40 show present production. The $686 
billion of resources is being extracted at approximately $1.7 billion a year. At this rate the 
mine will operating sustainably for more than 400 years.  The people of South Australia who 
own the resource are receiving around $60 million in royalties per year.  This is a return of 
1/10,000th of the value of the resource per year.  
 
The mine never made a profit for the firm who built the plant. They were taken over due to 
their failure to make a profit. The new owners have been so frustrated with demands and 
restrictions placed on their proposed expansion that it has been shelved. It is unlikely they are 
making any significant profits now and are more focused on not losing more. The project has 
been locked in a “no win” stasis for 24 years. The operating firms cannot make a good return 
on investment. The government and people of South Australia have yet to receive a benefit in 
proportion to the value locked up 350 metres underground. 
 
Table 36 shows the value of the Olympic Dam deposit at recent market prices. 
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asymmetry and the level of responsibility accepted by management is based on many case 
studies. Where informed management is planning to avoid responsibility for project outcome 
whilst actively promoting the project as a great investment, information asymmetry is visible. 
Where projects were selectively financed from the least informed, or government then 
information asymmetry is visible. Where the management has a significant stake in success 
and a personal risk in failure, information asymmetry is less likely. The difference between a 
person making a significant but honest error of judgement, and a person planning to act for 
own advantage to the limit of the law, is difficult to determine in advance. Their own wealth 
at stake is a good indicator.  
 
The model proposed in Chapter Thee covers the points used to allocate the risk ratings. In 
sheet 7 of the appendix the twelve projects with the greatest information asymmetry and 
avoidance of responsibility all failed. These failures would not have been unexpected by well 
informed investors. They were probably even less unexpected to their proponents. 
The forty five projects with the lower level of information asymmetry and higher levels of 
responsibility (.4 or .5) by proponents were safe investments, with good outcomes. 
 
The complex interactions between innovation, government involvement and information 
asymmetry help to explain why otherwise highly respected firms might have used 
information asymmetry and strategic misrepresentation. 
 
6.3.2 Distributional data on execution, performance and outcome   
The twelve projects with the greatest information asymmetry and avoidance of responsibility 
experienced an average of 77.5% construction delay, and 2.15 x cost over-run. Production 
performance was on average 28.3% of nameplate capacity, and none paid back their 
investments. The average, theoretical payback was 145 years in contrast to an average of a 
little over 4 years for successful projects. 
 
6.3.3 Sunrise Dam (Case 45) $130,000,000 invested. On budget, 8.3% under time 
delivery. 206% of 100,000 oz. of gold produced in first year! Built 1996 – 1997 
Asymmetric information can have a negative connotation, should the insider group with the 
better information seek advantage for themselves by transferring responsibility for losses to 
the less informed outside investor. But in this case the most informed group, the proponents, 
were as open with their information as is commercially prudent and then out-performed 
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expectations. This is associated with higher levels of the firm competence model, and this 
case study will be examined as meeting both models. 
 
Firm competence is the ability of a business entity to successfully complete the task they 
have proposed; meeting or exceeding the aim, to achieve a favourable outcome … one better 
than the investors might reasonably have expected, compared to the median outcomes. 
 
The Sunrise Dam Gold Mine is located 55 km south of Laverton, Western Australia. It is 
presently fully owned by South African registered AngloGold Ashanti. In 1997 Acacia 
Resources Ltd achieved the measurably most positive outcome over projection for any 
transformation project in this study. The team, which had devolved from Biliton PLC, sought 
to transform hard rock with about 3 to 4 parts per million of gold into solid gold bullion. 
They proposed to produce 3,110 kg of gold. At the end of the first year of operation they had 
produced 6,407 kg of gold.  
 
They achieved this miracle by a process of selecting and setting aside for initial production 
the richest ores, which allows a plant to recover the most gold as quickly as possible. The 
plant was designed to process a million tonnes of ore a year. If fed ore of 3 ppm gold then 
somewhat less than 3 tonnes of gold will be produced. Depending on the nature of the ore and 
the skill of the operators there is usually around a 90% recovery rate. Acacia aimed for a 20% 
gold recovery by gravity, (for coarse visible gold) and 72.5% recovery by cyanide leaching. 
This enabled the rapid repayment of the capital invested in the plant, and is an indication of 
an astute and financially conservative management.  
 
The crush plant commissioned in February 1997, and the first Gold pour was on 27th March 
1997.251 The process plant was a copy of Union Reefs plant which had been successful three 
years earlier.  In the three years of operation any troubles had been revealed, worked out and 
process improvements implemented. The risk at Sunrise Dam was minimal due to resolving 
the technical risks on an earlier plant, of similar scale and design. They were cloning success. 
 
The process plant was constructed on budget and in 11 months rather than 12 as proposed.  
Due to the relatively low gold price at the time of $359 per ounce the team needed to quickly 
over produce to pay back the bank debt incurred in construction and return exceptional 
performance for the shareholders.  The proposed production would have yielded an income of 
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around $35 million US dollars; instead they achieved $72 million US dollars.  At the 
prevailing exchange rate in 1997-1998 (1.34 to 1.59 Australian $ to 1 $ U.S.) they came very 
close to generating enough income to pay off the project in the first year.  
 
The firm had an exceptional knowledge and competence with both the ore and the process.  
The ore body was thoroughly explored between 1994 and 1996, and had run tests on the 
geology and treatment chemistry of the three main ore types. Incremental improvements in 
plant operation skills from the earlier plant enabled an ore throughput 18% greater than 
design.  Consumption of consumables (cyanide, lime, grinding media and electricity) were 
able to be reduced to between 90% and 60% of design calculation. The operators were 
masters of the ore and the process. 
 
The preferentially selected ores, which contained much more “visible gold” enabled gravity 
recovery to reach 45% of gold recovered, leaving 50.5% to be recovered by leaching. The 
total recovery rate was 95.6%. The greater production, at lower costs, and with very limited 
start up difficulties indicates the “firm competence” built up from Union Reefs and previous 
gold mine activities.  
 
Acacia did seek to test the “financial confidence” of the market to fund the project, and were 
able to achieve a credit line almost twice the size of the proposed investment. This was 
financed against the income of their other existing and profitable gold mine, as well as the 
new project. Shareholders were rewarded in 1998 with an increase in earnings per share of 
112% on the year before, which also has the effect of making the share much more desirable, 
and hence worth more to sell.252 Financiers recovered their capital and interest with minimal 
risk. 
 
The five model criteria for Firm Competence are: 
Track record: Acacia Resources had grown from a prior experienced and successful team 
and had established, operated and upgraded the Union Reefs Gold Mine at Pine Creek in the 
years they had worked together as Acacia Resources (AAA on ASX). 
 
Firm focus: Acacia was a low cost Gold miner and refiner. They had reduced their 
production cost from $348 to $293 per ounce.253 They sold their 40.1% interest in the 
Blendevale zinc-lead project in Western Australia, to concentrate on gold. 
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Scale up: The Sunrise Dam plant was a duplicate of the Union Reefs plant with some 
incremental improvements. 
 
Financial: In 1997 Acacia had established a five year unsecured $225 million syndicated 
revolving credit facility to underpin future growth. At that time they had a net debt position at 
year end was $29.5 million. They had forward sale contracts at year end totalled 2.02 million 
ounces of gold at an average price of $588 an ounce… with production costs of $ 293 per 
ounce. 
 
Profit: Producing an extra 3.3 tonnes of gold, whilst modestly reducing operational costs 
equals wonderful profit for the investors. I suspect they were well pleased. 
 
The five model criteria for information asymmetry in resource projects are: 
 
Low level of information asymmetry and power balance: As Sunrise Dam plant was a 
duplicate plant there was little that was not known and public. Acacia had made some modest 
incremental improvements, and felt they could get a little better performance at Sunrise Dam. 
They did. 
 
Limited motivation for strategic misrepresentation: Acacia knew their ore body, and 
plant, and had more than enough capital. They were a trusted team, and thus had the most to 
lose by lack of veracity. 
 
Open commercial access to resource: Acacia had achieved the license to operate, under 
standard conditions, without any unusual impediments. Gold mining in the Western Australia 
desert is mature, and as long as the royalty payment is made the government has little interest 
to be involved. 
 
Modest use of information asymmetry by successful firms: Acacia was a successful 
medium sized firm with an excellent track record, and access to finance under favourable 
conditions. They were known as very good at what they did, and the market respected them 
for it. Investors like the security and profit, and in this case a larger firm liked the team, the 
assets, and the lack of risk and bought them at a premium in a trade sale. 
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Profit made as expected: The profit was much greater than expected. The only information 
asymmetry was in not announcing how well they were planning to do in advance. Competent 
firms rarely need to advertise. The astute investor learns quickly enough. 
 
6.3.4 Bulong Nickel and Cobalt from Laterite plant (Case 4) $250,000 Invested. 8.7% 
over budget. 50% delay in completion. Built 1997 – 1998 
Between 1997 and 1999 three new process plants were built to extract nickel and cobalt from 
laterite ores, which represent 72% of Australian nickel reserves, rather than the more easily 
processed sulphide ores, which had largely been exploited, and where declining grades were 
a factor.  
 
Australian reserves of nickel held in identified laterite deposits is reported at 24 million 
tonnes254 which would have a theoretical value of around $324 billion (US) dollars at the 
January 2014 (London Metals Exchange) price of $13,500 a tonne.  Australian reserves of 
nickel are 30% of world reserves and twice as large as any other supplier.  The Nickel price 
had risen from $5,293 per tonne in 1993, to $6,340 in 1994, to $8,228 in 1995, giving 
encouragement to enthusiasts with limited experience and less capital.  
 
Preston Resources was a small firm, with multiple lease sites that might have gold, or nickel, 
but no production or facilities.  They were planning a $700 million Nickel plant at 
Marlborough in Queensland that would purportedly produce 28,000 tonnes of Nickel. Their 
issue and paid share capital was below $10,872,135 according to their 1997 Annual Report. 
 
They had $2 million in the bank255 which seems a little short of required, when they entered 
into a deal with Resolute to purchase their Bulong HPAL Nickel Cobalt plant that was 
nearing completion. Preston shareholders were advised in September 1998 that Bulong, was 
“an outstanding opportunity”. “The cash flow that Bulong will generate from the second half 
of this financial year will create a sound financial base to assist the financing of 
Marlborough on the most attractive terms possible.”  Shareholders were told construction of 
the Bulong processing plant was 95 per cent complete, and that “There are many financial, 
technical, physical and practical benefits for Preston in owning and operating two world-
class lateritic nickel/cobalt projects.  The immediate advantage arising from the Bulong 
acquisition has been to provide access to technology, technical expertise, personnel and 
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services in the construction, commissioning and operation of the lateritic nickel plant.  This 
has already proved of enormous benefit in the planning of Marlborough.  The Company will 
draw on the Bulong experience in the construction and commissioning of Marlborough over 
the next two years.” The $700 million Marlborough plant was never built. 
 
The debt incurred to purchase Bulong was $319 million, which proved difficult to finance. 
The firm was seen as a credit risks in a high technical risk endeavour. $140 million was 
raised at 12% p.a. interest, and this was 40% undersubscribed with Barclays Bank having to 
put in $56 million as underwriters. Resolute retained 41% of the project as vendor finance, 
and new shares were issued driving down the price. Initial shareholder who had paid as much 
as $3 saw shares fall to 27 cents before they were suspended. 
 
A 1998 explanatory memorandum to shareholders forecast production of 3477 tonnes of 
nickel and 477 tonnes of cobalt in 1998-99, ramping up to 9600 tonnes of nickel and 900 
tonnes of cobalt in 2002. Projected revenue from Belong was $68 million, of which $8 
million would be net profit.256 In retrospect this is a painfully thin margin, and signals high 
risk. Production in 1998-99 was only 460 tonnes of nickel. Operating revenue in 1998-99 was 
$3.1 million, resulting in an $18.5 million loss. Revenue reached $63 million the following 
year but the loss soared to $97 million.  This contrasted the claim made in the 1999 Annual 
Report that: “At Belong we have a world class lateritic nickel and cobalt resource, proven 
metallurgical processes, integrated refineries, and we are set to produce metal in the lowest 
cost quality."  In 2000-01, the loss from production jumped to $247 million.  
 
In the same 1999 Annual Report the firms accountants, Arthur Andersen stated: “Should the 
equity capital raising not prove successful and the Belong nickel/cobalt operations not 
achieve positive cash flows, there is significant uncertainty whether the company will be able 
to continue as a going concern and therefore whether it will realise its assets and extinguish 
its liabilities in the normal course of business and at the amounts stated in the financial 
statements.” 
 
By 2002, production output totalled 6331 tonnes of nickel or 66% of the projected 9600 
tonnes.  In 2003 the project was in the hands of the bond holders, who were owed about $300 
million.  The bondholders, led by Barclays called in KPMG as receivers in May 2003.  Even 
with the high price for nickel in 2003257 of $9,629 per tonne the theoretical income of $61 
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million a year could not cover production costs, debt servicing and the need to import sulphur 
and produce sulphuric acid locally. The WMC Kalgoorlie Acid Plant could not provide 
enough acid for the Belong operations. The 1% Nickel in the ore was mixed in with 6% 
Magnesium, both of which react in the acid. Rather than a Nickel plant with a magnesium 
impurity, the plant was a magnesium mine with a nickel residual. 
 
Belong was closed for maintenance in October 2003 and was not re-opened. In April 2004 
the plant was sold for $15 million, realising just 5 cents return for every dollar lost. Preston 
Resources Ltd became Chrome Corporation Limited between 2005 and 2009, transforming 
into Pacific Nguni Minerals Ltd between the 2nd and 4th of December 2009, then to Pacific 
Nguni Limited after that. Their 2013 Annual Report discloses a loss of $ 2,696,695, up from 
a loss of $2,326,986 the year before. It is presently investigating a number of gold 
opportunities in locations from Papua New Guinea to Mexico, much as it did as Colonial 
Resources from 1990 to 1995, before becoming Preston resources, where we started the story. 
 
Firms and their management team develop a track record. There are many indicators in this 
story to indicate asymmetric information and strategic misrepresentation. The case study will 
consider the criteria for firm competence, new process innovation and asymmetric 
information models. There was no unusual government involvement. 
 
Track record of implementation: Preston had not run a process plant before this time. 
 
Firm focus in particular endeavour: Other than proposing two unique and challenging 
plants on opposite sides of the country at once, without capital or experience, none. 
 
Step scale up ratio from previous success: Infinite, no prior success. 
 
Financial confidence engendered by firm: Very little, not enough capital, at interest rates 
not high enough to balance the significant risk. 
 
Profits: None in any of the three models. 
 
Individual Ownership and responsibility: They bought a plant from another firm under 
financial duress, without the capital to complete the job, or the experience to do it. No one 
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went to jail. There was low ownership and responsibility.  
 
Initial process simplicity: The HPAL process is high pressure, high temperature process 
using sulphuric acid. In Australian four plants have tried and four failed. The initial plant at 
Moa Bay in Cuba took three owners and decades to be sorted out. This is not a simple 
process or one that can be worked at small scale. 
 
Multistage scale up: None, they bought an almost complete plant as is where is.  
 
Niche demand for innovation: Nickel and Cobalt have high commodity values, and are 
available from laterite ores. However the desire to do so by HPAL is now restrained and 
other processes are being tried.  
 
High of information asymmetry and power imbalance: This was an ill-considered, high 
risk gamble, and the projections made were at best wildly optimistic hopes. 
 
Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation: Given the circumstances there was 
little alternative. 
 
Asymmetrical information used to manage ignorant power: There was no ignorant power 
(misguided government) involved. The ignorant were the financiers and investors.  
 
Selective strategic misrepresentation to promote investment: In the examples shown, the 
exceptionally positive projections to raise “almost certain loss” risk capital, seems to be 
strategic misrepresentation. 
 
6.3.5   Bendigo Gold Mine (Case 40) $250,000,000 invested. 16.3% over budget, on time 
delivery. 26.8% of 83,000 ounces of gold produced. Built 2005 – 2006. 
 
Bendigo Gold Mine sought to re-visit the days of the of the 1851 Victorian Gold rush, when 
up two tonnes a week of gold was being recovered by miners with little more than picks and 
shovels. There are 32,151 troy ounces of gold in a metric tonne and at 2013 values about 
$51.5 million dollars (Australian) each tonne.  Between 1851 and 1954 the Bendigo 
Goldfields produced 22 million ounces, or 684 tonnes of gold258. At today’s prices this would 
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be $35 billion value in gold. This is a fantastic introduction to an exciting story; that took a 
long time to tell and a short time to disprove. From 2001 to 2005 Annual reports were 
published rich with detailed and extensive geological analysis, building the case for 
investments. 
 
Bendigo Gold N.L. (No Liabilities) the firm that formed Bendigo Gold proposed the simple 
idea that gold mining had not stopped in 1954 due to lack of gold, but for the reasons of 
“Large number of companies with small lease holdings”, “mine ventilation” and “mine 
dewatering.” They went on to state “It was not depletion of gold, head grade averaged 17 g/t 
in the main production zone regardless of depth”259. This is a bold statement that should have 
alert the experienced investor to caution. The story of reopening an old gold mine, as the 
proponents “have found more gold down there” is popular. It is the most retold story 
presented for low value high risk new gold mines. The hope for undiscovered treasure and the 
investors’ capital rarely last long. This is not to say that there is not gold still left in old sites, 
but as in Case 39 it is in the slag heap, not the bottom of the mine. 
 
The proponents claimed that there was 13 million ounces of gold potentially recoverable and 
that the mine would run for 25 years. The mine in fact started operation in the October of 
2006, as a 600 000 tonnes per year (of ore) processing plant. The plant design was that about 
80 per cent of the gold would be recovered through a series of gravity circuits, with the 
balance of about ten per cent recovered via flotation and subsequent leaching of flotation 
concentrate. 
 
“In early 2007 it became clear that the initial ore reserves had been overestimated, leading 
to an immediate change of strategy from production to exploration.” It is not the usual 
practice to build a processing plant then revert to exploration to find the ore to feed it. 
 
Mining and processing ceased in May 2007, with the plant having processed 176 000 tonnes 
at an average grade of 5.4 g/t gold for 26 735 oz. of gold. An additional 3122 ounces of gold 
were produced during commissioning and decommissioning in 2006 and 2007. 
 
If the ore had contained the “average 17 grams per tonne” as boldly claimed, and the plant 
operated at 600,000 tonnes per annum, then each tonne of ore would have contained .5466 of 
an ounce of gold, and production of gold would have been 327,974 ounces. This would have 
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brought in an income stream of $207 million dollars in the first year; at the then modest price 
of $630.35 Australian per ounce260 
 
In fact the 29,857 ounces produced were but 9.1% of that proposed for the first year of 
operation. The closure of the mine after only 8 months indicates that the management were 
aware of how badly they had estimated the ore, and equally how quickly the investors’ funds 
had been depleted.   
 
By 2008 the investment presentation261 claimed only 8.1 g/t ore, noted that it was highly 
variable, and announced that 8558 ounces had been produced. By 2010 a net profit of $11.2 
million was declared, and a final dividend of 0.5 cents per share was declared on 26 August 
2010.262 
 
In 2011 the company changed its name to Unity Mining Limited and sought to raise further 
capital with the issue of 510 million more shares.263 This would dilute whatever value the 
existing shareholders still had.  Market capitalisation was listed as $51 million dollars, and 
the value of the enterprise was listed as $12 million.  This was a very poor return for the 
investors, who had on the advice offered by the promoters, sunk more than $250 million into 
the venture. 
 
The advice contained in presentation and prospectus was shown to be wildly optimistic and a 
poor projection of what would happen.  Whether this was extraordinary professional 
misjudgement, or strategic misrepresentation, or just random bad luck is difficult to prove. 
 
The proponents were not without extensive and relevant experience, many were senior and 
respected members of the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy. Their actions in 
promptly and accurately disclosing the problems; and then seeking practical solutions to the 
situation meet the ethical and legal requirements. The question of how they could make such 
fundamental mistakes in ore classification, after such a long and detailed analysis of a well-
known ore body is difficult to understand. 
 
The facts are that the expert projections as to the grade of ore, and thus the suitability for 
mine operation were wrong by more than 90%. Investors accepted the presentations of trusted 
and experienced geologists and made a significant investment. The fault in the estimation of 
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grade was quickly discovered and revealed after the investment had been spent. The investors 
lost almost all their capital. 
It could be argued that there was no information asymmetry, as the proponents were as 
surprised as the investors at how little gold was in the seams. However given the long 
experience of the proponents, and the long history of the site, this seems an unusual outcome. 
 
6.3.6 Conclusions 
Moral hazard  is described by economist Paul Krugman264  "any situation in which one 
person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if 
things go badly.” 
 
There is little evidence of information asymmetry leading to strategic misrepresentation in the 
fifty two projects that succeeded. In six of the fifteen failures the outcome seems to have been 
genuine error or unexpected accident. But in nine of the failures there is significant 
information asymmetry leading to probable strategic misrepresentation.  
 
In every case the taxpayer took a proportion of the loss, as a failure pays no corporate tax, 
and often has the ATO as a creditor. In four cases the Australian taxpayer would have 
indirectly funded a major share of the losses and in two of these the Commonwealth and State 
were investors.  Where an investor detects strategic misrepresentation in a prospectus, they 
would be wise to stop. Where government has also invested they should run. 
 
The commonwealth tax payer bore much of the cost and losses from four new process 
innovation projects that were built by the two leading firms in Australia.  Cases 1, 7 and 8 
had higher levels of research and development, which would have attracted tax concessions. 
Cases 1 and 11 had exceptionally beneficial finance arrangements that saw the losses 
converted beneficially in to tax losses. This was found to be within the law. Cases 9 and 10 
saw large tax write downs for a very profitable firm, which had the indirect consequence of 
lower the tax the firm paid. 
 
The careful thought put into managing the financial effects of failure was sadly not matched 
by the expertise at implementing successful new process innovation. 
 
Table 37 shows where the majority of financial losses fell over 15 failed projects. 
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7. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
 
7.1 The outsider view of resource project success and failure 
 
Resource projects between 1993 and 2010 were the largest chemical engineering projects in 
Australia. Resource exports were the engine of national prosperity. Resource projects were 
the private sector investment steps to exploit the publicly owned minerals and energy. These 
projects were a driving force in the national economy and their success contributed to the tax 
base of the Commonwealth and States.   
 
Successful projects made up 73% of investments, unsuccessful 27%. Failure destroyed $ 12 
billion of investment and changed investment patterns away from local new process 
innovation. Valuable resources of nickel, cobalt, copper and uranium are now underutilised.    
 
The failure of 99% of investment in new process innovation stopped investment in local 
innovation by 2005. No new process plants have been built since.  Failed projects did not 
make a profit. Their production averaged less than 29% of their design capacity and they 
were unable to pay back investments. These process plants have been demolished with few 
exceptions. The few rejuvenated plants produce at sub optimal rates.  New processes failed to 
unlock value from complex ores and declining grades. This was an adverse outcome for 
innovation. 
 
Successful projects made profits, paid taxes and royalties, contributed to high wages and 
grew. Almost all produced more than 90% of their nameplate capacity, and most paid back 
the initial investments in less than 5 years. One firm has exported its new process 
technologies around the world but was taken over due to financial difficulties in 2003. 
Australia largest and most successful resource firms were unsuccessful with new process 
innovation and now focus on incremental improvements. 
 
An outsider view was adopted to avoid bias. An outsider view looks at what happened, 
focusing on system cost and performance.  It is an investor view rather than a proponent 
view. A database of sixty seven projects with initial investment over $ 100 million was built. 
The database includes all projects like a census. It has enough cases to be statistically robust, 
and over a time frame long enough to see trends. The data is displayed in positional display in 
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the appendix. Case studies were used to understand what happened. Five simple models with 
five parameters from greatest risk to least risk were developed to describe the inputs and 
outcomes observed.  These models gave robust indication or project failure before the first 
concrete is poured or steel cut on a project. 
 
The success of competent firms in processing natural gas into LNG gave an investment boom 
in this sector. In 2011 it was more than 91% of new investment in elaborate resource 
transformation. Between 1993 and 2010 the proportion was 20.5%. The failure of projects 
that sought to transform complex mineral resources led to a drop in investment for noble 
metals investment from an average over 18 years of 26.4% down to 3.6% in 2011. 
 
The gulf between competent and successful outcomes and failure was wide. Cost over-run, 
and completion delay was between 5 and 6 times worse on average for failed projects than 
successful projects. Twelve case studies were detailed to support the four hypotheses. They 
were chosen to contrast the best and worst outcomes and the inputs that caused them.  
 
From the public domain data the simplest models that would explain the outcomes were 
developed. These cover firm competence, innovation success models, interactions of 
government in value adding processes and strategic misrepresentation in mega projects.  
 
7.2 Firm competence 
 
Projects failed where they lacked firm competence. More challenging projects, such as 
refineries, failed more frequently than less challenging projects like concentration plants. 
Fifteen of forty four refineries failed (34%). Yet twenty three of twenty three (100%) 
concentration plants succeeded. Competent firms, with extensive market experience 
preferentially selected this minimal local value adding option, as it cut investment costs and 
risk. New start-up firms with limited firm competence and optimism bias launched complex 
value adding refineries, and failed.    
 
Projects undertaken by international firms with long track records of firm competence, such 
as LNG, Alumina and Aluminium projects all succeeded. Eight of fifteen failed projects were 
firms quite new to the process and with limited experience. They did not know how to fly and 
crashed. Two failed projects (Cases 2 and 46) were from foreign firms experienced only in 
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their home market who were apparently unaware how different conditions were in Australia. 
Both experienced a run of calamitous misfortunes at a time when their home financial 
position was under severe challenge. But five failed projects were implemented by the two 
largest and most profitable firms in Australia and in the world’s mining industry. The three 
other hypotheses explored and explained this anomaly. 
 
Inexperienced firms ran out of money, and could not get any more. They ran out of money 
because their project implementation was substandard. Their production costs were much 
higher than planned and output was lower than planned.   
 
Whilst some developed their skills and knowledge in the specific process area, it was not fast 
enough to overcome the initial shortfalls.  In three projects (Cases 3, 9 and 10) the firms had 
mastered some new skills but failed. The new owner who bought the plant for cents in the 
dollar invested, gained hard won skills and plant most economically. These buyers of these 
distressed plants were able to accept production of 50% of nameplate capacity as they had 
only paid 10% of the costs. They then went on to make moderate profits on the flawed plant 
by building on the competence attained in the struggle for production. Failure in these cases 
was competence building.  
 
The problems with large and rapid scale up have become well known. The two failure case 
studies (Case 7 and Case 1) destroyed $4.37 billion on a large scale plant. There small scale 
test and development was not done to the point where the process was fully understood or 
successful.  
 
The role of adequate capital to complete a difficult project was different between a one 
project start-up firm and a difficult project in an otherwise prosperous firm.  Small firms 
failed when there was not enough capital available to overcome difficulties. Starting a project 
without enough money to complete it and cover incremental costs in sorting out the new 
process was a strong indication of lack of firm competence. The management either were 
ignorant of the investment required to do the job right, or chose to proceed for less noble 
reasons.   
 
The first eight projects to the left of sheet 4 of the Appendix, Cases 7, 33, 6, 3, 4, 52, 5, and 
60 all ran out of money and failed. They were one project start-up firms, with the highest risk. 
 225
All the original firms are gone, and with them almost all of the investor’s capital. 
 
The next seven projects were part of firms with multiple operations. They failed when their 
parents decided to stop the loss of capital.  An alternative might have been that the project 
had met a more important objective explored in other hypotheses. 
 
Firms like BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto are exceptionally competent at what they do well, iron 
ore, coal and other well established processes. They lacked firm competence in the new 
process area, and the outcomes showed this. 
 
Firm competence was defined as an organisation with a track record of successful 
implementations in the specific area where they have built unique skills. Firms evolved these 
skills by building on previously successful projects that they then improved. These competent 
firms were able to raise capital at preferential rates from the best informed financiers as their 
projects had regularly made profits. 
 
A lack of firm competence was shown by starting a project in where the firm did not have 
experience or a process focus. They were shown to not understand the ore or process. They 
built large scale plants without an evolution of knowledge creation gained from smaller 
successful plants. These plants had greater cost over-run in budget, longer time to operation 
and disappointing production. The high costs and low revenue killed them. The smaller firms 
had found finance from less informed investors at high rates of interest. They could not pay 
back as they never made a profit and failed. 
 
This failure was predictable from the model of firm competence.   
 
7.3 New process innovation 
 
Only 1% of investment in innovative new processes succeeded. Investment on $ 100 million 
plus plants using local innovation new processes stopped in 2005.  Resource firms have 
chosen to be the second or third to implement a proven and tested new technology. Business 
preferred innovation stripped of risk. Australia became a difficult place to develop new 
processes, as eleven of twelve new process projects had failed. All new process projects after 
1994 failed. 
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Two projects with little innovation failed for reasons not connected with innovation. Two 
projects with modest innovation but large scale up without any process evolution to build on 
also failed.  Scale up without building knowledge of ore and process from earlier small scale 
work is identified as a major risk factor.  
 
Sheet 5 of Appendix placed to the left the projects that indicate the greatest risk. 13 were at 
extreme risk, in that their model was one indicating failure.   
 
Sadly eight of the nine firms with innovative new process projects were also not competent at 
implementing innovation successfully. Alternatively it could be argued they were following a 
model that has a high probability of failure. 
 
There is a risk in comparing many failures with a single success. The many failures had five 
factors in common. They had management with limited responsibility or ownership of the 
outcomes. The new processes were initially complex and became more complex as the 
evolved. There is evidence in some cases that processes that were still not successful were 
scaled up too early. The small scale testing and process evolution was truncated and the step 
to a mega scale project was fast. Firms scaled up quickly as they saw the market as crowed 
and want to be first. These processes made a loss from small scale to large and failed. 
 
This successful Case 40 was the contrast. There was individual ownership of the initial 
process development, and responsibility that each stage worked before progressing to the 
next step. The initial simple process evolved to meet new ores and market opportunities. 
There was a strong niche demand for the unique productivity increase provided by the 
innovation. The process worked and made a profit at each stage of development, and did not 
need to be built at huge scale to get the numbers to add up. 
 
A more complex innovation model is shown in sheet 9 of the Appendix with contrasting 
characteristics of the eleven failed mega projects and Case 40. 
 
7.4 Government involvement in value adding  
 
Government involvement in value adding was successful in eleven projects valued at $8.37 
billion. One of these projects (Case 30) was recently closed. Governments wanted to receive 
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extra economic benefits from value adding in their state. Firms wanted low cost energy for 
what were very energy intensive refining operations. Alumina refineries needed natural gas 
cheaply and aluminium refineries needed very low cost electricity.  
 
These eleven successful projects were all mature and well understood processes. Alumina 
and Aluminium production are a century old technology operated by large and stable firms 
with a long track record. These firms had complete control of the value chain till recently and 
were used to collaboration with Government for mutual benefits. There is a low level of 
information asymmetry with each side having a good idea of how the other will act. These 
firms built and operated refineries in return for low cost energy supply.  Till 2008 they made 
a profit doing this. Then a drop in the price for aluminium to almost half and increasing 
energy costs fractured the mutual benefit model.  
 
Government involvement in value adding was unsuccessful in four projects valued at $8.57 
billion. All have been closed and demolished. The other (Case 48) has been stalled for a 
decade, with little profit and no expansion.  In contrast to the collaborative give and take in 
the successful projects the five failures were uneconomic expectations for complex processes. 
Cases 7, 8 and 1 were new process innovations by firms without skill or focus in the 
technology. Case 48 has evolved into a standoff where the governments’ requirements for 
political outcomes frustrated the firms desire to operate the project profitably. In case 2 the 
Government wanted foreign investment in a sensitive area, but without matching 
considerations. The Japanese firm had not understood how different business was in Australia 
than Japan.  They failed and closed the plant and there has been no further Japanese 
investment in refining or value adding in Australia since. 
 
Government desire to be involved in value adding peaked in the years 2001 -2003, when it 
was policy to create new industries from public sector research and government fiat. The loss 
of all the capital invested by government in Cases 7 and 8 tempered this enthusiasm. The 
multi-billion dollar waste of capital in Case 1 was largely passed on to the Commonwealth 
through the tax system.  
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7.5 Asymmetrical Information and strategic misrepresentation  
 
Asymmetrical information leading to strategic misrepresentation and adverse outcomes were 
an undesirable combination. In 16 cases studied asymmetric information led to strategic 
misrepresentation with avoidance of responsibility. This misrepresentation and avoidance of 
responsibility preceded and signalled an adverse outcome.  Their misrepresentations and 
subsequent loss of credibility destroyed the projects, many firms, and the invested capital.  
 
An investor who could have discerned the strategic misrepresentation would have avoided all 
these failed projects. The one unusual case was Case 16. Here the plant worked well and was 
a desirable and profitable asset. The strategic misrepresentation was between the entrepreneur 
who thought he owned the plant and an Australian bank that was more successful in court 
with their claims of ownership. Debt and lifestyle seem inextricably mixed up with hardnosed 
commercial opportunism.  
 
Strategic misrepresentation in innovative resource projects destroyed credibility for this class 
of projects. Technology projects to unlock value only proceeded after 2005 when they are 
second or third embodiments of a proven overseas development. Adoption of the best 
overseas processes after others have taken the risks and losses was economically rational. Yet 
it was at odds with the innovation policies and investment in research and development, 
promoted by Governments in the past.   
 
A natural reaction from investors to strategic misrepresentation was to adopt a sceptical 
outlook. They restricted their investments to projects with minimal risk that have been tried 
and profitable many times. This transformed the vast majority of new investment flows into 
three areas of relatively assured profit, LNG, iron ore and coal. Mineral resources that 
suffered from decline in grade or increased complexity of ore structure were progressively 
ignored.  
 
There was a linkage between failures in the 1993 to 2010 period, and where investments 
flowed to as a result. New process innovation went from 25.3% of all investments before 
2005 to zero after. The wrong innovation models, the wrong government involvement and the 
high association between strategic misrepresentation and failed innovation projects forced 
this investment sector closed. 
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7.6 Relationships between success and failure  
 
At the extremes failure and success are diametrically opposite. This is shown in Sheet 8 of 
the appendix. Five models, each with five points are modelled from the data taken from the 
67 projects.  
 
The four risk areas examined in the four hypotheses had similar structures and key points. 
They were overlapping models in that the worst failure could encompass the worst examples 
of all four hypotheses. However there was a middle ground where competent firms ran into 
difficulties and were taken over. 
 
Two of the most competent firms at developing new processes, and implementing complex 
technologies with diligence and perseverance were Mount Isa Mines (MIM) and Western 
Mining Corporation (WMC). They failed respectively between 2003 and June 2005.  MIM 
had been the one firm to bring a new process innovation plant (Case 40) to successful 
production and world-wide licence sales.  WMC had located and brought into production the 
Olympic Dam resource, underground mine, and complex processing plant. This was probably 
the most valuable single noble metal deposit in the world. The total value of the resource was 
estimated at $686 billion. 
 
From 1924 till 1947 MIM was financially challenged, and dependant on creditors. They 
mined difficult ore bodies, and had long faced difficulties in processing the rich but complex 
ores. This led in 1962 to their being a founding sponsor of the Australian Minerals Industry 
Research Association ("AMIRA") at the University of Queensland, which led to the 
formation of the Julius Kruttschnitt Mineral Research Centre.265 MIM became the world 
leader in developing new mineral processing technologies as a response to declining grades, 
complex ores, metal price variations and increased production costs. They were the only firm 
to invest so much, and so successfully over a long time period. Their unique firm competence 
in innovation and commercial application was sadly not matched by same skills at accessing 
new ores in a timely manner, or managing high confidence in their financial abilities. 
Production of ores at the main facility fell from 5 million tonnes in 1994 to 1.2 million in 
2002266.  
 
The prices MIM received for their copper fell from $3,009 in January 1995, to $1,587 in 
 230
April 2003. Lead fell from $667 to $437 in the same time.  
 
The Swiss based firm Xstrata, first listed on the London Stock exchange in 2002 were able to 
access more than $3 billion U.S to purchase MIM between April and June 2003. Xstrata had 
enjoyed the confidence of the financial market in a way that MIM did not. This financial 
confidence factor was probably the most significant element these two firms lacked. Both 
firms failed to convince markets and investors that they could be solidly profitable. 
 
Western Mining had been caught with low cash flow and two large projects with significant 
technical difficulties that required time and capital to resolve at a time when the commodity 
prices for their output turned down.  The difficulties experienced by Olympic Dam were 
described in Section 6.2.5. Two fires in their solvent extraction unit in December 1999 and 
October 2001 stopped production at a time when production was required to provide capital 
for rebuilding. This alone should not have been fatal, but for similar troubles at Phosphate 
Hill (Case 13). Phosphate Hill was slow to reach nameplate capacity. WMC persevered and 
reached the design goals, but this came at increased cost in further delay and investment. 
Then the commodity price fell to almost half that was projected, and the expected revenue of 
around $271 million a year, or $813 million in first 36 months, was in fact only $155 million. 
In 2003 WMC made a profit of only $245 million. Three technical difficulties at once were 
hard to imagine, but the collapse of the commodity price at the same time was unable to be 
managed. WMC was purchased by BHP-Billiton for $9.2 billion, which was accepted by the 
shareholders at $7.85 a share as a reasonable return. 
 
The irony is that BHP-Billiton sold Phosphate Hill, only to watch as production held steady at 
close to nameplate capacity and the price of Ammonium Phosphate climbed to $967 in 2008. 
In that year the income was estimated at $948 million, more than six times that received in 
the vital first 36 months. The unexpected events can works in two directions. 
 
7.7 Why did new process innovation fail so often? 
 
New process innovation that has radically transformed resource processing has a long history. 
The Bayer Alumina process and Hall Heroult process were developed by brilliant inventors 
working under what were primitive conditions, with little capital. The flotation process was 
developed by practical if unscientific and competing individuals around Broken Hill in the 
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early 1900’s. These inventors were confronted with a unique challenge of extracting silver, 
lead and zinc from ores already mined and crushed ore. In stages they succeeded and 
transformed how ores are processed to extract the precious metals. In 1887 John MacArthur 
built on earlier work by Faraday to develop the cyanide extraction process for gold.  The 
rewards from these discoveries were significant increases in gold recovery and mine 
productivity. Pervious processes were quickly replaced by the economic advantages offered 
by the radical new process. So the first two ingredients are a brilliant individual and a strong 
financial incentive. 
 
The Pidgeon process for magnesium production was developed in 1940. Wartime demand for 
light alloys for aircraft gave the work urgency. Dr Pidgeon was working for the Canadian 
National Research Council. His simple method is still the basic process for most of the 
world’s magnesium production. Dr John Floyd was working at CSIRO when he started work 
on the process that became Case 40, though he later left and founded his own firm. 
 
It was not important that these great inventors worked alone or in a Government research 
laboratory. Over time the latter has displaced the former over the last century. What was 
important was the ownership of the process by its named parent. This parent nurtured the 
process through many stages to commercial success. 
 
In all these cases the innovation was relatively simple, worked quickly, and showed potential 
for resolving a problem that had significant economic need.  The need was relatively specific, 
a niche market. For MacArthur it was fine gold in South Africa, for John Floyd it was 
sulphide base metals and later recycling lead.   
 
The processes worked from the start, and at each scale up were refined and improved. In 
some cases the utility of the simple invention was refined to cover new resource applications. 
These successful processes were simple and robust. The inventor looked for a reward from 
the outcome of the process. They wanted to take a share of the profits to be made. 
  
The contrast in the failed projects was the opposite. The inventor was not well known and 
had little parental role in the project. Management were paid for the process not necessarily 
the outcome. Reward by the hour invested is a different dynamic to reward for outcome.  
Initially complex processes usually involve many hours, even years of further work and 
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development. The Case 8 process took almost 30 years to fail through three embodiments. 
 
An initially complex process is often not robust, and to achieve an outcome becomes more 
complex. If the economic advantage from working a small plant is absent there is a 
temptation to increase the scale to a point where there is a theoretical advantage. On paper 
this may have looked good, but in practice it has only led to huge failures. 
 
The five point innovation model encapsulates these points.  
 
Government involvement and strategic misrepresentation are two more elements of new 
process innovation failure. Government has been a notable poor picker of winners. Their 
investments of hundreds of millions of dollars have gone unerringly to projects that failed. 
 
7.8 How could new processes succeed? 
 
On sheet 9 of the Appendix there is an expansion of the five point model into 33 points of 
difference between a successful model for new process innovation and the model shown 
repeatedly to fail. This would also apply to smaller businesses associated with resources 
processing. It was based on the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 and on two innovative firms 
in the $25 to $50 million a year turnover. These are Gekko Systems of Ballarat and Russell 
Mineral Equipment of Toowoomba. New process innovation has been shown to have the 
greatest chance of success at smaller scale and with a simple process. The outcomes from the 
largest firms new process innovation projects were so negative they would be unlikely to 
repeat them. 
 
7.9 Opportunity for future research 
An opportunity for further research would be in utilising the methods, factors and models 
developed in this research to understand and explain the outcomes of poorly performing 
public sector projects. The outsider methodology of reference class forecasting (RFC) is used 
in this thesis could well have been applied to Australian transport infrastructure projects, 
especially those that involved tunnels. These tunnel projects have a notable shortfall in 
insider or “expert” prediction of usage volume and hence toll revenue collectable.   
Four such tunnel projects have failed quickly and spectacularly. Lane Cove Tunnel (-$ 470 m 
loss) and Cross City Tunnel ($500 m debt) in NSW; River City (-$1.56 b write down) and 
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Appendix Sheet 1 
Appendix.xlsx 67 case studies outcomes and values 11th March 2014
Case Project Refinery Concentrate Capital Success Capital Failed Fail To produce per year Product/s Name plate  Price (est) Production Lost Production Outcome
New Process Plants
1 HBI Boodarie 1 $3,370,000,000 1 2.250,000 t of 90% Fe HBI Crude steel HBI 2,250,000 $335 $753,750,000 Failed
2 Southern Copper 1 $600,000,000 1 120,000 t Copper cathode Copper refinery 120,000 $7,504 $900,480,000
3 Murrin‐Murrin 1 $1,000,000,000 1 45,000 t of Ni  Nickel  45,000 $21,710 $976,950,000 Failed & sold
& 3,000 t of Cobalt Cobalt 3,000 $47,040 $141,120,000
4 Bulong 1 $250,000,000 1 9,000 t on Nickel  Nickel  9,000 $21,700 $195,300,000
& 630 t of Co Cobalt 630 $47,040 $29,635,200
5 Cawse 1 $378,000,000 1 8,400 t if Ni  Nickel  8,400 $21,710 $182,364,000
& 1,700 t of Cobalt Cobalt 1,700 $47,040 $79,968,000
6 Stuart Oil Shale Project 1 $480,000,000 1 1,600,000 barrels (159 litre) oil Shale oil 1,600,000 $100 $160,000,000
7 AMG‐CSIRO 1 $1,000,000,000 1 97,000 tonnes of magnesium Magnesium 97,000 $3,100 $300,700,000
8 HIsmelt 1 $1,020,000,000 1 800,000 t of Hiron (pig iron) Crude steel DRI 800,000 $335 $268,000,000
9 BHP‐B Ravensthorpe 1 $2,450,000,000 1 220,000 t of Ni/Co hydroxide for Yabulu Nickel Hydroxide 50,000 $21,710 $1,085,500,000
sent to Cobalt Hydroxide 1,400 $47,040 $65,856,000
10 Yabulu expansion 1 $510,000,000 1 45,000 t on Ni & 1,800 t of Cobalt Nickel / Cobalt Refinery
11 Beenup 1 $300,000,000 1 600,000 t of ilmenite (low grade) Ilmenite 600,000 $70 $42,000,000
20,000 t of zircon Zircon 20,000 $1,124 $22,480,000
40 ISASmelt 1 $110,000,000 210,000 of copper  Copper 210,000 $7,504 $1,575,840,000
Gas transformed
12 Kalgoorlie Acid Plant 1 $145,000,000 500,000 tons of sulphuric acid Acid (Sulphuric) 500,000 $50 $25,000,000 Environmental
13 Phosphate Hill 1 $750,000,000 1,000,000 tonnes Ammonium phosphate fertiliser Ammonium Phosphate 1,000,000 $800 $800,000,000 Troubled firm
14 NW Shelf Train 4 1 $2,700,000,000 4,200,000 tonnes of liquid natural gas LNG 4,200,000 $453 $1,902,600,000 Success
15 Darwin LNG 1 $1,750,000,000 3,500,000 tonnes of liquid natural gas LNG 3,500,000 $453 $1,585,500,000
16 Burrup Fertilisers 1 $800,000,000 760,000 tonnes Ammonia (for fertiliser) Ammonia 760,000 $400 $304,000,000
17 NW Shelf Train 5 1 $2,600,000,000 4,400,000 tonnes of liquid natural gas LNG 4,400,000 $453 $1,993,200,000
18 Yarwun Ammonium Nitrate 1 $145,000,000 300,000 t of ammonium nitrate Explosives 300,000 $600 $180,000,000
19 Kwinana CSBP 1 $400,000,000 260,000 t of ammonium nitrate Explosives 260,000 $600 $156,000,000
Alumina & Aluminium
20 Tomago Expansion #1 1 $600,000,000 140,000 t extra Aluminium 140,000 $2,278 $318,920,000
21 Wagerup # 1 1 $150,000,000 200,000 t of extra Alumina Alumina 200,000 $293 $58,600,000
22 Boyne Smelters Expand 1 $1,000,000,000 230,000 tonnes of extra aluminium Aluminium 230,000 $2,278 $523,940,000
23 Tomago Expansion #2 1 $200,000,000 40,000 t extra Aluminium 40,000 $2,278 $91,120,000
24 Wagerup # 2 1 $285,000,000 440,000 t of extra Alumina Alumina 440,000 $293 $128,920,000
25 Worsley Alumina 1 $1,000,000,000 1,250,000 extra tonnes of alumina Alumina 1,250,000 $293 $366,250,000
26 Tomago Efficiency improve 1 $210,000,000 70,000 t extra Aluminium 70,000 $2,278 $159,460,000
27 QAL Efficiency improve 1 $175,000,000 Improved environmental performance Alumina 0 $293 $0
28 Pinjarra Upgrade 1 $550,000,000 600,000 tonnes of Alumina Alumina 600,000 $293 $175,800,000
29 Yarwun Alumina Refinery 1 $1,500,000,000 1,400,000 tonnes of Alumina Alumina 1,400,000 $293 $410,200,000
30 Alcan Gove G3 Expansion 1 $2,700,000,000 1,800,000 t of Alumina Alumina 1,800,000 $293 $527,400,000
Mineral Sands
31 TiWest Kwinana TiO2 1 $110,000,000 70,000 t TiO2 pigment TiO2 Pigment 70,000 $2,900 $203,000,000
32 Iluka Synthetic Rutile 1 $134,000,000 130,000 tonnes synthetic rutile Synthetic Rutile 130,000 $760 $98,800,000
33 Skardon River Kaolin 1 $130,000,000 1 175,000 tonnes kaolin Kaolin 175,000 $120 $21,000,000
34 Ginko & Broken Hill Plant 1 $176,000,000 59,000 t of Rutile Rutile 59,000 $860 $50,740,000
41,000 t of Zircon Zircon 41,000 $1,124 $46,084,000
136,000 t Ilmenite Ilmanite 136,000 $100 $13,600,000
110,000 t Leucoxene Leucoxene 110,000 $450 $49,500,000
35 Douglas 1 $284,000,000 98,000 t of Rutile Rutile 98,000 $860 $84,280,000
135,000 t of Zircon Zircon 135,000 $1,124 $151,740,000
200,000 t of Ilmenite Ilmanite 200,000 $100 $20,000,000
10,000 t of Leucoxene Leucoxene 10,000 $450 $4,500,000
36 Murray Basin Stage 2 1 $240,000,000 220,000 t of Rutile Rutile 220,000 $860 $189,200,000
180,000 t of Zircon Zircon 180,000 $1,124 $202,320,000
37 Eucla Basin 1 $390,000,000 300,000 t of Zircon Zircon 300,000 $1,124 $337,200,000
(Jacinth‐Ambrosia) 120,000 t of Ilmenite Ilmanite 120,000 $100 $12,000,000
30,000 t of Ilmenite Ilmanite 30,000 $100 $3,000,000
38 Kwinana TiO2 Stage 2 1 $120,000,000 45,000 t of TiO2 Pigment TiO2 Pigment 45,000 $29,000 $1,305,000,000
Noble metals
39 SuperPit (Kaltails) 1 $100,000,000 695,000 oz Gold recovered from Tailings Gold 695,000 $1,200 $834,000,000
41 Kambalda 1 $105,000,000 37,000 t of nickel concentrate Nickel  37,000 $21,710 $803,270,000
42 Mt Keith 1 $450,000,000 28,000 t of Nickel in concentrate Nickel 28,000 $21,710 $607,880,000
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43 Osborne 1 $160,000,000 33,000 t of copper  Copper 33,000 $7,504 $247,632,000
and 40,000 oz of Gold Gold 40,000 $1,200 $48,000,000
44 North Parkes 1 $255,000,000 70,000 t of Copper  Copper 70,000 $7,504 $525,280,000
and 50,000 oz of gold Gold 50,000 $1,200 $60,000,000
45 Sunrise Dam 1 $130,000,000 100,000 ozs of gold Gold 100,000 $1,200 $120,000,000
46 Mt Todd 1 $330,000,000 1 260,000 oz gold Gold 260,000 $1,200 $312,000,000
47 Cadia Hill 1 $441,000,000 300,000 oz of Au Gold 300,000 $1,200 $360,000,000
and 23,000 t of Cu Copper 23,000 $7,504 $172,592,000
48 Olympic Dam expansion 1 $1,600,000,000 1,500 t of U3O8  Copper  116,000 $7,504 $870,464,000
& 116,000 t of Cu extra Uranium 1,500 $134,400 $201,600,000
49 Ernest Henry 1 $350,000,000 95,000 t of Copper  Copper 95,000 $7,504 $712,880,000
& 120,000 oz of gold Gold 120,000 $1,200 $144,000,000
50 Mt Isa Anode Expansion 1 $285,000,000 75,000 t of anode copper Copper 75,000 $7,504 $562,800,000
51 Enterprise 1 $370,000,000 117,500 t of Cu Copper 117,500 $7,504 $881,720,000
52 Windimurra Vanadium 1 $200,000,000 1 7,200 tonnes of Vanadium pentoxide V2O5 Vanadium 7,200 $15,680 $112,896,000
53 Ridgeway 1 $376,000,000 360,000 oz of Gold Gold 360,000 $1,200 $432,000,000
26,0000 t of Cu Copper 26,000 $7,504 $195,104,000
54 Granny Smith 1 $150,000,000 400,000 oz of gold Gold 400,000 $1,200 $480,000,000
55 Telfer 1 $1,200,000,000 800,000 oz Au  Gold 800,000 $1,200 $960,000,000
& 30,000 t of Cu  Copper 30,000 $7,504 $225,120,000
56 Fosterville 1 $117,000,000 110,000 ozs Gold Gold 110,000 $1,200 $132,000,000
57 St Ives 1 $125,000,000 50,000 ozs of Gold Gold 50,000 $1,200 $60,000,000
58 Lake Cowal 1 $440,000,000 250,000 oz of gold Gold 250,000 $1,200 $300,000,000
59 Nifty sulfide copper 1 $148,000,000 60,000 t of copper concentrate Copper 60,000 $7,504 $450,240,000
60 Bendigo Gold Mine 1 $250,000,000 1 83,000 oz of Gold in first 3 years Gold 83,000 $1,200 $99,600,000
61 Boddington / Wandoo 1 $3,250,000,000 600,000 oz Au  Gold  600,000 $1,200 $720,000,000
& 22,500 t of Cu Copper 22,500 $7,504 $168,840,000
62 Prominent Hill 1 $1,150,000,000 104,000 t of Copper Copper 104,000 $7,504 $780,416,000
115,000 oz of Gold Gold 115,000 $1,200 $138,000,000
Base metals
63 McArthur River 1 $290,000,000 160,000 t of Zinc  Zinc 160,000 $2,240 $358,400,000
& 45,000 t of Lead Lead 45,000 $2,106 $94,770,000
64 Cannington 1 $460,000,000 175,000 t of Pb Lead 175,000 $2,106 $368,550,000
50,000 t of Zn  Zinc  50,000 $2,240 $112,000,000
and 750 t of Ag Silver 750 $570,663 $427,997,250
65 Century 1 $1,100,000,000 450,000 t of zinc  Zinc 450,000 $2,240 $1,008,000,000
66 Korea Zinc (Sun Metals) 1 $530,000,000 170,000 t of zinc  Zinc refinery 170,000 $2,240 $380,800,000
and 325,000 t of Sulphuric Acid Sulphuric Acid 325,000 $50 $16,250,000
67 George Fisher 1 $270,000,000 170,000 t Zn Zinc 170,000 $2,240 $380,800,000
100,000 t Pb  Lead 100,000 $2,106 $210,600,000
44 23 & 155 t Au Silver 155 $570,663 $88,452,765
$33,076,000,000 $12,268,000,000 15 $29,694,172,015 $5,749,599,200
72.94% 27.06% 83.78% 16.22%
Success $33,076,000,000 Annual Success $29,694,172,015
Failed $12,268,000,000 Annual Failed $5,749,599,200
Total Invested $45,344,000,000 Annual Total $35,443,771,215
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Case New Process Plants Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay Outcome
(New techniques to transform)
1 HBI Boondarie $3,370,000,000 $750,000,000 349.33% 30/06/1995 28/02/1999 44.0 24.0 83.33% Failed
2 Southern Copper $600,000,000 $220,000,000 172.73% 30/05/1996 30/05/2000 48.0 18.0 166.67%
3 Anaconda / Murrin‐Murrin $1,000,000,000 $900,000,000 11.11% 1/03/1997 1/05/1999 26.0 18.0 44.44% Sold
4 Bulong $250,000,000 $230,000,000 8.70% 1/04/1997 30/09/1998 18.0 12.0 50.00%
5 Cawse $378,000,000 $150,000,000 152.00% 1/08/1997 28/02/1999 19.0 12.0 58.33%
6 Stuart Oil Shale Project $480,000,000 $250,000,000 92.00% 1/08/1997 28/02/1999 18.0 12.0 50.00%
7 AMG‐CSIRO Stanwell $1,400,000,000 $720,000,000 94.44% 1/12/01 abare Dec 2004 Aim Never completed 36.0
8 HIsmelt $1,020,000,000 $300,000,000 240.00% 1/01/2003 1/04/2005 27.0 24.0 12.50%
9 BHP‐B Ravensthorpe $2,450,000,000 $720,000,000 240.28% 1/04/2005 26/05/2008 38.0 27.0 40.74%
10 Yabulu expansion $510,000,000 $200,000,000 155.00% 1/04/2005 26/05/2008 38.0 27.0 40.74%
11 Beenup $300,000,000 $100,000,000 200.00% 1/07/1993 1/12/1996 35.0 24.0 45.83%
40 ISASmelt $110,000,000 $100,000,000 10.00% 1/08/1992 1/03/1993 7.0 7.0 0.00%
Average for reference sub class $989,000,000.00 $386,666,666.67 143.80% 28.9 20.1 53.87%
Case Gases transformed Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay
(LNG, Fertilizer & Explosives, Acid plants)
12 Kalgoorlie Acid Plant $145,000,000 $145,000,000 0.00% 1/03/1995 1/03/1996 12.0 12.0 0.00% Enviro
13 Phosphate Hill $750,000,000 $750,000,000 0.00% 31/12/1996 1/12/1999 35.0 36.0 ‐2.78% Trouble
14 NW Shelf Train 4 $2,700,000,000 $2,300,000,000 17.39% 1/06/2001 30/09/2004 39.0 36.0 8.33% Success
15 Darwin LNG $1,750,000,000 $1,500,000,000 16.67% 1/06/2003 1/02/2006 32.0 32.0 0.00%
16 Burrup Fertilisers $800,000,000 $630,000,000 26.98% 1/04/2003 1/04/2006 36.0 30.0 20.00%
17 NW Shelf Train 5 $2,600,000,000 $2,400,000,000 8.33% 1/08/2005 30/08/2008 37.0 36.0 2.78%
18 Yarwun Ammonium Nitrate $145,000,000 $135,000,000 7.41% 1/10/2005 1/08/2006 10.0 12.0 ‐16.67%
19 Kwinana Ammonium Nitrate $400,000,000 $140,000,000 185.71% 31/10/2005 31/10/2008 36.0 24.0 50.00%
Average for reference sub class $1,161,250,000 $1,000,000,000 32.81% 29.6 27.3 7.71%
Case
Light metals Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay
Alumina and Aluminium
20 Tomago Expansion 1 $600,000,000 $600,000,000 0.00% 1/01/1993 31/12/1993 12.0 12.0 0.00%
21 Wagerup expansion 1 $150,000,000 $150,000,000 0.00% 1/01/1995 31/12/1995 12.0 12.0 0.00%
22 Boyne Smelters Expand $1,000,000,000 $800,000,000 25.00% 30/03/1995 1/03/1998 36.0 36.0 0.00%
23 Tomago Expansion 2 $200,000,000 $200,000,000 0.00% 30/06/1997 31/03/1999 21.0 18.0 16.67%
24 Wagerup expansion 2 $285,000,000 $260,000,000 9.62% 1/12/1997 1/12/1999 24.0 24.0 0.00%
25 Worsley Alumina $1,000,000,000 $750,000,000 33.33% 1/12/1997 1/05/2000 29.0 30.0 ‐3.33%
26 Tomago Efficiency improve $210,000,000 $210,000,000 0.00% 1/12/2002 1/12/2007 60.0 60.0 0.00%
27 QAL Efficiency improve $175,000,000 $175,000,000 0.00% 1/01/2003 31/12/2003 12.0 12.0 0.00%
28 Pinjarra Upgrade $550,000,000 $400,000,000 37.50% 1/08/2003 31/12/2006 28.0 16.0 75.00%
29 Yarwun Alumina Refinery $1,500,000,000 $1,500,000,000 0.00% 26/10/2001 1/10/2004 33.0 36.0 ‐8.33%
30 Alcan Gove G3 Expansion $2,700,000,000 $1,200,000,000 125.00% 1/10/2004 1/10/2007 36.0 36.0 0.00%
Average for reference sub class $760,909,090.91 $567,727,273 20.95% 27.5 26.5 7.27%
Case
Mineral Sands Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay
31 TiWest Kwinana TiO2 $110,000,000 $110,000,000 0.00% 30/09/1995 30/09/1997 24.0 24.0 0.00%
32 Iluka Synthetic Rutile SR2 Kiln $134,000,000 $134,000,000 0.00% 30/09/1995 30/09/1997 24.0 24.0 0.00%
33 Skardon River Kaolin $130,000,000 $70,000,000 85.71% 1/07/1997 1/12/1999 15.0 12.0 25.00%
34 Ginko & Broken Hill Seperation Plant $176,000,000 $163,000,000 7.98% 20/02/2005 20/02/2006 12.0 12.0 0.00%
35 Douglas $284,000,000 $270,000,000 5.19% 30/04/2005 30/05/2007 24.0 12.0 100.00%
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36 Murray Basin Stage 2 $240,000,000 $180,000,000 33.33% 30/04/2008 31/10/2009 18.0 18.0 0.00%
37 Eucla Basin $390,000,000 $400,000,000 ‐2.50% 31/10/2008 31/10/2010 24.0 24.0 0.00%
38 Kwinana TiO2 Pigment $120,000,000 $100,000,000 20.00% 30/04/2008 31/10/2010 30.0 30.0 0.00%
Average for reference sub class $198,000,000 $178,375,000 18.71% 21.4 19.5 15.63%
Case Nobler metals Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay
Copper Gold ‐ Sulphide Nickel & Vanadium
39 SuperPit (Kaltails) $100,000,000 $100,000,000 0.00% 1/06/1989 30/09/1999 123.0 97.0 26.80%
41 Kambalda Expansion $105,000,000 $105,000,000 0.00% 30/06/1993 31/12/1994 18.0 18.0 0.00%
42 Mt Keith Sulphide Nickel $450,000,000 $450,000,000 0.00% 1/12/1993 1/12/1994 12.0 12.0 0.00%
43 Osborne $160,000,000 $160,000,000 0.00% 1/01/1994 1/08/1995 20.0 20.0 0.00%
44 North Parkes $255,000,000 $255,000,000 0.00% 1/12/1994 15/12/1996 24.0 24.0 0.00%
45 Sunrise Dam $130,000,000 $130,000,000 0.00% 1/05/1996 19/04/1997 11.0 12.0 ‐8.33%
46 Mt Todd $330,000,000 $208,000,000 58.65% 1/06/1996 1/06/1997 12.0 12.0 0.00%
47 Cadia Hill $441,000,000 $442,000,000 ‐0.23% 1/10/1996 1/08/1998 22.0 23.0 ‐4.35%
48 Olympic Dam expansion $1,600,000,000 $1,400,000,000 14.29% 1/12/1996 1/12/1999 36.0 36.0 0.00%
49 Ernest Henry $350,000,000 $300,000,000 16.67% 1/04/1997 1/02/1998 22.0 20.0 10.00%
50 Mt Isa Anode Expansion $285,000,000 $285,000,000 0.00% 1/06/1997 31/12/1998 18.0 18.0 0.00%
51 Enterprise $370,000,000 $370,000,000 0.00% 1/04/1998 30/08/2000 28.0 28.0 0.00%
52 Windimurra Vanadium $200,000,000 $110,000,000 81.82% 1/12/1998 1/12/1999 12.0 12.0 0.00%
53 Ridgeway $376,000,000 $286,000,000 31.47% 1/05/2000 19/04/2002 23.0 23.0 0.00%
54 Granny Smith (expand) $150,000,000 $150,000,000 0.00% 30/06/2001 30/06/2002 12.0 12.0 0.00%
55 Telfer $1,200,000,000 $1,000,000,000 20.00% 1/03/2003 1/02/2005 23.0 24.0 ‐4.17%
56 Fosterville $117,000,000 $117,000,000 0.00% 14/11/2003 20/04/2005 17.0 16.0 6.25%
57 St Ives $125,000,000 $125,000,000 0.00% 21/11/2003 30/11/2004 12.0 12.0 0.00%
58 Lake Cowal $440,000,000 $270,000,000 62.96% 1/04/2004 1/04/2006 24.0 24.0 0.00%
59 Nifty sulfide copper $148,000,000 $70,000,000 111.43% 30/06/2004 30/06/2005 12.0 12.0 0.00%
60 Bendigo Gold Mine $250,000,000 $215,000,000 16.28% 30/05/2005 30/05/2006 12.0 12.0 0.00%
61 Boddington (Wandoo) $3,250,000,000 $735,000,000 342.18% 1/03/2006 23/07/2009 40.0 32.0 25.00%
62 Prominent Hill $1,150,000,000 $530,000,000 116.98% 30/04/2007 31/12/2008 24.0 20.0 20.00%
Average for reference sub class $520,956,521.74 $339,695,652 37.93% 24.2 22.6 3.10%
Case
Baser Metals Best estimate of final project cost Original ABARE projected cost Cost growth  Start Complete Actual project build time Projected (ABARE) build time Delay
Zinc, lead and silver
63 McArthur River $290,000,000 $290,000,000 0.00% 30/09/1993 30/09/1995 24.0 24.0 0.00%
64 Cannington $460,000,000 $450,000,000 2.22% 30/06/1995 30/10/1997 28.0 28.0 0.00%
65 Century $1,100,000,000 $750,000,000 46.67% 30/06/1996 21/12/1999 42.0 24.0 75.00%
66 Korea Zinc (Sun Metals) $530,000,000 $530,000,000 0.00% 30/07/1997 30/11/1999 28.0 28.0 0.00%
67 George Fisher $270,000,000 $270,000,000 0.00% 1/04/1998 30/08/2000 28.0 28.0 0.00%
Average for reference sub class $530,000,000.00 $458,000,000.00 9.78% 30.0 26.4 15.00%
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Factors
Greatest risk .1 Considerable risk .2
Item Visible before project start
1 Past record of firm New firm  Firm with short history
2 Process focus of firm New to specific transformation process Limited experience in key skills area
3 Scale‐up ratio New project at infinite scale (no previous operation) New project at 5 x scale or more of previous success
4 Financial confidence Financed by least informed at higher risk rates Finance or bonds at risk rates
5 Innovation type New technology with radical innovation Radical technology with long pilot testing
6 Government involvement Government wants non commercial political outcome Unfavourable conditions challenge commercial outcome
7 Value‐adding level Value adding to meet lease condition Elaborate transformation value add refinery
8 Information Asymmetry Highest level information asymmetry without responsibility High level information asymmetry with some responsibility
Calculated before project build
9 Commodity value Calculated average value of commodity 3 years prior opening  from ABARE or USGS
10 Pay‐back plan measure At full Name Plate Capacity with average commodity price  over three years prior to plant opening calculation
Actual project build factors
11 Time management Projected and reported times from ABARE and other data
12 Cost management Projected and reported costs from ABARE and other data
Shown after project operation
13 Production  performance Average actual production over first 3 years or part  there of if less than 3 years
14 Return (actual pay back) At actual production with average commodity price  over three years after plant opening
15 Life of Firm Firm de‐listed or "Phoenixed" Existing but at low production level
16 Life of Process No more similar process projects since  No more similar process projects by firm since 
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Median risk .3 Limited risk  .4 Least risk .5
New to country Mostly good outcomes over some years Firm with long record of superior outcomes Qualitative
Diversified firm with variety of applicable skills Stronger skills in more closely allied fields Close focus on incremental improvement with specific skill Qualitative
New project 2‐5 x previous plant success Duplication of success more than 100% scale up Duplication of successful plant less than 100% scale up Qualitative
Commercial finance  Internally financed by firm Financed by best informed at favourable rates Qualitative
Tested process with significant innovation Mature technology with some novel elements Mature technology with only incremental improvements Qualitative
Normal lease conditions Favourable infrastructure and breaks delivered Government invests for long term for economic outcome Qualitative
Mature and well understood process for refining  Modest value adding semi finish transformation Only that level of concentration needed to ship commodity Qualitative
Medium level information asymmetry with more responsibility Modest information asymmetry with responsibility Limited information asymmetry with accountability Qualitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Taken over and operational Firm with variable results Firm with good regular returns Qualitative
Other firms have duplicated successfully outside Australia Firm built / expanded one more plant Project pipeline of similar plants Qualitative
Alan Tomlinson (c) "Understanding success and failure in innovative Australian resource processing projects" Sheet 3
 244
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Sheet 4 
Appendix.xlsx Firm Competence 11th March 2014
Firm competence
Positional (least to most) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Case 7 33 6 3 4 52 5 60 2 1 9 11 46
Identification Stan Skardon Stuart Murrin Bulong Wind Cawse Bendigo South HBI Raven Beenup Mt Todd
Firm ANM AKL SPP ANL RSG WVL CTR BDG JAP BHP BHP BHP Pegasus
Pre‐project factors
1 Past record of firm 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
2 Process focus of firm 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
3 Scale‐up ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
4 Financial status 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2
Least to most competence 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Financial calculations
9 Commodity value 94.47% 87.50% 147.44% 88.75% 88.02% 36.07% 71.00% 208.62% 89.32% 71.43% 77.74% 144.04% 73.77%
10 Pay‐back plan measure 180.6 148.6 428.6 54.1 66.5 40.5 63.6 178.1 65.4 322.7 44.0 120.9 79.1
Project build measures
11 Time management Never 125% 150% 144% 150% 100% 158% 100% 267% 183% 141% 146% 100%
12 Cost management 2000% 186% 192% 111% 109% 182% 252% 116% 273% 347% 340% 300% 159%
Project performance measures
13 Production performance 0.00% 1.20% 31.25% 54.35% 11.11% 50.00% 36.63% 26.82% 50.00% 17.78% 10.00% 27.83% 88.46%
14 Return (actual pay back) Never 12381.00 930.16 114.30 798.75 224.47 254.29 318.22 146.43 2541.18 565.87 327.20 121.25
(Some figures nominal not estimates*) *
15 Life of firm 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1
16 Life of process 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Colour key
Project failed (12)
Project failed but restarted (3)
Firm financial trouble (15)
Environment or efficiency (4)
Builder still operating (31)
Closed after operation (2)
An anomalous result
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Average
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
10 8 56 13 16 12 65 19 50 63 51 49 62
Yabulu Hismelt Foster Phosp Burrup K Acid Century Kwin AN Anode McArth Enter Ehenry Promin
BHP RIO PSV WMC BPFL WMC ZFX WES MIM MIM MIM MIM OZL
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
77.74% 202.24% 103.88% 200.83% 55.04% 133.67% 97.14% 82.44% 138.64% 66.15% 107.89% 89.32% 67.53% 118.41%
9.2 228.4 135.34 70.7 66.1 63.0 198.9 49.8 93.2 36.5 36.0 41.2 29.8 40.9
141% 113% 144.14% 106% 97% 120% 100% 175% 150% 100% 100% 100% 110% 120%
255% 340% 225.86% 100% 100% 127% 100% 147% 286% 100% 100% 100% 117% 217%
10.00% 11.92% 28.49% 76.23% 63.14% 100.00% 98.94% 118.84% 100.00% 100.00% 63.92% 100.00% 105.19% 100.23%
117.79 947.24 1413.44 46.19 190.12 17.13 206.90 50.60 67.26 55.11 52.56 46.11 42.59 33.60
* * * *
0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
67 34 66 54 57 58 43 25 40 48 42 41 59 64 39 44
Gfish Ginko Sun Gsmith StIves Cowal Osborne Worsley ISASMELT OD Mt Keith Kambal Nifty Cannin SuperP Parkes
MIM BMX KOR ABX ABX ABX ABX BHP MIM WMC WMC WMC AB BHP ABX RIO
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
76.10% 123.98% 92.41% 147.10% 184.76% 208.62% 95.31% 114.02% 106.30% 78.15% 102.30% 93.21% 335.25% 85.20% 84.91% 77.25%
26.0 53.0 60.9 32.6 190.5 104.0 44.6 72.7 3.6 133.7 62.1 10.0 28.6 67.0 10.2 32.9
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 127% 100%
100% 108% 100% 100% 100% 163% 100% 133% 100% 114% 100% 100% 100% 102% 100% 100%
100.00% 100.00% 117.65% 79.93% 100.00% 88.53% 119.62% 100.00% 100.00% 90.52% 129.01% 91.80% 87.16% 122.86% 100.00% 100.00%
34.22 42.77 62.29 27.73 103.09 56.33 39.82 63.79 3.41 173.87 47.04 11.67 9.80 62.07 12.03 42.65
* * * * * * * * * *
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
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43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
22 30 45 31 32 35 36 37 28 29 61 20 23 26 53 27
Boyne G3 Sunrise TiO2 Rutile Douglas MB 2 Eucla Pinj Yarwun Bodd Tom 1 T E 2 T Effic Ridge QAL
RIO AL AGG Tiwest ILU ILU ILU ILU AWAC RIO NEM RIO RIO RIO NCM RIO
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
88.64% 97.37% 73.77% 99.31% 124.42% 108.02% 112.41% 93.90% 120.81% 105.56% 135.82% 79.80% 97.31% 103.64% 156.89% 100.00%
63.7 46.1 81.0 20.0 38.0 32.2 15.3 27.5 59.1 79.4 83.6 51.4 80.6 34.9 49.3 60.0
100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 200% 100% 100% 175% 100% 125% 100% 117% 100% 100% 100%
125% 192% 100% 100% 100% 105% 133% 98% 138% 100% 442% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100.00% 65.31% 205.96% 100.00% 100.00% 90.00% 90.18% 100.00% 100.00% 91.43% 120.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 110.89% 100.00%
71.91 72.51 53.34 20.17 30.54 55.38 15.28 28.42 48.89 82.24 50.00 64.45 82.87 33.69 23.90 60.00
* * * * * * * *
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Average Positional (least to most)
21 47 14 24 38 55 18 15 17 Case
Wag 1 Cadia T4 Wag 2 TiO2 (2) Telfer Yarwun Darwin T5 Identification
AWAC NCM WPL Alcoa Tiwest NCM ORI COP WPL Firm
Pre‐project factors
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.39 Past record
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.39 Firm focus
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.37 Scale‐up
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.34 Financial status
1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 1.48
Financial calculations
113.10% 71.94% 123.70% 125.10% 100.00% 224.60% 133.67% 172.64% 151.79% 116.85% Commodity
78.6 63.0 50.1 54.3 29.0 109.5 38.9 40.5 42.2 57.44 Pay‐back (plan)
Project build measures
100% 96% 108% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 103% 107.96% Time manage
100% 100% 117% 110% 120% 120% 100% 117% 100% 121.73% Cost manage
Project performance measures
100.00% 98.35% 91.67% 100.00% 100.00% 77.80% 100.00% 100.00% 94.55% 99.80% Production 
69.50 85.94 44.18 43.43 28.96 57.65 29.10 23.48 29.41 53.96 Return (actual pay back)
* *
0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.42
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.32 Outcome
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New Process Innovation Average
Positional (least to most) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Case 7 6 3 4 5 11 2 1 9 52 33 10 8
Identification Stan Stuart Murrin Bulong Cawse Beenup South HBI Raven Wind Skardon Yabulu Hismelt
Firm ANM SPP ANL RSG CTR BHP JAP BHP BHP WVL AKL BHP RIO
3 Scale up ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
5 Innovation type 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2
Simple risk number 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Financial calculations
9 Commodity value 94.47% 147.44% 88.75% 88.02% 71.00% 144.04% 89.32% 71.43% 77.74% 36.07% 87.50% 77.74% 202.24%
10 Pay‐back plan measure 180.6 428.6 54.1 66.5 63.6 120.9 65.4 322.7 44.0 40.5 148.6 9.2 228.4
Project build measures
11 Time management Never 150% 144% 150% 158% 146% 267% 183% 141% 100% 125% 141% 113% 151.50%
12 Cost management 2000% 192% 111% 109% 252% 300% 273% 480% 340% 182% 186% 255% 340% 251.67%
Project proformance measures
13 Production performance 0.00% 31.25% 54.35% 11.11% 36.63% 27.83% 50.00% 17.78% 10.00% 50.00% 1.20% 10.00% 11.92% 26.01%
14 Return (actual pay back) 1000.00 930.16 114.30 798.75 254.29 327.20 146.43 2541.18 565.87 224.47 12381.00 117.79 947.24 1,612.39
(Nominal rather than estimate*) *
15 Life of firm 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.00%
16 Life of process 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.24
Local R&D 1 1
First in country 1 1 1 1 1
Closed or demolished 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colour key
Project failed (12)
Project failed but restarted (3)
Firm financial trouble (15)
Environment or efficiency (4)
Builder still operating (31)
Closed after operation (2)
An anomalous result
New Process Innovation (12)
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
40 60 13 56 65 46 50 63 62 34 44 30 32 35 36 37
ISASMELT Bendigo Phosp Foster Century Mt Todd Anode McArth Promin Ginko Parkes G3 Rutile Douglas MB 2 Eucla
MIM BDG WMC PSV ZFX Pegasus MIM MIM OZL BMX RIO AL ILU ILU ILU ILU
0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.8 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
106.30% 208.62% 55.04% 200.83% 82.44% 73.77% 66.15% 107.89% 118.41% 123.98% 77.25% 97.37% 124.42% 108.02% 112.41% 93.90%
60.0 178.1 66.1 70.7 49.8 79.1 36.5 36.0 40.9 53.0 32.9 46.1 38.0 32.2 15.3 27.5
100% 100% 97% 106% 175% 100% 100% 100% 120% 100% 100% 100% 100% 200% 100% 100%
110% 116% 100% 100% 147% 159% 100% 100% 217% 108% 100% 192% 100% 105% 133% 98%
100.00% 26.82% 63.14% 76.23% 118.84% 88.46% 100.00% 63.92% 100.23% 100.00% 100.00% 65.31% 100.00% 90.00% 90.18% 100.00%
60.00 318.22 190.12 46.19 50.60 121.25 55.11 52.56 33.60 42.77 42.65 72.51 30.54 55.38 15.28 28.42
*
0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1
1
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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
53 31 64 12 38 14 17 16 19 54 57 58 66 43 51 49 67
Ridge TiO2 Cannin K Acid TiO2 (2) T4 T5 Burrup Kwin AN Gsmith StIves Cowal Sun Osborne Enter Ehenry Gfish
NCM Tiwest BHP WMC Tiwest WPL WPL BPFL WES ABX ABX ABX KOR ABX MIM MIM MIM
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1.6 1.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
156.89% 99.31% 85.20% 97.14% 100.00% 123.70% 151.79% 133.67% 138.64% 147.10% 184.76% 208.62% 92.41% 95.31% 89.32% 67.53% 76.10%
49.3 20.0 67.0 198.9 29.0 50.1 42.2 63.0 93.2 32.6 190.5 104.0 60.9 44.6 41.2 29.8 26.0
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 108% 103% 120% 150% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 110% 100%
100% 100% 102% 100% 120% 117% 100% 127% 286% 100% 100% 163% 100% 100% 100% 117% 100%
110.89% 100.00% 122.86% 98.94% 100.00% 91.67% 94.55% 100.00% 100.00% 79.93% 100.00% 88.53% 117.65% 119.62% 100.00% 105.19% 100.00%
23.90 20.17 62.07 206.90 28.96 44.18 29.41 17.13 67.26 27.73 103.09 56.33 62.29 39.82 46.11 42.59 34.22
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
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47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
28 29 61 47 15 21 25 48 42 59 39 41 22 45 23 24 26
Pinj Yarwun Bodd Cadia Darwin Wag 1 Worsley OD Mt Keith Nifty SuperP Kambal Boyne Sunrise T E 2 Wag 2 T Effic
AWAC RIO NEM NCM COP AWAC BHP WMC WMC AB ABX WMC RIO AGG RIO Alcoa RIO
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
120.81% 105.56% 135.82% 71.94% 172.64% 113.10% 114.02% 78.15% 102.30% 335.25% 84.91% 93.21% 88.64% 73.77% 97.31% 125.10% 103.64%
59.1 79.4 83.6 63.0 40.5 78.6 72.7 133.7 62.1 28.6 10.2 10.0 63.7 81.0 80.6 54.3 34.9
175% 100% 125% 96% 100% 100% 97% 100% 100% 100% 127% 100% 100% 92% 117% 100% 100%
138% 100% 442% 100% 117% 100% 133% 114% 100% 100% 100% 100% 125% 100% 100% 110% 100%
100.00% 91.43% 120.00% 98.35% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 90.52% 129.01% 87.16% 100.00% 91.80% 100.00% 205.96% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
48.89 82.24 50.00 85.94 23.48 69.50 63.79 173.87 47.04 9.80 12.03 11.67 71.91 53.34 82.87 43.43 33.69
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
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64 65 66 67
27 55 18 20
QAL Telfer Yarwun Tom 1
RIO NCM ORI RIO
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
100.00% 224.60% 133.67% 79.80% 117.75%
60.0 109.5 38.9 51.4 61.12
100% 96% 100% 100% 107.67%
100% 120% 100% 100% 122.50%
100.00% 77.80% 100.00% 100.00% 98.24%
60.00 57.65 29.10 64.45 61.15
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
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Government Involvement in value adding
Positional (least to most) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Case 7 8 1 2 48 9 6 3 4 33
Identification Stan Hismelt HBI South OD Raven Stuart Murrin Bulong Skardon
Firm ANM RIO BHP JAP WMC BHP SPP ANL RSG AKL
Pre‐project factors
6 Government involvement 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
7 Value‐adding level 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Most to least Government 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
involvement in value adding
Financial calculations
9 Commodity value 94.47% 202.24% 71.43% 89.32% 78.15% 77.74% 147.44% 88.75% 88.02% 87.50%
10 Pay‐back plan measure 180.6 228.4 322.7 65.4 133.7 44.0 428.6 54.1 66.5 148.6
Project build measures
11 Time management Never 113% 183% 267% 100% 141% 150% 144% 150% 125%
12 Cost management 2000% 340% 480% 273% 114% 340% 192% 111% 109% 186%
Project performance measures
13 Production performance 0.00% 11.92% 17.78% 50.00% 90.52% 10.00% 31.25% 54.35% 11.11% 1.20%
14 Return (actual pay back) 947.24 2541.18 146.43 173.87 565.87 930.16 114.30 798.75 12381.00
15 Life of firm 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
16 Life of process 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Colour key
Project failed (12)
Project failed but restarted (3)
Firm financial trouble (15)
Environment or efficiency (4)
Builder still operating (31)
Closed after operation (2)
An anomalous result
Alumina  & Aluminium (11)
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
52 5 46 13 19 50 66 40 31 38 32 18 60 56 11 10
Wind Cawse Mt Todd Phosp Kwin AN Anode Sun ISAMelt TiO2 TiO2 (2) Rutile Yarwun Bendigo Foster Beenup Yabulu
WVL CTR Pegasus WMC WES MIM KOR MIM Tiwest Tiwest ILU ORI BDG PSV BHP BHP
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
36.07% 71.00% 73.77% 55.04% 138.64% 66.15% 92.41% 106.30% 99.31% 100.00% 124.42% 133.67% 208.62% 200.83% 144.04% 77.74%
40.5 63.6 79.1 66.1 93.2 36.5 60.9 3.6 20.0 29.0 38.0 38.9 178.1 70.7 120.9 9.2
100% 158% 100% 97% 150% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 106% 146% 141%
182% 252% 159% 100% 286% 100% 100% 100% 100% 120% 100% 100% 116% 100% 300% 255%
50.00% 36.63% 88.46% 63.14% 100.00% 100.00% 117.65% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 26.82% 76.23% 27.83% 10.00%
224.47 254.29 121.25 190.12 67.26 55.11 62.29 3.41 20.17 28.96 30.54 29.10 318.22 46.19 327.20 117.79
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 43 44
12 54 57 58 39 45 30 35 36 37 61 55 34 43 20 27
K Acid Gsmith StIves Cowal SuperP Sunrise G3 Douglas MB 2 Eucla Bodd Telfer Ginko Osborne Tom 1 QAL
WMC ABX ABX ABX ABX AGG AL ILU ILU ILU NEM NCM BMX ABX RIO RIO
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
97.14% 147.10% 184.76% 208.62% 84.91% 73.77% 97.37% 108.02% 112.41% 93.90% 135.82% 224.60% 123.98% 95.31% 79.80%
198.9 32.6 190.5 104.0 10.2 81.0 46.1 32.2 15.3 27.5 83.6 109.5 53.0 44.6 51.4
100% 100% 100% 100% 127% 92% 100% 200% 100% 100% 125% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100% 163% 100% 100% 192% 105% 133% 98% 442% 120% 108% 100% 100% 100%
98.94% 79.93% 100.00% 88.53% 100.00% 205.96% 65.31% 90.00% 90.18% 100.00% 120.00% 77.80% 100.00% 119.62% 100.00%
206.90 27.73 103.09 56.33 12.03 53.34 72.51 55.38 15.28 28.42 50.00 57.65 42.77 39.82 64.45
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
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45 46 49 50 41 42 47 48 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
28 29 24 25 23 26 22 21 64 65 16 63 51 49 62 67
Pinj Yarwun Wag 2 Worsley T E 2 T Effic Boyne Wag 1 Cannin Century Burrup McArth Enter Ehenry Promin Gfish
AWAC RIO Alcoa BHP RIO RIO RIO AWAC BHP ZFX BPFL MIM MIM MIM OZL MIM
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
120.81% 105.56% 125.10% 114.02% 97.31% 103.64% 88.64% 113.10% 85.20% 82.44% 133.67% 107.89% 89.32% 67.53% 118.41% 76.10%
59.1 79.4 54.3 72.7 80.6 34.9 63.7 78.6 67.0 49.8 63.0 36.0 41.2 29.8 40.9 26.0
175% 100% 100% 97% 117% 100% 100% 100% 100% 175% 120% 100% 100% 110% 120% 100%
138% 100% 110% 133% 100% 100% 125% 100% 102% 147% 127% 100% 100% 117% 217% 100%
100.00% 91.43% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 122.86% 118.84% 100.00% 63.92% 100.00% 105.19% 100.23% 100.00%
48.89 82.24 43.43 63.79 82.87 33.69 71.91 69.50 62.07 50.60 17.13 52.56 46.11 42.59 33.60 34.22
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
44 42 59 41 53 14 17 47 15
Parkes Mt Keith Nifty Kambal Ridge T4 T5 Cadia Darwin
RIO WMC AB WMC NCM WPL WPL NCM COP
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90
77.25% 102.30% 335.25% 93.21% 156.89% 123.70% 151.79% 71.94% 172.64%
32.9 62.1 28.6 10.0 49.3 50.1 42.2 63.0 40.5
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 108% 103% 96% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 117% 100% 100% 117%
100.00% 129.01% 87.16% 91.80% 110.89% 91.67% 94.55% 98.35% 100.00%
42.65 47.04 9.80 11.67 23.90 44.18 29.41 85.94 23.48
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
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Information Asymmetry
Positional (least to most) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Case 7 33 60 1 8 4 5 3 9 6 52 46
Identification Stan Skardon Bendigo HBI Hismelt Bulong Cawse Murrin Raven Stuart Wind Mt Todd
Firm ANM AKL BDG BHP RIO RSG CTR ANL BHP SPP WVL Pegasus
8 Asymmetric Information 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Financial calculations
9 Commodity value 94.47% 87.50% 208.62% 71.43% 202.24% 88.02% 71.00% 88.75% 77.74% 147.44% 36.07% 73.77%
10 Pay‐back plan measure 180.6 148.6 178.1 322.7 228.4 66.5 63.6 54.1 44.0 428.6 40.5 79.1
Project build measures
11 Time management Never 125% 100% 183% 113% 150% 158% 144% 141% 150% 100% 100%
12 Cost management 2000% 186% 116% 480% 340% 109% 252% 111% 340% 192% 182% 159%
Project performance measures
13 Production performance 0.00% 1.20% 26.82% 17.78% 11.92% 11.11% 36.63% 54.35% 10.00% 31.25% 50.00% 88.46%
14 Return (actual pay back) 12381.00 318.22 2541.18 947.24 798.75 254.29 114.30 565.87 930.16 224.47 121.25
15 Life of Firm
16 Life of Process
15 Life of firm 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
16 Life of process 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
Project failed (12)
Project failed but restarted (3)
Firm financial trouble (15)
Environment or efficiency (4)
Builder still operating (31)
Closed after operation (2)
An anomalous result
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
2 11 10 16 56 13 65 66 62 34 64 12 19 54
South Beenup Yabulu Burrup Foster Phosp Century Sun Promin Ginko Cannin K Acid Kwin AN Gsmith
JAP BHP BHP BPFL PSV WMC ZFX KOR OZL BMX BHP WMC WES ABX
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
89.32% 144.04% 77.74% 133.67% 200.83% 55.04% 82.44% 92.41% 118.41% 123.98% 85.20% 97.14% 138.64% 147.10%
65.4 120.9 9.2 63.0 70.7 66.1 49.8 60.9 40.9 53.0 67.0 198.9 93.2 32.6
267% 146% 141% 120% 106% 97% 175% 100% 120% 100% 100% 100% 150% 100%
273% 300% 255% 127% 100% 100% 147% 100% 217% 108% 102% 100% 286% 100%
50.00% 27.83% 10.00% 100.00% 76.23% 63.14% 118.84% 117.65% 100.23% 100.00% 122.86% 98.94% 100.00% 79.93%
146.43 327.20 117.79 17.13 46.19 190.12 50.60 62.29 33.60 42.77 62.07 206.90 67.26 27.73
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
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27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
57 58 63 43 51 49 67 48 44 59 30 31 32 35 36
StIves Cowal McArth Osborne Enter Ehenry Gfish OD Parkes Nifty G3 TiO2 Rutile Douglas MB 2
ABX ABX MIM ABX MIM MIM MIM WMC RIO AB AL Tiwest ILU ILU ILU
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
184.76% 208.62% 107.89% 95.31% 89.32% 67.53% 76.10% 78.15% 77.25% 335.25% 97.37% 99.31% 124.42% 108.02% 112.41%
190.5 104.0 36.0 44.6 41.2 29.8 26.0 133.7 32.9 28.6 46.1 20.0 38.0 32.2 15.3
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 110% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 200% 100%
100% 163% 100% 100% 100% 117% 100% 114% 100% 100% 192% 100% 100% 105% 133%
100.00% 88.53% 63.92% 119.62% 100.00% 105.19% 100.00% 90.52% 100.00% 87.16% 65.31% 100.00% 100.00% 90.00% 90.18%
103.09 56.33 52.56 39.82 46.11 42.59 34.22 173.87 42.65 9.80 72.51 20.17 30.54 55.38 15.28
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
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42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
37 38 28 61 14 18 39 41 22 45 25 40 29 42 50
Eucla TiO2 (2) Pinj Bodd T4 Yarwun SuperP Kambal Boyne Sunrise Worsley ISAMelt Yarwun Mt Keith Anode
ILU Tiwest AWAC NEM WPL ORI ABX WMC RIO AGG BHP MIM RIO WMC MIM
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
93.90% 100.00% 120.81% 135.82% 123.70% 133.67% 84.91% 93.21% 88.64% 73.77% 114.02% 106.30% 105.56% 102.30% 66.15%
27.5 29.0 59.1 83.6 50.1 38.9 10.2 10.0 63.7 81.0 72.7 3.6 79.4 62.1 36.5
100% 100% 175% 125% 108% 100% 127% 100% 100% 92% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100%
98% 120% 138% 442% 117% 100% 100% 100% 125% 100% 133% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 120.00% 91.67% 100.00% 100.00% 91.80% 100.00% 205.96% 100.00% 100.00% 91.43% 129.01% 100.00%
28.42 28.96 48.89 50.00 44.18 29.10 12.03 11.67 71.91 53.34 63.79 3.41 82.24 47.04 55.11
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2
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57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Average Positional (least to most)
23 24 26 53 27 17 47 15 55 20 21 Case
T E 2 Wag 2 T Effic Ridge QAL T5 Cadia Darwin Telfer Tom 1 Wag 1 Identification
RIO Alcoa RIO NCM RIO WPL NCM COP NCM RIO AWAC Firm
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.38 Misrepresentation
Financial calculations
97.31% 125.10% 103.64% 156.89% 151.79% 71.94% 172.64% 224.60% 79.80% 113.10% 112.45% Commodity value
80.6 54.3 34.9 49.3 42.2 63.0 40.5 109.5 51.4 78.6 73.99 Pay‐back plan measure
Project build measures
117% 100% 100% 100% 100% 103% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 113.91% Time management
100% 110% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 117% 120% 100% 100% 173.51% Cost management
Project performance measures
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 110.89% 94.55% 98.35% 100.00% 77.80% 100.00% 100.00% 82.34% Production performance
82.87 43.43 33.69 23.90 29.41 85.94 23.48 57.65 64.45 69.50 336.33 Return (actual pay back)
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.38 Project outcomes
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.28
Alan Tomlinson (c) "Understanding success and failure in innovative Australian resource processing projects" Sheet 7
 Appe
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ndix Sheet 8 
268
Appendix.xlsx Five models with five parameters 11th March 2014
Parameter Failure outcome model Success estimation model
Profit The project and the firm made a loss The project and the firm made a profit
Production Production less than 70% nameplate capacity in 36 months Production better than 90% of planned output
Return CRoI more than double industry average < 106 months Calculated Return on Investment > 105 months 
Firm life Firm has ceased, been taken over, been deregistered Firm is alive, grows and evolves
Process life Process is no longer worked, or only worked sub optimally Transforming process is worked and duplicated
Firm Competence failure  model Firm Competence success  model
Track record Limited or no relevant track record of success Track record of successful implementation
Firm focus Limited or no prior firm focus in area endeavour Firm focus in particular area of endeavour
Scale up ratio Large scale up from previous similar project success Modest scale up from previous similar project success
Financial confidence Firm financed at high interest from least informed Firm engenders financial confidence from best informed
Profit The firm and the project made a loss The firm and its projects regularly made a profit
New process innovation failure model New process innovation success model
Ownership Management with limited responsibility or ownership Individual Ownership and responsibility
Simplicity Initially complex process that became more complex Initial process simplicity that evolved
Evolution steps Rapid scale up to mega scale without evolution Multistage incremental scale up with evolution
Demand Many firms chasing same perceived opportunity Niche demand for innovation
Profit The process made a losses from start to finish The process made profits quickly and repeatedly
Government Involvement failure model Government Involvement success model
Understood process New process, not well understood Mature and well understood processes evolved 
Mature firm New firms with less established value chains Mature firms with complete value chain 
Shared benefits One sided benefits sought upfront Mutual benefit from decades on agreed collaboration
Reward for misinform High level of reward for information asymmetry Low level of reward for information asymmetry
Profit The project made a loss despite government investment The project made a profit after government involvement
Asymmetric Information failure model Asymmetric Information success model
Asymmetry balance High of information asymmetry and power imbalance Low of information asymmetry and power balance
Need for misinform Driving force exists for strategic misrepresentation Limited motivation for strategic misrepresentation
Power management Asymmetrical information used to manage ignorant power Open and commercial access to resources 
Infomation "noise" Loud strategic misinformation to promote investment Little information noise on good projects
Profit The project made a loss that was unexpected The project made a profit that was expected
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Appendix.xlsx Innovation success and failure contrasts 33 points 11th March 2014
Process innovation success characteristics Process innovation failure characteristics
Ownership and responsibility
1 Direct Indirect
2 Individual inventor and or small team, investors and owners Multiple organisations acting in more diverse collaborative service mode
3 Hope to get reward at successful completion Funding is up front or contractually assured (business fund raising and budget)
4 Risk is personal and often linked to personal assets Risk is carried by investors and unrelated to managers own assets
5 Strong responsibility for out come Limited personal responsibility for outcome, often carefully limited
6 Personal, reputation and financial loss from failure Paid by hour, regardless of outcome
7 Rewards flow only from success Managing failure slowly can have adequate rewards
8 Failure is pain and shame Failure can be later re‐defined or spun (especially with Government)
9 Process makes early productivity increases that lead to profits Process fails to makes early productivity increases that leads to massive loss
Complexity and performance
10 Initially simple, and incrementally more complex Initially complex, and incrementally even more complex
11 Works at the micro scale, and shows utility at every scale up stage Needs mega‐scale project to "make numbers add up"
12 Simple system low cost at small scale, incremental improvements economical Complex system expensive to implement at small scale
13 Relatively easy and quick to implement with low cost resources High costs in working systems encourage fast scale up
14 Early trial and measurement of outcome is practical Early trial is more focused around "proving" demonstration or producing samples
15 Rapid modification at small scale is practical and economical Change is difficult as system is complex and change unwelcome in rapid scale up
16 Complexity evolves with process incremental improvements over a longer time Complexity evolves beyond the capacity to manage it successfully
17 Firm wants to use its new process to increase its own productivity Firm uses new process to promote investment flow
Step up stages and benefits
18 Multi stage scale up steps and improvements  Quickly to mega scale … we know all the answers or have to pretend so
19 Many moderate iterative scale up steps in process development Must be big like dinosaur to be safe from competition
20 Incremental improvements in process, and knowledge base, with low cost and risk Mega scale needed to get numbers to add up
21 Advantage in being able to fail fast, change cheap, learn quickly at smaller scale Hubris in thinking "we know it all"… long delay in acknowledging failure
22 Complexity evolves with process incremental improvement steps over time Complexity catches unwary and unprepared
23 New process delivers more product for lower cost New process delivers little product for greater costs
24 Often build on brown fields site Often built on greenfields site
25 Scale up of a successful process is often done quietly by firm Loud promotion indicates risk, the term "fast track" indicates extreme risk
Niche demand and uptake
26 Small focus a "micro climate" not  visible to larger predators Widely visible demand, perhaps enthusiastically overestimated or overstated
27 Strong unmet demand for product and process visible to practitioners Alternative supply exists, but biased perceptions leading to phantom opportunity
28 Existing processes inadequate for transforming resource Existing processes transform the resource at lower cost than new
29 New type of cheap and abundant resource requires new process Cheap and abundant resource remain largely untransformed
30 Unique transformation advantage relatively easy to establish Unique transformation advantage more difficult to establish
31 Few players in early stages Many players in a rush, for what they see as easy
32 Firms that have unique need and expertise to do it Firms that see an abstract need and lack the skills to implement fully
33 Firms with similar unique needs adopt process world wide quickly … Firms in similar business do not adopt new process …
because the new process transforms the market and makes others obsolete because it fails to perform well enough to be worthwhile
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